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INTRODUCTION

[Y]ou might say every one of us is a fiddler on the roof trying to scratch
out a pleasant,simple tune without breaking his neck.
-Fiddleron the Roof I

For today's CEOs and corporate boards of directors, trying to capture the
benefits of new technology while tackling emerging cybersecurity
challenges is a delicate balance akin to fiddling on the roof. This Article
outlines recent developments in ".com" cybersecurity and their
implications for corporate cybersecurity. Section I summarizes how
information technologies have revolutionized the functioning of global
economies, societies, and governments. Section II discusses the U.S. selfregulatory approach to ".com" cybersecurity and the long-standing
challenge of securing critical infrastructure ("CI") networks. Sections
III-V discuss technology trends, the cyberthreat landscape, and legislative
developments affecting cybersecurity, respectively. Specifically, Section
III outlines three technological trends that pose cybersecurity challenges:
explosive growth in mobile technology; migration to cloud computing; and
increasing pervasiveness of social networks. Section IV examines the
increasingly complex global cyberthreat landscape, including the problems
of cybercrime, cyberespionage, and cyberwarfare. Section V discusses
recent congressional and executive action on cybersecurity, including the
ongoing congressional debate over cybersecurity legislation. Finally,
Sections VI and VII describe private sector cybersecurity challenges and
opportunities, including the potential for the private sector to shift the longstanding ".com" cybersecurity debate in Washington toward a more holistic
strategy that encompasses not only vulnerability mitigation, but also
deterrence.
I.

THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF CYBERSPACE

It has been said that "[c]yberspace touches practically everything and
everyone." 2 With over two billion people relying on the Internet3 for a

1. FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (United Artists 1971).
2. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE i (2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace Policy Reviewfinal.pdf
[hereinafter WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW].
3. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN

CYBERSPACE 1 (2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/d20l107l4cyber.pdf ("From
2000 to 2010, global Internet usage increased from 360 million to over 2 billion
people.").
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wide variety of economic, 4 social, 5 and political interactions,6 cyberspacethe "globally-interconnected digital information and communications
infrastructure"'-is nothing short of essential to modem life.
Information technologies ("IT") have revolutionized the functioning of
economies, societies, and governments around the globe. First, by any
measure, IT has transformed the way we conduct business. IT has
fundamentally changed the relationship between businesses and consumers,
allowing not only for improved market differentiation and personalization
of services, but also for the transformation of marketing through social
media. 8
Internally, IT has driven business efficiency through the
automation and/or reorganization of business processes, such as invoicing,
recordkeeping, and supply chain management;9 big data analytics;10 and the
4. Global e-commerce sales are expected to reach $963 billion by 2013, according

to Goldman Sachs projections. Don Davis, Global e-Commerce Sales Headfor the $1
Trillion
Mark,
INTERNET
RETAILER
(Jan.
4, 2011,
3:02
PM),
http://www.intemetretailer.com/2011/01/04/global-e-commerce-sales-head-1 -trillionmark. Cf SUCHARITA MULPURU ET AL., FORRESTER, THE ECOMMERCE JUGGERNAUT
DOMINATES RETAIL 1 (2012) (noting that global e-commerce will represent a "trilliondollar opportunity" by 2016). By 2016, Forrester predicts that "more than half of the
dollars spent in U.S. retail will be influenced by the Web." SUCHARITA MULPURU ET
AL., FORRESTER, US CROSS-CHANNEL RETAIL FORECAST, 2011 To 2016 (2012).
5. See, e.g., The Local Network: Experian Analysis Highlights Which Countries

Spend Longest on Facebook, EXPERIAN (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.experianplc.com
/news/company-news/2011/27-09-201 .aspx ("Social networking is now one of the
biggest online pastimes across the globe.").
6. Claire Cain Miller, How Obama's Campaign Changed Politics, N. Y. TIMES
BITS BLOG (Nov. 7, 2008, 7:49 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/howobamas-intemet-campaign-changed-politics ("Mr. Obama used the Internet to organize
his supporters in a way that would have in the past required an army of volunteers and
paid organizers on the grounds . . . . Were it not for the Internet, Barack Obama would
not be president."); see Megan Garber, The Campaign Tumblr Is Dead! (Long Live the
Campaign
Tumblr!),
THE
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
28,
2012,
5:33 PM),

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/ 1/the-campaign-tumblr-is-deadlong-live-the-campaign-tumblr/265688/ (discussing the first presidential campaign
Tumbir).
7. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 2, at iii.

8. Jessica Bosari, The Developing Role of Social Media in the Modern Business

World, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2012, 12:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/moneywisewomen/2012/08/08/the-developing-role-of-social-media-in-the-modernbusiness-world/ (asserting that social media marketing has become a "must" and citing
a recent survey finding that "94% of all businesses with a marketing department used
social media as part of their marketing platform").
9. Victoria Taylor, Supply Chain Management: The Next Big Thing, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Sept.
12,
2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/businessschools/supply-chain-management-the-next-big-thing-09122011 .html.
10. David Feinleib, The 3 I's of Big Data, FORBES (July 9, 2012, 4:05 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davefeinleib/2012/07/09/the-3-is-of-big-datal ("Big Data
is . . . a transformative set of technological advances that have made analyzing data
vastly more efficient."); Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y.
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adoption of electronic payment solutions." Moreover, the deployment of
telecommunications
technologies
(e.g.,
videoconferencing)
and
collaborative software has reduced unnecessary business travel and
improved collaboration across borders and time zones.
Second, IT has transformed societies. We work, shop,12 and socialize 3
online. We embrace information technology's promise of improved
healthcare (e.g., through personalized medicine, 4 telemedicine, healthrelated mobile applications,16 and big data analytics17 ), greater
(Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shoppinghabits.html?pagewanted=all (describing major retailers' use of big data analytics to
TIMES

more efficiently market to consumers).
11. See Greg McAllister, Mobile Payments: The Case for Choosing an Open

Platform, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2012, 8:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/ciocentral/2012/11/24/mobile-payments-the-case-for-choosing-an-open-platform/
(referencing efficiencies through mobile payments); MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE,
BENEFITS OF OPEN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROLE OF INTERCHANGE 8 (2008),
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/docs
/BENEFITS%200F%20ELECTRONIC%20PAYMENTS%20%20US%20EDITION.pdf ("[Merchants using electronic payments] benefit by
reducing costs associated with handling other forms of payment, including bounced
checks, check verification and guarantee services, and check processing [as well as]
collecting, counting, and transporting [cash].").
12. See Alistairr Barr, Cyber Monday sales best ever, for Amazon's Kindle too,

CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-rt-us-amazonkindlebre8aq0qt-20121127,0,4261081.story ("Internet sales jumped 30.3% on Cyber
Monday [November 26, 2012] making it the biggest online shopping day ever ...").
13. JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEw RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE
OF ONLINE SOCIALIZING 1 (2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1652/social-relationsonline-experts-predict-future ("[E]mail, social networks, and other online tools offer
'low friction' opportunities to create, enhance, and rediscover social ties that make a
difference in people's lives. The internet lowers traditional communications constraints
of cost, geography, and time; and it supports the type of open information sharing that
brings people together.").
14. See generally DARRELL M. WEST, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS,
ENABLING PERSONALIZED MEDICINE THROUGH HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
ADVANCING THE INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION 1 (2011), http://ww--,brookings.edu/-

/media/research/files/papers/2011/l/28%20personalized%20medicine%20west/O I28p
ersonalized medicinewest.pdf (discussing the challenges and concerns of
implementing personalized healthcare through technology and offering possible
solutions).
15. See Pam Belluck, With Telemedicine as Bridge, No HospitalIs an Island,N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/health/nantucket-hospitaluses-telemedicine-as-bridge-to-mainland.html?pagewanted=all&r-0.
16. See Joshua Brustein, Coming Next: Using an App as Prescribed,N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/technology/coming-nextdoctors-prescribing-apps-to-patients.html.
17. Derrick Harris, Better Medicine, Brought to You By Big Data, GIGAOM (July
15, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/cloud/better-medicine-brought-to-you-by-bigdata/ (discussing the potential impact of big data analytics on genomics and current
health-related applications for big data analytics including an effort to treat pediatric

230

AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA wREVIEW

Vol. 2:2

democratization,' 8 and improved quality of life for ourselves as individuals
and as societies.19
Third, at the nation-state level, governments increasingly rely on IT
solutions to provide cheaper, more efficient delivery of government
services through e-government initiatives; 20 to manage their own supply
chains; 2 1 to facilitate online voting; 22 and to carry out essential government
functions, such as national defense.2 3
cancer based on the individual genetic profile of each affected child).
18. See RICHARD HUNDLEY ET AL., THE GLOBAL COURSE OF THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION: RECURRING THEMES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, RAND CORP. xxvii
(2003),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographreports/MR1680
/MR1680.sum.pdf ("New political actors are being empowered by the information
revolution-in the business, social, and political realms, at the subnational,
transnational, and supranational levels-which is changing the distribution of political
power.").
19. Press Release, United Nations, Information technology must be used to
improve life in poor countries - Annan (Sept. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=8227&Cr-information&Crl=technol
ogy (describing a video message from then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
imploring UN Information and Communications Technology Task Force members to
"spread the word" at the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society "about
initiatives that make creative use of technology to improve the quality of life in
developing countries").
20. See OFFICE OF E-Gov'T & INFO. TECH., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DIGITAL
GOVERNMENT: BUILDING A 2Ist CENTURY PLATFORM TO BETTER SERVE THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 27 (2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/egov/digitalgovemment/digital-govemment-strategy.pdf (describing the Obama Administration's
strategy for "harnessing the power of technology to help create a 21st century digital
government-one that is efficient, effective and focused on improving the delivery of
services to the American people").
21. See HUNDLEY ET AL., supra note 18, at xxvii.
22. Although not generally accepted in the United States, other countries, such as
the United kingdom, Estonia, Switzerland, and Canada, have all begun to use Internet
voting. Joanna Stern, Why You Cannot Vote Online Today, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/election-day-vote-online-intemettoday/story?id=1 7647954#.ULTveo4QgqY.
23. CHARLES BILLO & WELTON CHANG, INST. FOR SEC. TECH. STUDIES AT
DARMOUTH COLL., CYBER WARFARE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS AND MOTIVATIONS
3
(2004), http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu
OF
SELECTED
NATION
STATES
/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf ("Information processing is becoming a 'center of gravity' in
future warfare."); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACE POLICY
REPORT 1 (2011), http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411 cyberstrategy

/docs/NDAA%20Section%20934%20Report For/o20webpage.pdf ("Cyberspace is a
critical enabler to Department of Defense (DoD) military, intelligence, business and,
potentially, civil support operations."); BRYAN KREKEL ET AL., NORTHROP GRUMMAN
CORP., OCCUPYING THE INFORMATION HIGH GROUND:
COMPUTER
NETWORK
OPERATIONS
AND
CYBER

CHINESE CAPABILITIES FOR
ESPIONAGE
10
(2012),

http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC%2OReport Chinese CapabilitiesforComputer

(describing the United States military's
NetworkOperationsandCyberEspionage.pdf
reliance on IT for vital "C4ISR" (i.e., command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions)); see COL. JASON SPADE, U.S.
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Finally, at the international level, the growing global reliance on
cyberspace has implications for established governance models, 2 4
alliances, 2 5 international stability, 26 and warfare. 2 7
As we work to realize the extraordinary promise of cyberspace, we face
As POWER: CHINA'S CYBER POWER AND AMERICA'S
Caton ed., 2012), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime
/documents/China's%20Cyber/o2OPower/o2Oand%2OAmerica's%2ONational%2OSecur
ity%20Web%20Version.pdf ("The U.S. military is particularly cyber dependent,
relying on a global network of 15,000 local area networks and 7 million computers
connected by over 100,000 telecommunication circuits, spread across bases
worldwide.").
24. See HUNDLEY ET AL., supra note 18, at xxvi ("Some traditional mechanisms of
governance (e.g., taxation, regulation and licensing) are becoming increasingly
problematic as the information revolution allows action beyond the reach of national
ARMY WAR COLL., INFORMATION
NATIONAL SECURITY 25 (Jeffrey

governments."); Violet Blue, U.S. Now 'Totally Unified' in Opposition to U.N. Internet

Governance, ZDNET (Dec. 6. 2012, 12:52 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/u-s-nowtotally-unified-in-opposition-of-u-n-internet-govemance-7000008382/ (reporting that,
as the U.N.'s International Telecommunications Union considered proposals from
various countries dealing with Internet regulation during the WCIT-12 summit in
Dubai, the House of Representatives unanimously passed (397-0) a resolution intended
to send a signal that the White House and Congress opposed any role the U.N. might
take in Internet governance or regulation).
25. See NATO, DEFENDING THE NETWORKS: NATO POLICY ON CYBER DEFENCE
(2011),
http://www.nato.int/nato static/assets/pdf/pdf 2011 09/20111004_110914policy-cyberdefence.pdf (providing a coordinated approach to cyberdefense across the
NATO Alliance); Press Release, NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration (Nov. 20, 2010),
available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official-texts 68828.htm?mode
=pressrelease ("Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and evolving in sophistication. In
order to ensure NATO's permanent and unfettered access to cyberspace and integrity of
its critical systems, we will take into account the cyber dimension of modern conflicts
in NATO's doctrine and improve its capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, defend and
recover in case of a cyber attack against systems of critical importance to the Alliance .
. . ."); NATO, STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF THE MEMBERS
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, MODERN
DEFENCE T 19 (2010), http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

("We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and
defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we
will: . . . develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from
cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and
coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under
centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning
and response with member nations . . . .").
26. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL
CYBER
STABILITY
14 (2012), http://www.acus.org/files/publicationpdfs/403
/kramer cyber _final.pdf (noting the establishment of a "cyber hot line" between the
United States and Russia, and arguing that better resilience, cooperation, and
transparency are necessary to enhance international cyber stability).
27. See generally The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Warfare, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEF. CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE,

https://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (announcing the
publication of the "Tallinn Manual," the result of a "three-year effort to examine how
extant international law norms" apply to cyberwarfare).
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an extraordinary challenge. Our shared digital infrastructure is vulnerable 28
to a wide-range of cyberthreats that are understood to pose some of the
most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century
(see infra Section IV).
II.

SELF-REGULATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE

The United States has adopted a largely self-regulatory, market-based
approach to cybersecurity, relying on the private sector to secure its own
networks. In keeping with this approach, no federal agency is responsible
for defending the civilian (i.e., ".com") domain, and the federal government
has avoided generally-applicable federal mandates regarding private sector
29
Private sector companies have long understood
cybersecurity practices.
that perfect security is unattainable, and, even if that were not the case,
would be cost-prohibitive. 30 Accordingly, they must decide for themselves
the optimal level of cybersecurity investment on a company-by-company
basis.
A key challenge to the prevailing self-regulatory approach to private
sector cybersecurity is the special problem of "critical infrastructures."
As explained in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which the
28. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 2, at iii; see WHITE
HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND
OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 4 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/rssviewer/internationalstrategyfor cyberspace.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE,
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE] (describing digital infrastructure
vulnerability to "natural disasters, accidents, and sabotage").
29. Companies handling certain types of sensitive personal data may be subject to
sector-specific information security rules and also should be aware that the FTC has,
under certain circumstances, set and enforced corporate data security obligations
through both litigation and consent orders under its statutory authority to regulate
"unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices pursuant to Section 5 of the FTCA. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 12-cv-01365-SPL (D. Ariz. filed June 26,
2012), discussed in greater detail infra Section V.E.
30. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNET SECURITY ESSENTIALS FOR
BUSINESS 2.0, at 3 (2012), http://www.uschamber.com/issues/technology/internetsecurity-essentials-business ("Perfect online security is unattainable . . . ."); Public
Fears in Virtual Places: Inaugural Cyber Security Lecture Tackles Crime, Solutions,
CABLE (July 21, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://cable.poly.edu/issue/news/public-fears-virtualplaces-inaugural-cyber-security-lecture-tackles-crime-solutions (according to Marcus
Sachs, Vice President of government affairs and national security policy at Verizon

Communications,

"perfection is impossible" and failures in cybersecurity are

"inevitable").
31. Critical infrastructures are the "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the [incapacitation] or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national

public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." Critical Infrastructures
Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (Supp. V 2011).
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Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") released in 2003 in response to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks:
Our nation's critical infrastructures are composed of public and private
institutions in the sectors of agriculture, food, water, public health,
emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information
and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance,
chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping. Cyberspace
is their nervous system-the control system of our country. Cyberspace
is composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers,
servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical
infrastructures to work. Thus, the healthy functioning of cyberspace is
essential to our economy and our national security.32
Critical infrastructure networks are overwhelmingly owned and operated
by individual private-sector companies; nevertheless, securing these
networks is essential to U.S. economic and national security, particularly in
view of the emerging threats of nation-state sponsored cyberespionage and
cyberwarfare (see infra Sections III.B and III.C).
III.

THE CHANGING FACE OF CYBERSECURITY:
TECHNOLOGY TRENDS

Our nation's cybersecurity challenge is exacerbated by recent technology
trends, most notably the: (1) explosive growth in mobile technology; (2)
migration to cloud computing; and (3) pervasiveness of social networks.

A. Mobile Technology
Mobile technology continues to penetrate the global market, with the
number of mobile devices expected to exceed the number of people on
Earth by the end of 2016. At the beginning of 2012, there already were
nearly six billion mobile-cellular subscriptions (eighty-six percent "global
32. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/national-strategy-secure-cyberspace (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
A prescient report from 1991 similarly described the risks of relying on information
technology in a way that continues to resonate today. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMPUTERS AT RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7 (1991) ("We are at
risk. Increasingly, America depends on computers. They control power delivery,
communications, aviation, and financial services. They are used to store vital
information, from medical records to business plans to criminal records. Although we
trust them, they are vulnerable-to the effects of poor design and insufficient quality
control, to accident, and perhaps most alarmingly, to deliberate attack. The modem
thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun. Tomorrow's terrorist may be able
to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.").
33. Cisco, Cisco VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: Cisco GLOBAL MOBILE DATA
TRAFFIC FORECAST UPDATE,
2011-2016 3 (2013), http://www.cisco.com/en
/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/VNI-Forecast QA.pdf.
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penetration") and more than one billion mobile-broadband subscriptions
worldwide, 34 with the latter figure expected to jump to nearly five billion in
2016. Simultaneously, the global mobile application market is exploding.
While it accounted for just $1.7 billion in revenue globally in 2010,36 it is
expected to exceed $30 billion in revenue by the end of 2012n3 and reach
Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store each
$38 billion by 2015.
now offers 700,000 mobile applications for their respective platforms, iOS
and Android OS."
"Bring your own device," or "BYOD," is another important trend that
has come with the penetration of mobile-broadband. Just a few years ago,
Research-in-Motion's ("RIM") Blackberry device was the dominant player
in the U.S. smartphone market, but new offerings from Apple, Google, and
Microsoft have changed that, with consumers increasingly opting to
purchase non-Blackberry devices. 40 For security reasons, it was once
34. Key Statistical Highlights:

ITU Data Release June 2012, ITU WORLD

(June
2012),
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/material/pdf
/201 1%20Statistical%20highlightsJune_2012.pdf. As mobile penetration increases,
the mobile advertising market is expected to continue on its own upward trajectory.
Google alone earned $2.5 billion in mobile advertising revenue in 2011, and the mobile
advertising market as a whole is expected to grow to $4.4 billion in the United States in
2013, with Facebook and Twitter projected to earn $72.7 million and $129.7 million in
mobile advertising revenue, respectively, in 2012. See Rachel King, Google's $8
TELECOMMS.

Billion Mobile Ad Run Rate: The Fine Print, ZDNET (Oct. 18, 2012, 9:12 PM),

http://www.zdnet.com/googles-8-billion-mobile-ad-run-rate-the-fine-print7000006019/ (explaining that the comparison between Google's $2.5 billion mobile
advertising run rate for 2011 at the end of the third quarter and its projected $8 billion
run rate for 2012 is "a bit like comparing apples and oranges" because the 2011 rate
included "gross revenue from mobile ads" while the 2012 rate also includes "gross
revenue from the mobile sales of Google Play content" and from "consumer spending
on the Play apps"); Cotton Delo, Facebook Tests Mobile-Ad Network, Challenging
Google and Apple, ADVERTISING AGE (Sept. 18, 2012), http://adage.com/article/digita

1/facebook-tests-mobile-ad-network-challenging-google-apple/237279/.
35. Press Release, Ericsson, Ericsson Predicts Mobile Data Traffic to Increase 10Fold by 2016 (Nov. 7, 2011), http://hugin.info/1061/R/1561267/483146.pdf (predicting
that mobile broadband subscriptions will reach nearly five billion in 2016, representing
sixty percent year-on-year growth).
36. Austin Carr, Report: Apps to Explode to $38 Billion Market by 2015, FAST

(Mar. 1, 2011, 8:22 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1732635/appsexplode-38-billion-market-2015.
COMPANY

37. Cumulative Mobile App Revenues Set to Exceed $30 Billion by End-2012,

ABI RESEARCH (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.abiresearch.com/press/cumulative-mobileapp-revenues-set-to-exceed-30-bi.
38. Aemon Malone, Report: Apps to Become $38 Billion Industry by 2015,

(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/report-apps-tobecome-38-billion-industry-by-2015/.
DIGITAL TRENDS

39. Damien Scott, Google Play Store Now Has as Many Apps as Apple App Store,

(Oct. 30, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://www.complex.com/tech/2012/10/googleplay-store-now-has-as-many-apps-as-apple-app-store.
40. In 2010, Research-in-Motion, which created the Blackberry, had thirty-nine
COMPLEX
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typical for U.S. corporations to require their employees to access corporate
networks using only corporate-issued devices (typically BlackBerry
devices, which earned top marks for enterprise security and was number
one in the U.S. smartphone market). 4 1 Today's corporations increasingly
permit employees to use mobile devices of their own choosing, including
those offered by Apple (e.g., iPhone, iPad), Google (e.g., Android devices),
and Microsoft. 4 2 Demand for the convenience and productivity offered by
these devices may have started in corporate boardrooms, but it quickly
trickled down to the rest of the corporate workforce and has put substantial
pressure on corporations to loosen their previously restrictive corporate
policies.
Mobile technology, by itself, poses a tremendous cybersecurity
challenge. Smartphones equipped with internal microphones, cameras, and
geolocation may be "the ultimate spy tool,"A3 enabling hackers to listen to
calls made on the device, monitor text messages to and from the device,
and track the location of the device." Hackers could use a hacked phone
percent of the U.S. smartphone market. Today, it has just 9.5%. David Goldman,
BlackBerry's Wipeout Creates Major Mobile Security Gaps, CNN MONEY (Sept. 26,
2012,
7:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/26/technology/mobile-security-

byod/index.html.
4 1. Id.
42. Debra Cassens Weiss, Bye-Bye BlackBerrys: 88% of BigLaw CIOs Expect Use

to Decline in Next Year, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 7, 2012, 5:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/byebye blackberrys 88_of largefirm ciosexpect use to decline in nextyea
(reporting that an American Lawyer survey of eighty-three Chief Information Officers

("CIOs") and technology chiefs at the nation's top law firms found that "eighty-eight

percent of the CIOs expect a net drop in the number of BlackBerry users at their law
firms in the next twelve months"). Apple's iPhone is reported to have roughly matched
RIM's BlackBerry devices when it comes to enterprise security. Nick Heath, iPhone
Now as Secure as BlackBerry, Say Tech Chiefs, TECHREPUBLIC (Sept. 18, 2012, 3:39
AM),
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/cio-insights/iphone-now-as-secure-asblackberry-say-tech-chiefs/39749386.
43. Darlene Storm, Mobile RAT Attack Makes Android the Ultimate Spy Tool,
COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 1, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://blogs.computerworld.com/19803

/mobileratattackmakesandroidtheultimate spy tool (quoting George Kurtz,
former Chief Technology Officer of McAfee Labs); see Smartphone Users Should Be
Aware of Malware Targeting Mobile Devices and Safety Measures to Help Avoid

Compromise, FBI (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/e-scams (warning
smartphone users regarding vulnerabilities in Android devices and suggesting
preventative measures).
44. See Ken Dilanian, New Security Flaw Discovered in Smartphones, L.A. TIMES

(Feb. 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/24/business/la-fi-smartphonehacking-20120224 ("[A cybersecurity researcher successfully] used a previously
unknown hole in smartphone browsers to plant China-based malware that can
commandeer the device, record its calls, pinpoint its location and access user texts and
emails."). At the annual RSA Conference, security researchers recently offered a live
demonstration of their successful "remote-access-tool" attack on an Android phone that
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"as a hidden camera, secretly record video, tap into the microphone to
eavesdrop or make audio recordings, and track your movements via GPS
location."45 Moreover, physical control over mobile devices is easily
compromised due to their small size and portability, 46 and built-in security
mechanisms are often unused 47 or easily circumvented, facilitating
unauthorized third-party control over mobile devices. 48 Moreover, as
devices become more functional, they often become less secure simply
because there are more ways to introduce vulnerabilities: "Every app you
install on your mobile device could lead to compromise, every text
message you receive. Every website you browse using your own device's
mobile browser is possibly suspect."A9
In the BYOD environment, securing mobile devices is even more
important. An employee's compromised device could be used to "listen in
to business meetings for espionage or for insider trading"50 or could serve
as a "back door" into corporate networks.' Moreover, "[i]f just one device
has been compromised-if a single employee clicks on a bad link,
downloads a malicious app, or leaves the device at a bar-attackers could
get a free pass into the network."5 2 Corporations embracing the BYOD
phenomenon may be "offering up a way into their networks on a silver
platter."5 3

enabled them to activate the smartphone's microphone to listen to calls made on the
device, monitor text messages to and from the targeted smartphone, and track the
location of the device. CrowdStrike, RSA 2012-Hacking Exposed: Mobile RATs
(CrowdStrike), YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=9smxU4gu8ac.
45. Storm, supra note 43.
46. WAYNE JANSEN & TIMoTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST. OF SCIENCE AND TECH.,
GUIDELINES ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN PUBLIC CLOUD COMPUTING, SPECIAL
PUBLICATION 800-144 viii (2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800144/SP800-144.pdf.

47. Id.; see Goldman, supra note 40 (reporting results of a Ponemon Institute study
finding that fifty-nine percent of corporations that allow BYOD report that their

employees fail to lock their personal devices, and fifty-one percent experienced some
form of data loss as a result).
48. JANSEN & GRANCE, supra note 46, at viii.
49. Goldman, supra note 40.
50. Storm, supra note 43.
51. See Patrick Lambert, BYOD: Risks, Rewards, and How to Deal with It,
TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 1, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security
/byod-risks-rewards-and-how-to-deal-with-it/8622 (noting the risk that an employee
could bring an infected laptop that could open a back door into a network).
52. Goldman, supra note 40.
53. Id.
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Cloud Computing54

Another important technology trend is the migration to cloud computing.
Cloud computing is constantly evolving,5 1 leading to some confusion over
the precise contours of the term, 6 but "at the most basic level, cloud
computing means that your data is stored on somebody else's computer."57
It is generally agreed that cloud computing refers to delivering computing
resources as a service over a network. 8 Cloud computing has been
54. The National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") defines cloud
computing as "a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction," but cautions that "[c]loud
computing is an evolving paradigm. The NIST definition characterizes important
aspects of cloud computing and is intended to serve as a means for broad comparisons
of cloud services and deployment strategies, and to provide a baseline for discussion
from what is cloud computing to how to best use cloud computing. The service and
deployment models defined form a simple taxonomy that is not intended to prescribe or
constrain any particular method of deployment, service delivery, or business
operation." PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST. OF SCIENCE AND TECH.,
THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145 1-2
(2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
The NIST

definition was the result of four years of work and fifteen draft definitions. Final
Version of NIST Cloud Computing Definition Published, NIST (Oct. 25, 2011),

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cloud- 102511 .cfm. There are a number of competing
theories regarding the origin of the term "cloud computing." Some assert that the term
comes from "the use of a cloud-shaped symbol as an abstraction for the complex
infrastructure it contains in system diagrams." See, e.g., Lakhmi Chand Goyal &
Pradeep Kumar Jatav, Cloud Computing: An Overview and Its Impact on Libraries, I
INT'L J. OF NEXT GENERATION COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 9, 9 (2012),
http://ijngca.com/Papers/IJNGCA08092012.pdf.
Others disagree. See, e.g., John
Willis, Who Coined the Phrase Cloud Computing?, IT MGMT. & CLOUD BLOG (Dec.
31,
2008),
http://www.johnmwillis.com/cloud-computing/who-coined-the-phrasecloud-computing/ (listing three different possibilities for the origins of the phrase).
55. Arif Mohamed, A History of Cloud Computing, COMPUTERWEEKLY (Mar.

2009),
http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/A-history-of-cloud-computing
("Cloud computing has evolved through a number of phases which include grid and
utility computing, application service provision (ASP), and Software as a Service
(SaaS)."); What Is The Cloud?, GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.info.apps.gov/content

/what-cloud (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (discussing the evolution of today's cloud
computing from grid and utility computing).
56. Most Americans Confused by Cloud Computing According to National Survey,
CITRIX (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.citrix.com/lang/English/lp/lp2328330.asp

(reporting that most respondents in a recent survey believed the cloud is related to
weather and that ninety-five percent of respondents who thought they were not using
the cloud actually were).

57. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) [hereinafter ECPA Reform Hearing] (statement of
Edward W. Felten, Professor, Princeton University), http://judiciary.house.gov
/hearings/printers/ 11th/ 111-149_58409.pdf.
Overview,
ACCENTURE,
Computing:
Services
58. See,
e.g.,
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analogized to the modern high-rise office building: "[j]ust as a high-rise
allows tenants to lease secure, individual offices in the same building while
sharing core services such as plumbing and electricity, multi-tenant
enterprise cloud computing allows organizations to use individualized
software applications while sharing core computing services such as
database and security."5 9
The reported benefits of cloud computing include scalability,60 rapid
greater reliability, 62 efficiency,63 increased storage,64
deployment,
flexibility, 6 5 business agility,66 cost savings, and energy savings.
http://www.accenture.com/sk-sk/Pages/service-technology-cloud-computing-overviewsummary.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (defining cloud computing as "the dynamic
provisioning of IT capabilities (hardware, software, or services) from third parties over
a network"); see also Mohamed, supra note 55 ("The idea of an 'intergalactic computer
network' was introduced in the sixties by J.C.R. Licklider, who was responsible for
enabling the development of ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network) [the predecessor to today's Internet] in 1969.").
59. ECPA Reform Hearing, supra note 57, at 44 (statement of David Schellhase,
Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Salesforce.com).
60. See ECPA Reform Hearing, supra note 57, at 14 (statement of Edward W.

Felten, Professor, Princeton University) ("[I]f [a] start-up's business grows rapidly and
it needs to expand its computing capacity dramatically to handle a flood of new
customers, this is easily done in the cloud, by simply increasing the number of servers
the start-up is renting from the provider."); Andrew Nusca, The Future of Cloud
Computing: 9 Trends for 2012, ZDNET (June 21, 2012, 3:26 AM),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/the-future-of-cloud-computing-9-trends-for-2012/80511
(reporting that "scalability is driving adoption," with fifty-seven percent of companies
in a recent poll identifying scalability as the most important reason they switched to the
cloud).
61. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 54, at 2.
62. See ECPA Reform Hearing, supra note 57, at 14 (statement of Edward W.

Felten, Professor, Princeton University).
63. Id. at 44 (statement of David Schellhase, Executive Vice President & General
Counsel, Salesforce.com) ("By eliminating the need for costly and wastefully
duplicative infrastructure, multi-tenant cloud computing frees users to focus on their
core business, not their IT.").
64. Mohamed, supra note 55 (" 'Many IT professionals recognise the benefits
cloud computing offers in terms of increased storage, flexibility and cost reduction,'
said Songian Zhou, chief executive officer of Platform Computing.").
65. Rajani Baburajan, The Rising Cloud Storage Market Opportunity Strengthens

Vendors, TMCNET (Aug. 24, 2011), http://technews.tmcnet.com/channels/cloudstorage/articles/211183-rising-cloud-storage-market-opportunity-strengthensvendors.htm ("Cloud computing is becoming the preferred choice of organizations not
only because of its cost savings but also because of the flexibility.").
66. See id. (observing that cloud computing enables enterprises to add capacity on
demand).
67. See id
68. Katie Fehrenbacher, Cloud Computing Could Lead to Billions in Energy

Savings, GIGAOM (July 21, 2011, 8:48 AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/07/2 1/cloudcomputing-could-lead-to-billions-in-energy-savings/ (reporting that cloud computing
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By any measure, the market for cloud computing services is exploding.
Global cloud computing revenue is projected to grow at a compound
annual growth rate of 28.8% between now and 2015, and the market is
expected to increase from $46 billion in 2009 to over $210 billion by 2015,
according to analysts.6 9
Despite this rapid growth, many corporations are reluctant to embrace
cloud-based solutions due to security concerns. 70 In a recent poll, more
than half of the companies surveyed identified security as the reason that
they have not adopted cloud computing technology.71
From a corporate cybersecurity perspective, the public cloud is a doubleedged sword.
It offers a number of potential benefits, including
professionally managed security, 7 2 backup and recovery capabilities,7 3 and
could lead to an estimated $12.3 billion in energy savings and 85.7 million metric tons
of carbon emissions savings per year by 2020, according to AT&T-sponsored
research); id. ("[M]oving business applications to the cloud could cut the associated
per-user carbon footprint by 30 percent for large, already-efficient companies and as
much as 90 percent for the smallest and least efficient businesses."); see Press Release,
Pike Research, Cloud Computing to Reduce Global Data Center Energy Expenditures
by 38% in 2020 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom
/cloud-computing-to-reduce-global-data-center-energy-expenditures-by-38-in-2020
(forecasting that cloud computing could lead to a thirty-eight percent reduction in
worldwide data center energy use by 2020 due to substantial energy efficiency
benefits); Cloud Computing Energy Efficiency: Strategic and Tactical Assessment of
Energy Savings and Carbon Emissions Reduction Opportunities for Data Centers
Utilizing SaaS, IaaS, and PaaS, NAVIGANT REs., http://www.pikeresearch.com

/research/cloud-computing-energy-efficiency (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) ("[W]e
anticipate that much of the work done today in internal data centers will be outsourced
to the cloud by 2020, resulting in significant reductions in energy consumption,
associated energy expenses, and GHG emissions from data center operations versus a
business as usual (BAU) scenario.").
69. Cloud Computing Energy Efficiency, supra note 68; Press Release, Gartner,

Gartner Says Worldwide Cloud Services Market to Surpass $68 Billion in 2010 (June
22, 2010), available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1389313 (reporting that
the worldwide market for cloud services will be worth $148.8 billion by 2014);
accord, Louis Columbus, Gartner Predicts Infrastructure Services Will Accelerate
Cloud
Computing Growth,
FORBES,
(Feb.
19,
2013,
12:36 PM),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2013/02/19/gartner-predicts-infrastructureservices-will-accelerate-cloud-computing-growth/ (reporting that global spending on
public cloud services is expected to achieve a compound annual growth rate of 17.7%
from 2011 through 2016 and that the worldwide market for cloud services is expected
to grown from $76.9 billion in 2010 to $210 billion in 2016).
70. Robert Scheier, Cloud Computing Tools: Improving Security Through Visibility

and Automation, CSO ONLINE (May 14, 2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article
/706357/cloud-computing-tools-improving-security-through-visibility-and-automation.
71. Nusca, supra note 60 (reporting the results of a North Bridge Venture Partners
poll of 785 people at thirty-nine enterprise technology companies, which noted a
concern regarding regulatory compliance and vendor lock-in as additional reasons for
inhibition of adoption of cloud-computing).
72. ECPA Reform Hearing, supra note 57, at 13 (statement of Edward W. Felten,
Professor, Princeton Univ.). Cloud provider reliance on "dedicated personnel" to
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automation of vulnerability mitigation and security management
functions 74 (although automation may be prohibitively expensive for many
companiess). But other characteristics of cloud computing-including
system complexity, 76 the multi-tenant environment, 77 and loss of
significant challenges to corporate cybersecurity.79
control 7 8-pose
maintain security, manage software updates, and "continually strengthen" security
measures could boost corporate security. Advancements in Cloud Security, DLT
http://www.dlt.com/technology/cloud-computing/understanding-cloudSOLUTIONS,
computing/cloud-security/advancements-in-cloud-securi (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
Indeed, "[c]loud providers ... have an opportunity for staff to specialize in security,
privacy, and other areas of high interest and concern to the organization. Increases in
the scale of computing induce specialization, which in turn allows security staff to shed
other duties and concentrate exclusively on security issues. Through increased
specialization, there is an opportunity for staff members to gain in-depth experience,
take remedial actions, and make security improvements more readily than otherwise
would be possible with a diverse set of duties." JANSEN & GRANCE, supra note 46, at
9.

73. JANSEN & GRANCE, supra note 46, at 9-10. ("Redundancy and disaster
recovery capabilities are built into cloud computing environments and on-demand
resource capacity can be used for better resilience when faced with increased service
demands or distributed denial of service attacks, and for quicker recovery from serious
incidents.").
74. 3rdlD8487, Cyber Security and American Power, YOUTUBE, at 34:30 (July 11,
[hereinafter
Keith
2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTwiZneMw3U
Alexander's Remarks]. JANSEN & GRANCE, supra note 46, at 9 ("Greater uniformity
and homogeneity facilitate platform hardening and enable better automation of security
management activities [such as] configuration control, vulnerability testing, security
audits, and security patching of platform components. Information assurance and
security response activities also profit from a uniform, homogeneous cloud
infrastructure . . . ."); Scheier, supra note 70 ("[T]he same automated, consistent
provisioning that is essential to managing either public or private clouds . . . can also
offer the fringe benefit of improving security . . . . Because so many security

vulnerabilities are caused by human error, automating proper server configuration also
automatically improves security . . . . Automated server provisioning tools . . . help
prevent variations that could create vulnerabilities . . . . [and] enable administrators to

easily control common security-sensitive settings, such as which ports are open and
which services are running.").
75. Scheier, supra note 70 ("[H]igh [per server] costs force organizations with
thousands of servers to go without automated patch or configuration management or
audit compliance . . . relying instead on scripts or manual processes.").
76. JANSEN & GRANCE, supra note 46, at 10-11 ("Many components make up a
public cloud, resulting in a large attack surface . . . . Security depends not only on the

correctness and effectiveness of many components, but also on the interactions among
them.").
77. Id. at 11 ("Having to share an infrastructure with unknown outside parties can
be a major drawback for some applications .... .").
78. Id. at 12 ("Loss of control over both the physical and logical aspects of the
system and data diminishes the organization's ability to maintain situational awareness,
weigh alternatives, set priorities, and effect changes in security . . . that are in the best
interest of the organization.").
79. See generally id; see also Jon Brodkin, Gartner: Seven Cloud-Computing
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Moreover, many cloud characteristics themselves are double-edged swords.
Take data concentration, for example. Concentrating data in the cloud may
expose data to fewer risks than a more distributed model in which data
resides on mobile devices, laptops, or other peripherals that can be lost or
stolen. However, consolidating data in one location creates an attractive
target and could render a successful security breach disastrous.o Likewise,
a uniform cloud infrastructure may benefit information assurance activities,
but may enable "a single flaw [to] manifest[] throughout the cloud,
potentially impacting all tenants and services."8
C. Social Networking
The rise of social networking also brings new cybersecurity challenges.
Hackers have long relied on "social engineering"-convincing people to
disclose information that they should not 82 -to gain the trust of targets and
compromise their networks. Now, detailed information gleaned from
social networking sites is helping adversaries successfully target even the
most sophisticated corporate victims through social engineering.
The May 2011 attack on RSA Security ("RSA"), one of the nation's
oldest and best-known security technology companies, serves as a
cautionary tale regarding how adversaries use social engineering to
compromise their victims' networks. In RSA's case, a spear-phishing
email (i.e., an email used to "target specific people at enterprises with the
aim of gaining a foothold into the corporate network" 84) was sent to two
Security Risks, INFOWORLD (July 2, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-

central/gartner-seven-cloud-computing-security-risks-853.
80. Mathew

J.

Schwartz,

Epsilon

Fell

to

Spear-Phishing Attack,

(Apr. 11, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://www.informationweek.com
/security/attacks/epsilon-fell-to-spear-phishing-attack/229401372 ("The Epsilon breach
highlights that with the growth of cloud services, one data breach can be a single point
INFORMATIONWEEK

of failure for numerous organizations . .

.

. [E]ntrusting a single company with data on

so many people makes it an attractive target for attackers, which may in fact place
customers at greater risk of having their personal information stolen.").
81. JANSEN & GRANCE, supra note 46, at 9.
82. Matthew Weinschenk, CyberSecurity's Biggest Threat is Decidedly Low Tech,

WALL ST. DAILY (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2012/03/08/cybersecuritys-biggest-threat/.
83. JANSEN & GRANCE, supra note 46, at viii ("The growing availability and use of
social media, personal Webmail, and other publicly available sites are a concern, since
they increasingly serve as avenues for social engineering attacks that can negatively
impact the security of the client, its underlying platform, and cloud services
accessed.").
84. Robert Westervelt, Study Finds Spear Phishing at Heart of Most Targeted
Attacks, SEARCHSECURITY (Nov. 29, 2012), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com

/news/2240173 534/Study-finds-spear-phishing-at-heart-of-most-targeted-attacks;
TRENDMICRO INC., SPEAR-PHISHING EMAIL: MOST FAVORED ATTACK BAIT 1-2 (2012),
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-
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groups of RSA employees. The subject of the email message was "2011
Recruitment Plan." Attached to the email was a malware-embedded85
Excel spreadsheet innocuously entitled "2011 Recruitment plan.xls." 86
Although RSA's systems automatically identified and marked the email as
"junk," one employee opened the email, thereby unwittingly releasing the
malware that ultimately facilitated the exfiltration of sensitive data.87
Spear-phishing also was the modus operandi in the 2011 attack on
Epsilon, an email marketing behemoth. In that attack, an estimated sixty
million email addresses were compromised, resulting in an estimated $225
million in costs to Epsilon from the data breach alone.
Phishers could
papers/wp-spear-phishing-email-most-favored-apt-attack-bait.pdf ("In a typical spearphishing attack, a specially crafted email is sent to specific individuals from a target
organization. The recipients are convinced through clever and relevant social
engineering tactics to either download a malicious file attachment or to click a link to a
malware- or an exploit-laden site .

.

.. [This] installs a malware in a compromised

computer. The malware then accesses a malicious command-and-control (C&C) server
to await instructions from a remote user. At the same time, [the malware] usually
drops a decoy document that will open when the malware or exploit runs to hide
malicious activity."). Id. at 1 ("[S]pear phishing makes use of information about a
target to make attacks more specific and 'personal' to the target. Spear-phishing
emails, for instance, may refer to their targets by their specific name, rank, or position
instead of using generic titles as in broader phishing campaigns."). A paradigmatic
example of spear-phishing came to light as a result of the long-running cyberbattle
between the nation-states of Georgia and Russia. In this intriguing case, a Russian
hacker believed to be seeking sensitive Georgian government documents on behalf of
Russian intelligence "sent a series of emails to [Georgian] government officials that
appeared to come from the president of Georgia, with the address
'admin@president.gov.ge.'
Those emails contained a malicious PDF attachment,
purportedly containing legal information, with an exploit that delivered malware."
Jeremy Kirk, Georgia Outs Russia-Based Hacker-With Photos, PC WORLD (Oct. 30,

2012, 11:20 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2013289/georgia-outs-russia-basedhacker-with-photos.html.
85. Malware
(Malicious
Software),
SEARCHMIDMARKETSECURITY,
http://searchmidmarketsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/malware (last updated Oct.
2008) ("Malware ... is any program or file that is harmful to a computer user.").
86. Peter Bright, Spearphishing + Zero-Day: RSA Hack Not "Extremely
Sophisticated," ARS TECHNICA, (Apr. 4, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://arstechnica.com

/security/2011/04/spearphishing-0-day-rsa-hack-not-extremely-sophisticated/.

87. Opening the email attachment led to installation of a variant of the Poison Ivy
RAT. A RAT is "a Remote Administration/Access Tool/Toolkit/Trojan. RATs allow
remote access to files, the registry, monitoring of network access, starting and stopping
programs, and more, making them extremely powerful: anything the user can do
locally, the hacker can do remotely . . . . With Poison Ivy installed, the attacker stole
user credentials and escalated their privileges to gain access to secure systems that the
originally compromised user didn't have access to. The attacker then used this system
access to exfiltrate . . . sensitive data ..... Id.
88. Total Cost of Epsilon E-mail Breach Could Reach $225M, Including up to
$45M in Lost Business, According to New Report by CyberFactors,Bus. WIRE (Apr.

29, 2011,

12:29 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110429005630

/en/Total-Cost-Epsilon-E-Mail-Data-Breach-Reach.
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further exploit the compromised email addresses, leading some to project
that the Epsilon breach could generate up to $4 billion in total costs,
including fines, litigation, lost business, forensic audits, and monitoring.89
As corporate security improves, adversaries increasingly rely on "social
engineering" to gain the trust of targets, to convince people to disclose
information that they should not,90 and subsequently to compromise
targets' networks. Thirty-seven percent of records compromised through
cyber data breaches were compromised as a result of incidents employing
social tactics. 91 Moreover, industry data suggest that spear-phishing is at
the heart of most targeted attacks.9 2
Government and private sector cybersecurity experts warn that hackers
increasingly are exploiting information gleaned from social networking
sites for social engineering-based attacks. For example, the FBI warns that
"[p]redators, hackers, business competitors, and foreign state actors troll
social networking sites looking for information or people to target for
exploitation."9 3 Security provider Trend Micro warns:
While human-related information like a target's name, job title, and
email address may be bought from the underground market or be
provided by the masterminds behind sanctioned attacks, the Internet is
the most convenient source of such information. Social networking sites,
corporate and academic publications, and organizations' sites allow
miscreants to harvest relevant information on their targets for various
social engineering schemes.94
Indeed, "[e]lite cybercriminals are tapping into search engines and social
networks to help them target specific employees for social-engineering
trickery at a wide range of companies, professional firms and government
agencies."
89. Id.
90. Weinschenk, supra note 82.
91. VERIZON, VERIZON's 2012 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 33 (2012),
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rpdata-breach-investigationsreport-2012_enxg.pdf.

92. Ninety-one percent of targeted attacks involved spear-phishing, and ninety-four
percent of emails contained malicious file attachments, according to TrendMicro's
analysis of targeted attack data collected between February and September of 2012.
See TRENDMICRO INC., supra note 84, at 1.
93. FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNET SOCIAL NETWORKING RISKS 2,
http://www.ncix.gov/issues/cyber/internet-social-networking-risks.pdf
94. TRENDMICRO INC., supra note 84, at 5.
95. Byron Acohido, Social-Media Tools Used to Target Corporate Secrets, USA
TODAY (Mar. 31, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-03-31hacking-attacks-on-corporations.htm ("[M]any attacks [that cybersecurity firm]
Mandiant has investigated began with the criminals doing reconnaissance on Google,
Facebook, Linkedln, Twitter and other popular Internet services to find companies to
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IV. THE CHANGING FACE OF CYBERSECURITY:
CYBERTHREAT TRENDS
There are only two types of companies in this country: those who know
they have been hacked, and those who don't.96

Cybercrime," cyberespionage,9 8 and cyberwarfare9 9 have long been
understood to threaten the security of cyberspace, however the gravity of
the cyberthreat recently has been publicly underscored with increasing
frequency at the highest levels of the United States government. President
Obama penned a Wall Street Journal op-ed in August 2012 describing the

cyberthreat as "one of the most serious economic and national security
challenges" facing our nation. 00 Six months later, he emphasized the
importance of cybersecurity in his post-election State of the Union address,

target-and pinpoint specific executives, researchers, analysts, engineers or key
administrative assistants to attack. The next step is to craft a spear-phishing lure
designed to entice a specific employee to click on a viral attachment or Web page link,
using information gleaned during the reconnaissance phase to make the attachment or
link seem trustworthy.").
96. Although the precise origin of this statement appears to be unknown, it is used
quite frequently in cybersecurity circles. See, e.g., DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, McAFEE,
REVEALED: OPERATION SHADY RAT 2 (2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us

/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf ("I divide the entire set of Fortune
Global 2,000 firms into two categories: those that know they've been compromised,and
those that don't yet know.") (emphasis in original); Jonathan Fisher, China Has Hacked
Every U.S. Major Company, Claims Richard Clarke, WEBPRONEWS (Mar. 28, 2012),

http://www.webpronews.com/china-has-hacked-every-u-s-major-company-claimsrichard-clarke-2012-03 (" 'There are two kinds of companies: those that have been
hacked, and those that will be.' If you listen to people talk about cyber security long
enough, you'll hear a hundred subtle variations of that statement. Another version
goes: 'There are two kinds of companies: those that know they've been hacked, and
those that don't,' implying that every server and every computer the world over is not
only vulnerable to attack, but has at least been probed in the past.").
97. See, e.g., Meredith Johnston, Cybercrime is on the rise, TECHREPUBLIC (June

16, 2000, 7:00 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cybercrime-is-on-therise/5032146 (illustrating twelve types of cybercrime, including financial fraud, denial
of service, and theft of proprietary information).
98. See, e.g., Nathan Thornburg, Inside the Chinese Hack Attack, TIME (Aug. 25,

2005), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1098371 ,00.html.

99. See, e.g., John Stanton, Rules of Cyber War Baffle US. Government Agencies,
NAT'L DEF.
MAG.
(Feb.
2000),
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

/archive/2000/February/Pages/Rules4391.aspx; US. Army Kick-Starts Cyber War
Machine, CNN
(Nov. 22, 2000),
http://articles.cnn.com/2000-11-22/tech
/cyberwar.machine.idg 1 computer-viruses-denial-of-servicecyberwarfare?_s=PM:TECH.
100. Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J. (July 19,

2012, 7:15 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904443309045775
35492693044650.html.
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declaring: "America must . .. face the rapidly growing threat."' 01 In March
2013, just one year after FBI Director Robert Mueller warned that
cyberthreats were expected to surpass terrorism as the single "greatest
threat" to the United States, 10 2 the U.S. Director of National Intelligence
("DNI") publicly identified cyber as the top global threat facing America,
stating "it's hard to overemphasize its significance."l 03 The next day,
President Obama invited select CEOs of critical infrastructure companies
directly to the White House to discuss cybersecurity,1 0 4 and a few weeks
later, in April 2013, he "summoned 15 of America's top financial leaders to
the White House to discuss . . . cyberrisks." 05

Throughout 2012, other top national security officials also publicly
emphasized the gravity of the cyberthreat. In February 2012, former
Director of the National Security Agency ("NSA") and former DNI, Mike
McConnell, said: "The United States is fighting a cyberwar today, and we
are losing." 1 0 6 In October 2012, then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
warned that the United States is at risk for a "cyber Pearl Harbor,"107 saying

101. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address
(Feb.
12,
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address.
The President took the
opportunity afforded by his State of the Union address to signal his intention to make
cybersecurity a priority in his second term and to lay out his plan for doing so, stating:
"Earlier today, I signed a new executive order that will strengthen our cyber defenses . .
. . But now Congress must act as well, by passing legislation to give our government a
greater capacity to secure our networks and deter attacks. This is something we should
be able to get done on a bipartisan basis." Id.
102. Stacy Cowley, FBIDirector: Cyberthreatwill eclipse terrorism, CNN MONEY,
7:55 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/02/technology
(Mar.
2,
2012,
/fbicybersecurity/index.htm (quoting FBI Director Mueller saying: "Terrorism does
remain the FBI's top priority, but in the not too-distant-future we anticipate that the
cyberthreat will pose the greatest threat to our country").
103. Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on

Intelligence, 113th Cong. 5-6 (2013) (remarks by James R. Clapper, Director of Nat'l
Intelligence),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%2OReports/WWTA
%20Remarks%20as%20delivered%2012%2OMar%202013.pdf.
104. Alex Mooney, President to Host CEOs in Situation Room for Cyber Security

Chat, CNN (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:22 PM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/13
/president-to-host-ceos-in-situation-room-for-cyber-security-chat/.
105.

Frederick Kempe, Seeking to Avert Cyberwar,April 15, 2013.

http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2013/04/15/seeking-to-avert-cyber-war/. An
executive who participated in the April meeting explained: "[t]he President scared the
hell out of all of us, and we're not easy to frighten." Id.
106. Mike McConnell, Mike McConnell on How to Win the Cyber-War We're
Losing, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493pf.html.
107. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of

Cyberattack on US, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12
/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html.
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"[t]his is a pre-9/1 1 moment."' 08 Finally, with respect to cyberespionage,
Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism czar in the Clinton and both Bush
administrations, warned of an impending "death of a thousand cuts
[whereby] we lose our competitiveness by having all of our research and
development stolen by the Chinese."' 09
Whatever one may think of the merits of these claims,1o it is clear that
despite corporate America's increasing awareness of, and investment in,
cybersecurity, our digital assets and infrastructure routinely are being
exploited. U.S. victims of major cyberincidents'"1 over the past few years
108. Julian E. Barnes & Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Readies Cyberdefense, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 11, 2012, 10:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article /SB10000872396390444
657804578051071681887566.html.
109. Emil Protalinski, Richard Clarke: China Has Hacked Every Major US

Company, ZDNET (Mar. 27, 2012, 6:04 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security
/richard-clarke-china-has-hacked-every-major-us-company/i 1125.
110. Bruce Schneier, The Threat of Cyberwar Has Been Grossly Exaggerated,

(July 7, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.schneier.com/blog
/archives/2010/07/the threat-of c.html ("[T]he entire national debate on cyberwar is
plagued with exaggerations and hyperbole."); Maggie Shiels, Cyber War Threat
Exaggerated Claims Security Expert, BBC (last updated Feb. 16, 2011, 4:21 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12473809 (reporting on claims that the threat
of cyberwar is greatly exaggerated and quoting security expert Bruce Schneier, who
said that, instead of cyberwar, "we are seeing . . . an increasing use of war-like tactics
and that is what is confusing us"); Barnes & Gorman, supra note 108 (explaining that,
according to one expert, then-Secretary Panetta's remarks "described the gravest attack
Americans might face, not the most likely," and that the 9/11 tragedy in which over
3,000 people died is "an unlikely scenario for a cyberthreat ... in the near term").
111. Although this Article focuses on the United States, other countries are not
immune from cyberexploitation, as recent breaches involving foreign aerospace,
defense, and manufacturing industries illustrate. See, e.g., Japan Confesses Data
Breach on Epsilon Rocket, VOICE OF RUSSIA (Dec. 3, 2012, 2:04 PM),
http://english.ruvr.ru/2012 11_30/Japan-confesses-data-breach-on-Epsilon-rocket/
(describing a recent breach at the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency ("JAXA") that
resulted in exfiltration of sensitive data about Japan's rocket program, including the
"parameters" and "specifics of engine maintenance" for Japan's solid-fueled Epsilon
Rocket). Notably, solid-fuel rockets of Epsilon's size can be used as intercontinental
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY

ballistic missiles. See also Matteo Emanuello, Epsilon Rocket Data Stolen by Hackers,
SPACE SAFETY MAGAZINE (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:36), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com
/2012/12/05/epsilon-rocket-data-stolen-hackers/; Nicole Perlroth, Nissan Is Latest
Company to Get Hacked, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Apr. 24, 2012, 12:34 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/nissan-is-latest-company-to-get-hacked/
("Nissan confirmed its computer systems were hacked .... The attack is just the latest
in a string of cyberattacks on corporations . . . ."); Eric Savitz, Military Contractor

Mitsubishi Heavy Hit by Hack Attack, FORBES (Sept.

19, 2011,

12:43 PM),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2011/09/19/military-contractor-mitsubishiheavy-hit-by-hack-attack/ (describing a "major hack attack" on Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries in which data reportedly was exfiltrated from "the Japanese industrial giant
that makes submarines, missiles and components for nuclear power plants"). David
Leppard, Chinese Steal Jet Secrets from BAE, THE SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 11, 2012),
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uknews/National/article991581 .ece
("Chinese spies hacked into computers belonging to BAE Systems, Britain's biggest
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include: U.S. Chamber of Commerce (May 2010),' 12 Google (June
2010)," RSA Security (May 201 1),114 Sony (May 2011; October 2012),"1
Booz Allen Hamilton (July 2011),1i6 U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission (September 2011),"1 twenty-three natural gas
pipeline operators (December 2011-June 2012),"' Global Payments
(March 2012),119 numerous financial services companies and the New York
Stock Exchange (September 2012-March 2013),120 the White House
defence company, to steal details about the design, performance and electronic systems
of the West's latest fighter jet . . . prompt[ing] fears that the jet's radar capabilities
could have been compromised.").
112. Nicole Perlroth, Hacked Chamber of Commerce Opposed Cybersecurity Law,
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Dec. 21, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com
/2011/12/21/hacked-chamber-of-commerce-opposed-cybersecurity-law/
("The United
States Chamber of Commerce has confirmed Chinese hackers last year broke into
internal networks.").
113. See infra note 158.
114. Riva Richmond, The RSA Hack: How They Did It, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG
(Apr. 2, 2011, 3:17 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/the-rsa-hack-howthey-did-it/.
115. Christopher MacManus, Sony's PlayStation 3 Experiences Its Biggest Hack
Yet, CNET (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:48 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938 10557539756-1 /sonys-playstation-3-experiences-its-biggest-hack-yet/; Jason Shreier, Sony
Hacked Again; 25 Million Entertainment Users' Info at Risk, WIRED (May 2, 2011,
7:11 PM), http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2011/05/sony-online-entertainment-hack/.
116. Andy Greenberg, Anonymous Hackers Breach Booz Allen Hamilton, Dump
90,000
Military
E-Mail
Addresses,
FORBES
(July
11,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/07/1l/anonymous-hackers-breachbooz-allen-hamilton-dump-90000-military-email-addresses/.
117. Mark Hosenball, U.S. Authorities Probe US.-China Commission Email Hack,
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/10/us-usaindia-hacking-idUSTRE80828N201201 10 ("U.S. authorities are investigating
allegations that an Indian government spy unit hacked into emails of [USCC,] an
official U.S. commission that monitors economic and security relations between the
United States and China, including cyber-security issues.").
118. Mark Clayton, Cyberattack Leaves Natural Gas Pipelines Vulnerable to
Sabotage, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com
/Environment/20 13/0227/Exclusive-Cyberattack-leaves-natural-gas-pipelinesvulnerable-to-sabotage.

119. The breach of credit card payment processor Global Payments, Inc. potentially
exposed personal information, card numbers, and card-verification codes associated
with millions of Visa and MasterCard cardholders. Global Payments estimates that the
breach affected at least 1.5 million accounts in North America and cost the company
$93.9 million dollars. Info. Sec. Media Grp., Global Payments Breach Tab: $94
Million, BANK INFO SEC. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com /globalpayments-breach-tab-94-million-a-5415/op-1.
120. Tracy Kitten, DDoS: 6 Banks Hit On Same Day, BANK INFO SEC. (Mar. 14,
2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/ddos-6-banks-hit-on-same-day-a-5607
("Six
leading U.S. banking institutions were hit by distributed-denial-of-service attacks on
March 12, the largest number of institutions to be targeted in a single day."); Perlroth,
supra note 112 (describing a massive distributed denial of service attack with
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(September 2012),I21 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (October
2012),122 major U.S. media outlets including the New York Times 123 and
Wall Street Journal (October 2012-January 2013),124 the Alabama State
Government (January 2013),125 the U.S. Sentencing Commission (January
2013),126 the U.S. Probation Office for the Eastern District of Michigan, 12 7
Large-scale
Evernote (March 2013),128 and Reddit (April 2013).129
cyberoperations uncovered during the same time period include Red
October, an alleged Chinese cyberespionage operation uncovered in
October 2012,130 and a massive operation discovered in early 2013 that
"unprecedented" volume of traffic affecting U.S. financial institutions, including Wells
Fargo, U.S. Bank, PNC, the New York Stock Exchange, and others).
121. Jana Winter & Jeremy A. Kaplan, White House Confirms Chinese Hack Attack
on
White
House
Computer,
Fox
NEWS
(Oct.
1,
2012),

http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/10/01/washington-confirms-chinese-hack-attackon-white-house-computer/.
122. Nationwide Insurance Says Data Breach Affects

. IM, ASSOCIATED PRESS

-

(Dec. 5, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nationwideinsurance-says-data-breach-affects-I l m.

THE BIG STORY

123.

Nicole Perlroth, Hackers in China Attacked the Times for Last 4 Months, N.Y.

(Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinesehackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html.
124. Siobhan Ghorman et al., Chinese Hackers Hit U.S. Media, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
SBl000142412788732
8:28 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
2013,
31,
3926104578276202952260718.html ("[The Wall Street Journal's] computer systems
had been infiltrated by Chinese hackers, apparently to monitor its China coverage.").
125. Press Release, Office of the Ala. Dep't of Homeland Sec., ALDHS Director
Details Cyber Intrusion in State IT System (Jan. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.homelandsecurity.alabama.gov/news_detail.aspx?ID=7511.
TIMES

126. Will Oremus, Aaroz Swartz Protestors Take Over Government Websites, Install

10:27 AM), http://www.slate.com
28, 2013,
Asteroids, SLATE (Jan.
/blogs/futuretense/2013/01/28/aaron swartzprotest anonymous hacksgovernment_
websites installs asteroids.html ("As part of its ongoing protest of the U.S.
government's prosecution of computer programmer and activist Aaron Swartz,
[hackers affiliated with the group known as] Anonymous . . . hacked the website of the

U.S. Sentencing Commission. . .
127. Id.
128. Doug Gross, 50 Million Compromised in Evernote Hack, CNNTECH (Mar. 4,

http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/tech/web/evernote-hacked/
4:34
PM),
2013,
(publicizing hack of Evernote, an online note-taking and archiving service with 50
million users, in which hackers accessed a variety of user information, including user
names, e-mail addresses, and encrypted passwords).
129. Dan Kaplan, Reddit site downed by DDoS attacks, SC MAGAZ[NE (Apr. 19,

2013), http://www.scmagazine.com/reddit-site-downed-by-ddosattacks/article/289680/.
130. Mathew J. Schwartz, Operation Red October Attackers Wielded Spear
PM),
3:06
2013,
18,
(January
INFORMATIONWEEK
Phishing,

http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/operation-red-october-attackerswielded/240146621 ("The primary focus of this campaign targets countries in Eastern
Europe, former USSR republics, and countries in Central Asia, although victims can be
found everywhere, including Western Europe and North America.").
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victimized Apple,' 3 ' Facebook,132 Twitter,13 3 Microsoft,134 and an estimated
forty other companies.' 35
A. Cybercrime
The term cybercrime is used to refer both to traditional crimes (e.g.,
extortion, 36 fraud, forgery, identity theft, and child exploitation) that are
committed over electronic networks and information systems as well as to
crimes unique to electronic networks (e.g., hacking and denial of service
attacks).
1. Costs of Cybercrime
By all measures, cybercrime is flourishing.'3 7 Symantec's Norton
estimates global cybercrime costs at $114 billion annually ($388 billion
131. Jim Finkle & Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Apple, Macs Hit by Hackers Who
Targeted
Facebook,
REUTERS
(Feb.
19,
2013,
4:50
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/19/us-apple-hackersidUSBRE91110920130219 ("The breaches described by Apple mark the highest-profile
cyber attacks to date on businesses running Mac computers."). The hackers are
believed to have used a browser-based Java exploit.
132. Doug Gross, Eastern European Gang Hacked Apple, Facebook, Twitter,
CNNTECH (Feb. 20, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/20/tech
/web/hacked-apple-facebook-twitter/index.html?iref=allsearch.
133. Mathew Schwartz, Twitter Pursues Two FactorAuthentication After Password
Breach,
INFORMATIONWEEK
(Feb.
4,
2013,
3:06
PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/security/application-security/twitter-pursues-twofactor-authenticatio/240147787 ("[Twitter detected] a security breach affecting an
estimated 250,000 of its 250 million users.").
134. Microsoft Hacked: Intrusion Was 'Similar' to Apple and Facebook Hacks,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Feb.
22,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013
/02/22/microsoft-hacked-apple-hacked-facebook-hacked_n 2745178.html.
135. Dara Kerr, Apple, Facebook Hackers Hit Car and Candy Companies, Too,
CNET (Mar. 11, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009 3-5757372083/apple-facebook-hackers-hit-car-and-candy-companies-too/?utmmedium=twitter
("At least some of these hacks are thought to have originated in Eastern Europe while
others are suspected to have come from China. It is unclear if all of the companies
were targeted by one group of hackers or if they were isolated incidents.").
136. See, e.g., GAVIN O'GORMAN & GEOFF McDONALD, SYMANTEC RANSOMWARE:
A GROWING MENACE
1-2, http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise
/media/securityresponse/whitepapers/ransomware-a-growing-menace.pdf
(describing
ransomware-i.e., malware that locks a target's computer and requires payment of a
fine as a condition of unlocking the computer-and "conservatively" estimating that
over $5 million per year is being extorted from ransomware victims).
INTERPOL,
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime
137. Cybercrime,
/Cybercrime (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) ("Cybercrime is one of the fastest growing areas
of crime."). Some of our most personal information is now available on the thriving
black market for a mere pittance. How Much Do You Cost on the Black Market?,
OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., http://www.ncix.gov/issues
/cyber/identitytheft.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) ("[On the black market,] [y]our
social security number, at $3, is less expensive than a McDonald's Happy Meal.").
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when you factor in downtime),138 and a highly controversial McAfee
estimate places cybercrime losses as high as $1 trillion in 2010 alone. 3 9
2. Professionalizationand Commodilization of Cybercrime
Cybercriminals have grown increasingly sophisticated, both in terms of
business models 4 0 and in terms of tools,141 leading cybercrime experts to
warn that we have entered an era of cybercrime "professionalization" and
138. Press Release, Symantec, Norton Study Calculates Cost of Global Cybercrime:
$114 Billion Annually (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.symantec.com
/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20110907 02 (describing the methodology for
arriving at the $114 billion and $388 billion figures as "extrapolations" based on a
survey of over 12,000 adults conducted in twenty-four countries).
139. See Robert Richardson, Bigger Than a Trillium, COMPUTER SEC. INST.,
http://gocsi.com/public/trillium (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (explaining that the $1
trillion estimate comes not from a McAfee report, but from company talking points);
Keith Alexander's Remarks, supra note 74, at 09:29 ("McAfee estimates that $1 trillion
was spent globally on remediation."); see also President Barack Obama, Remarks by
the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure (May 29, 2009), available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-on-Cybersecurity#transcript
(citing McAfee's estimate of $1 trillion in cybercrime losses). But see Andy
Greenberg, McAfee Explains the Dubious Math Behind Its 'Unscientific' $1 Trillion
Data Loss Claim, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg
/2012/08/03/mcafee-explains-the-dubious-math-behind-its-unscientific-1-trillion-dataloss-claim/ (questioning the validity of the $1 trillion estimate, which McAfee has
called a "ballpark figure" and "unscientific," but noting that McAfee stands by the
estimate, saying that it was not simply made up); Peter Maas & Megha Rajagopalan,
Does Cybercrime Really Cost $1 Trillion?, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:12 AM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/does-cybercrime-really-cost- I-trillion (criticizing the
validity of the $1 trillion estimate and reporting that Ross Anderson, a well-known

security researcher at the University of Cambridge, called the "intellectual quality" of
the $1 trillion estimate "below abysmal").

See generally Ross ANDERSON ET AL.,
(June
26,
2012),
http://lyle.smu.edu/~tylerm/weisl2pres.pdf (calling existing cybercrime estimates "eyepoppingly large," identifying methodological flaws in certain reports on costs of
MEASURING

THE

COST

OF

CYBERCRIME

cybercrime, and offering a framework for analyzing the costs of cybercrime).
140. See TRENDMICRO, THE BUSINESS OF CYBERCRIME: A COMPLEX
MODEL

5

(2010),

BUSINESS

http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-

intelligence/reports/rpt business-of-cybercrime.pdf ("[C]yber scams are often part of
an intricate, highly sophisticated and highly organized [cybercrime] business model
based on the concept of affiliate marketing."); Jim Finkle, Inside a Global Cybercrime
Ring, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2010, 11:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2010/03/24/us-technology-scareware-idUSTRE62N29T20100324
(describing
Innovative Marketing, a "complex underground corporate empire with [cybercrime]

operations stretching from Eastern Europe to Bahrain; from India and Singapore to the
United States" with estimated revenue of about $180 million in 2008, as a "scareware"
pioneer whose programs "pretend to scan a computer for viruses and then tell the user
that their machine is infected" in order to scam users into paying to clean their PCs).

141. See, e.g., Rachael King, Operation High Roller Targets Corporate Bank
Accounts, WALL ST. J. CIO J. (June 26, 2012, 9:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012
/06/26/operation-high-roller-targets-corporate-bank-accounts/ ("Operation High Roller
is characterized by extensive automation.").
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"commoditization of attack codes."l 42
With respect to the "professionalization" of cybercrime, there is
substantial evidence that cybercriminals are adopting "time-tested business
processes to enhance the profitability of crime syndicates worldwide." 4 3
As one journalist explains:
The disturbing trend in cybercrime is the "enterprise-class" approach
crime syndicates take to grow their businesses. Today's syndicates
employ hierarchies of participants with roles that mirror the executive
suite, middle management and the rank and file. The executive suite
oversees strategy and operations that initiate nefarious acts. Recruiters
identify "infantry" that carry out large-scale attack schemes on a
permanent hire or outsource (affiliate) basis. They also . . . mold reward
programs to pay affiliates once successful attacks are carried out. . . .
[W]ith creative profit-sharing flair, crime syndicates are continuing to
grow sophisticated pay-per-click/install/purchase affiliate programs to
reward up and coming cybercriminal affiliates on a performance-based
scale. [And] taking a page out of Wall Street, crime syndicates are
engaging in mergers and acquisitions to grow their botnets . . . .144
Simultaneously, we are witnessing the commoditization of cybercrime
tools. While hacking once required considerable technical expertise,
cybercrime toolkits are now available as commodities on the black
market,145 as are so-called "zero-day" exploits, which are used to exploit
142. Tom Kellermann, Panel 1: The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected,
Interoperable, and Intelligent at the American University Law Review Symposium:
America the Virtual: Security, Privacy, and Interoperability in an Interconnected World
(Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://www.aulawreview.com/index.php?view
=vidlink&catid=1:symposium-2012&id=155:promise-and-peril-ofinterconnectivity&option=com vidlinks&ltemid= 150 ("You no longer need to learn to
build a gun to learn to pull the trigger . . . [adversaries] don't have to build an AK-47;
they just need to learn to use it.").
143. Derek Manky, Why Cybercrime Remains Big Business - And How to Stop It,

FORBES (Feb. 1, 2013, 5:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentraU2013/02/01
/why-cybercrime-remains-big-business-and-how-to-stop-it/.
144. Id. (describing how competition between two rival crimeware kits-Zeus and
SpyEye-hurt profits for both, leading the botnet owners to "merge[] source code,
retire[] Zeus support, and pass[] the torch to SpyEye.").
145. See id ("Zeus, circa 2007, peaked in 2010 as the most prolific banking crime
kit around. The crimeware kit would create new versions of powerful malware which
had the capability to steal banking credentials, as well as hijack and manipulate secure
online banking sessions."); RSA, RSA 2012 CYBERCRIME TRENDS REPORT: THE
CURRENT STATE OF CYBERCRIME AND WHAT TO EXPECT IN 2012 (2012),
http://www.rsa.com/products/consumer/whitepapers/Il 634_CYBRCl2_WP 01 12.pdf
("The more savvy criminals offer their goods and services to those who may be starting
out or are in need of set-up and instructions. Whether selling off-the-shelf botnets,
Trojans by the binary, or Zeus recompiles, the underground is loaded with tools to
allow any 'newbie' cybercriminal to launch an attack.").
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previously unknown vulnerabilities. 14 6 The black market demand for such
exploits is driven by those who lack the "technical sophistication to find
their own vulnerabilities and launch attacks," and the black market
functions relatively efficiently with "Google-like search engines
connect[ing] those who have discovered the vulnerability with customers
who have the money to buy the knowledge," whether nation-states,
criminals, terrorists, or hacktivists.14 7
B. Cyberespionage
Every major company in the United States has already been penetrated
by China.
-Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism expert and
special advisor on cybersecurity to PresidentClinton148

"Cyberespionage" in this Article refers to state-sponsored theft of
industrial and defense secrets and/or intellectual property. 14 9 General Keith
Alexander, who is dual-hatted as director of the NSA and chair of U.S.
Cyber Command,15 0 recently characterized the volume of intellectual
146. Andy Greenberg, Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers' Secret
Software Exploits, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/andygreenberg/201 2/03/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-secretsoftware-exploits/ (documenting the black market for so-called "zero-day" exploits or
"cyberweaponry"); Stew Magnuson, Growing Black Market for Cyber-Attack Tools
Scares Senior DoD Official, NAT'L DEF. MAGAZINE (Feb. 22, 2013, 2:49 PM),
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog /Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1064 ("There
has been a black market for those willing to sell knowledge of [zero-day exploits] for
years. That market has now moved into the world of supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems that run power plants," according to Eric Rosenbach,
deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy).
147. Magnuson, supra note 146 ("[The] growing black market for zero-day
vulnerabilities is allowing almost anyone with the cash to buy the means to launch
destructive cyber-attacks against U.S. industrial control systems .... ).
148. Ron Rosenbaum, Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack,
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history(Apr. 2012),
MAG.
SMITHSONIAN
archaeology/Richard-Clarke-on-Who-Was-Behind-the-StuxnetAttack.html?c=y&story=fullstory.
149. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Online Threat: Should We Be Worried About a
Cyberwar?, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting
/2010/11/01/101101fa fact hersh.
150. Cyber Command, or CYBERCOM, "coordinates defense of the military part of
the Internet, the '.mil' domain, and conducts offensive computer network operations as
ordered." SPADE, supra note 23, at 28. See US. Cyber Command Factsheet, U.S.
STRATEGIC

COMMAND,

http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/CyberCommand/

(last

updated Dec. 2011) ("USCYBERCOM is responsible for planning, coordinating,
integrating, synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and defend the
Department of Defense information networks and when directed, conducts fullspectrum military cyberspace operations (in accordance with all applicable laws and
regulations) in order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while
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property theft the United States experiences as "astounding"' 5 ' and publicly
stated that, in his opinion, it is the "greatest transfer of wealth in history."l 52
Some prominent examples of cyberespionage include: Moonlight Maze
(1998);'15 Byzantine Hades (2002);154 Operation Titan Rain (2003);15
denying the same to our adversaries."); see also Joanna Stern & Luis Martinez,
Pentagon Cyber Command: Higher Status Recommended, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2012),

http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/pentagon-cyber-command-unit-recommendedelevated-combatant-status/story?id=I 6262052#.UMU444QgqY.
151.

Keith Alexander's Remarks, supranote 74, at 34:30.

152. Id. at 09:06-09:11.

Cybersecurity expert Dmitri Alperovitch, the Chief

Technology Officer of CrowdStrike, Inc., appears to have coined this phrase in August
2011 while working as Vice President of Threat Research at McAfee, Inc. See
ALPEROVITCH, supra note 96, at 2 ("What we have witnessed over the past five to six
years has been nothing short of a historically unprecedented transfer of wealth-closely
guarded national secrets (including those from classified government networks), source
code, bug databases, email archives, negotiation plans and exploration details for new
oil and gas field auctions, document stores, legal contracts, supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) configurations, design schematics, and much more has
'fallen off the truck' of numerous, mostly Western companies and disappeared in the
ever-growing electronic archives of dogged adversaries."); see also Dean Takahashi,
Black Hat's Spotlight Falls on McAfee's Dmitri Alperovitch for Uncovering
Cyberspying,
VENTURE
BEAT
(Aug.
4,
2011,
7:00
AM),

http://venturebeat.com/2011/08/04/black-hats-spotlight-falls-on-mcafees-dmitrialperovitch-for-uncovering-cyber-spying/ (quoting Alperovitch, who called the
widespread, China-based "Shady RAT" cyberespionage campaign the "biggest transfer
of wealth in terms of intellectual property in human history").
153. Moonlight Maze refers to a series of intrusions into the U.S. Department of
Defense ("DoD") computers that began in March 1998 and lasted for three years.
Moonlight Maze probed computers at NASA, the Pentagon, the Department of Energy,
and private institutions, accessing "troop configurations, maps of military installations,
and military hardware designs" in what was then deemed the "largest sustained cyberattack on the United States." Jessica Bourquin, The Evolution of Cyber Espionage: A
Case for an Offensive U.S. Counterintelligence Strategy 11 (Oct. 14, 2011)
(unpublished student white paper), available at https://www.treadstone7l.com
/index.php/news-info-whitepapers/masters-in-cybersecurity-intelligence-andforensics/doc download/48-the-evolution-of-cyber-espionage-j essica-bourquin.
Experts traced the attacks to Moscow but could not confirm that Russia was
responsible for the attacks. Id. at 12.
154. Byzantine Hades refers to a decade-long series of attacks believed to be
perpetrated by the Chinese military. Brian Grow & Mark Hosenball, Special Report:
In Cyberspy vs. Cyberspy, China Has the Edge, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2011, 3:52 PM)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/14/us-china-usa-cyberespionageidUSTRE73D24220110414 ("Secret U.S. State Department cables, obtained by
WikiLeaks and made available to Reuters by a third party, trace systems breaches colorfully named "Byzantine Hades" by U.S. investigators - to the Chinese military.
An April 2009 cable even pinpoints the attacks to a specific unit of China's People's
Liberation Army.") These attacks, which generally rely on spear-phishing, have
resulted in the exfiltration of terabytes of sensitive information from the U.S.
government and private sector companies, including "designs for multi-billion dollar
weapons systems," see id., such as the blueprints for the "quiet electric drive" that U.S.
submarines use for stealth operation. Bourquin, supra note 153, at 13; Mathew J.
Schwartz, Leaked Cables Indicate Chinese Military Hackers Attacked U.S.,
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Operation Buckshot Yankee (2008);156 Operation Night Dragon (2008201 1);'5 Operation Aurora (2009); 158 penetration of Lockheed Martin,

INFORMATIONWEEK (Apr. 19, 2011, 1:09 PM), http://www.informationweek.com
/security/attacks/leaked-cables-indicate-chinese-military/229401866;
Michael Riley

and John Walcott, China-BasedHacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War,

(Dec. 14, 2011, 8:47 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1213/china-based-hacking-of-760-companies-reflects-undeclared-global-cyber-war.html.
155. "Operation Titan Rain" refers to a series of security breaches that targeted
sensitive, but unclassified information.
The Department of Defense "has
acknowledged that the majority of such incidents ... were orchestrated by China as a
method of cyber-espionage." Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100
CALIF. L. REv. 817, 829 (2012). Beginning in 2003, the Titan Rain cyberespionage
team successfully exfiltrated sensitive information from DoD as well as private sector
companies supporting the military's mission. Exfiltrated data included copies of U.S.
Air Force flight-planning software, "specifications for the aviation-mission-planning
system used in Army helicopters," and "hundreds of detailed schematics on propulsion
systems." Bourquin, supra note 153, at 15.
156. In 2008, DoD "suffered a significant compromise of its classified military
BLOOMBERG

computer networks."
Melissa E. Hathaway, Leadership and Responsibility for
Cybersecurity, GEO. J. OF INT'L AFF. (2012), at 71, 72. Specifically, Central Command,

which was overseeing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, was penetrated through an
infected USB drive. "Operation Buckshot Yankee" was the codename for recovery
from this incident. Id.
157. "Night Dragon" is the code name for a cyberespionage campaign leveled
against six global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, including Exxon Mobil,
Royal Dutch Shell, and BP. The attack has been described as a "systemic long-term
compromise of [the] Western oil and gas industry." ALPEROVITCH, supra note 96, at 2.
It is believed to have lasted from 2008 to 2011, during which time Chinese cyberspies
are alleged to have stolen valuable intellectual property including: bidding information,
prospecting data including computerized topographical maps worth "millions of
dollars" that show locations of potential oil reserves, and highly sensitive confidential
business information. Michael Riley, Exxon, Shell, BP Said to Have Been Hacked
Through Chinese Internet Servers, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2011, 3:26 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-24/exxon-shell-bp-said-to-have-beenhacked-through-chinese-internet-servers.html.
The tools, techniques, and network
activities associated with the attack were traced back to China. ALPEROVITCH, supra
note 96, at 2.
158. "Operation Aurora" refers to a successful Chinese cyberespionage campaign
against Google and thirty-three other major U.S. companies (reportedly including Intel,
Dow Chemical, Morgan Stanley, and computer security guru, Symantec). While
reports initially suggested that the cyberspies were trying to hack primarily into Gmail
accounts of Chinese dissidents as part of an effort to quell dissent, security experts later
opined that the cyberspies were in fact targeting Google's sensitive systems and
intellectual property. David Drummond, A New Approach to China, GOOGLE PUB.
POL'Y BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 6:53 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com
/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html. Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked
Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 28, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html
(reporting that leaked
American diplomatic cables indicate that "China's Politburo directed the intrusion into
Google's computer systems," and that the "Google hacking was part of a coordinated
campaign of computer sabotage carried out [in part] by government operatives").
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BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman (2009);159 Operation Shady RAT
(2006);160 GhostNet (2009);161 the RSA Breach (201 1);162 and twenty-three
natural gas pipeline operators (December 2011-June 2012).163

159. Chinese cyberspies are alleged to have stolen several terabytes of classified
data related to the design and electronics system of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the
Pentagon's $300 billion weapons project. Specifically, in 2009, cyberspies attacked
networks belonging to several major western defense contractors, including Lockheed
Martin and Northrop Grumman in the United States and BAE Systems in the United
Kingdom. See Siobhan Gorman et al., Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project,

2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article
(Apr.
21,
ST.
J.
/SB124027491029837401.html.
160. "Operation Shady RAT" refers to a five-year cyberspying campaign allegedly
perpetrated by the Chinese that successfully penetrated the computer networks of more
than seventy governments and major corporations (including thirteen defense
contractors) in fourteen countries. Approximately fifty targets were in the United
States. The list of governments and institutions believed to have been infiltrated
includes the United States, Taiwan, Vietnam, Canada, the United Nations, the Olympic
committees in three countries, and the International Olympic Committee. See
ALPEROVITCH, supra note 96, at 2-4; Takahashi, supra note 152.
161. GhostNet refers to a "vast" malware-based cyberespionage network exposed in
2009 that penetrated more than 1200 computer systems in 103 countries. RON DIEBERT
WALL

& RAFAL ROHOJINSKI, TRACKING GHOSTNET: INVESTIGATING A CYBER ESPIONAGE
MONITOR
5
(Mar.
29, 2009),
INFORMATION
WARFARE
http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-CyberNETWORK,

Espionage-Network; see John Markoff, Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103

Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29
/technology/29spy.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=0F9A5B2A394E6EF2A8B207BOD830
5565. The GhostNet remote access tool may have been created by the same
organization as Byzantine Hades. Bourquin, supra note 153, at 13.
162. RSA Security's products protect computer networks at the White House, CIA,
NSA, Pentagon, Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), most top defense
contractors, and the majority of Fortune 500 companies. RSA is best known for the
SecurID key fob that forty million employees across the globe use to remotely access
their employer's computer networks. In May 2011, hackers breached the servers at
RSA and stole information that could be used to compromise the security of the fobs
used to access sensitive corporate and government networks. Chinese hackers are
believed to have targeted RSA in order to compromise defense contractors and
government agencies using RSA's technology, a view borne out by the fact that shortly
after the attack on RSA, Lockheed Martin was attacked using information gained from
the RSA attack. See Siobhan Gorman & Shara Tibken, Security 'Tokens' Take Hit,
WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI00014240527023049
06004576369990616694366.html ("[RSA Security] openly acknowledged for the first
time that intruders had breached its security systems at defense contractor Lockheed
Martin Corp. using data stolen from RSA."). The subsequent investigation revealed
that hackers used spearphishing (described at supra note 84) to gain access to RSA's
servers.
163. Clayton, supra note 118 ("Cyberspies linked to China's military targeted nearly
two dozen U.S. natural gas pipeline operators over a recent six-month period, stealing
information that could be used to sabotage U.S. gas pipelines.").

256

AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA WREVIEW

Vol. 2:2

1. Costs of Cyberespionage

By some reports, cyberespionage is estimated to cost the United States
(in terms of lost jobs, innovation, and national security) and its corporations
(in terms of lost intellectual property, remediation, and reduced consumer
confidence) up to $200 billion annually,'64 but reliably quantifying the
potentially staggering costs of cyberespionage has been an elusive goal.
Obstacles include the fact that many companies do not know that they have
been victimized and even those that do know are often reluctant to disclose
out of concern for their reputation. Moreover, "victims of trade secret theft
use different methods to estimate their losses; some base estimates on the
actual costs of developing the stolen information, while others project the
loss of future revenues and profits."' 6 5
2. Advanced PersistentThreats

One particularly insidious form of cyberespionage is known as an
advanced persistent threat ("APT"). APTs are highly targeted malwarebased attacksl 6 6 with several distinguishing features. First, as their name
suggests, APTs are often-though not always-advanced.167 In many
cases, they "utilize the full spectrum of computer intrusion technologies
and techniques" and "combine multiple attack methodologies and tools in
order to reach and compromise their target." 68 Second, APTs are

164. J.P. London, Made In China, 137 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS MAG. (Apr.
2011),
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-04/made-china#footnotes
("Cyber espionage alone is estimated to cost the United States up to $200 billion a

year."); see Mike McConnell et al., China's Cyber Thievery is National Policy-And
Must
Be
Challenged,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
27,
2012),
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/WSJ-China-OpEd.pdf ("[I]t is also difficult to
estimate the economic costs of [cyberespionage] ... to the U.S. . . . [but] we think it is
safe to say that [it is] . . . billions of dollars and millions of jobs.").

165.

OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE i (2011), http://www.ncix.gov/publications
/reports/fecieall/ForeignEconomicCollection_2011 .pdf [hereinafter NCIX, FOREIGN
SPIES].

US

166. See What is Malware?, MICROSOFT SAFETY & SEC. CTR.,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/resources/malware-whatis.aspx (last visited Apr. 1,

2013) ("Malware is any kind of unwanted software that is installed without your

adequate consent.").
167. Contra Kelly Jackson Higgins, Government Agencies Get Creative in APT
Battle, DARK READING (Oct. 3, 2012, 7:31 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/threatintelligence/167901121 /security/news/24000843 8/government-agencies-get-creative-

in-apt-battle.html (quoting Australian cybersecurity expert David Cottingham, who
asserts that APTs are "not actually that advanced at all" and are more like "targeted,
persistent threats").
168. Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), DAMBALLA, https://www.damballa.com
/knowledge/advanced-persistent-threats.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
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persistent.16 9 APT operators seek long-term access to their targets, with
attack objectives generally extending beyond immediate financial gain.170
In order to maintain long-term access to targets, APTs generally operate
stealthily for as long as possible.171 Finally, APTs rely on "skilled,
motivated, organized and well-funded" operators to coordinate and execute
attacks.172 The substantial resources required to operate APTs generally
makes them a tool of nation-states. At their essence, APTs are "computer
intrusions staged by threat actors that aggressively pursue and compromise
specific targets, often leveraging social engineering or the 'art of
manipulation,' in order to maintain a persistent presence within the victim's
network so that they can move laterally and extract sensitive
information."173
APTs traditionally targeted government and military networks.17 4 Now,
they also target "the defense industrial base and high tech companies, the
energy and finance sectors, telecommunications companies as well as
media outlets, civil society organizations and academic institutions."
Law firms and other small- and medium-sized businesses that work with
large companies increasingly are being targeted because they often are
entrusted with clients' most sensitive information, yet have weaker cyber
defenses. 176
169. Press Release, Mandiant, Mandiant Releases Annual Threat Report on
at
available
2013,
13,
Mar.
Attacks,
Targeted
Advanced
https://www.mandiant.com/news/release/mandiant-releases-annual-threat-report-onadvanced-targeted-attacksl/ ("Attackers spend an estimated 243 days on a victim's
network before they are discovered.").
170. DAMBALLA, supra note 168.
171. See Higgins, supra note 167 ("Cyberespionage attacks are often camouflaged
to maintain their foothold in the victim's network."); DAMBALLA, supra note 168
("[O]perators of APT technologies tend to focus on 'low and slow' attacks-stealthily
moving from one compromised host to the next, without generating regular or
predictable network traffic-to hunt for their specific data or system objectives.
Tremendous effort is invested to ensure that malicious actions cannot be observed by
legitimate operators of the systems.").
172. DAMBALLA, supra note 168.
173. Developments in China's Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities:Hearing Before the
U.S.-China Econ. and Security Rev. Comm'n, 112th Cong. 29 (2012) [hereinafter Devs.
in China's Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities] (statement of Nart Villeneuve, Senior

http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files
TrendMicro),
Threat Researcher,
/transcripts/3.26.12HearingTranscript.pdf.
174. Id. at 31.
175. Id at 29.
176. Think That Cyber Espionage Only Happens to Big Companies? Think Again.
Hackers Are Targeting Smaller Companies, RDINSIGHTS (Nov. 5, 2012),

http://www.rdinsights.com/2012/1 1/think-that-cyber-espionage-only-happens-to-bigcompanies-think-again-hackers-are-targeting-smaller-companies-vendors-andsuppliers/ (asserting that small- and medium-sized businesses have weaker
cybersecurity measures "in terms of infrastructure and personnel training" and noting
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APTs are likely to remain one of the most serious concerns for U.S.
businesses for some years to come,177 but with the explosive growth of
mobile broadband and cloud computing, experts are warning that mobilemalware,178 including mobile "drive-by-downloads," 79 and cloud-based
attacks 80 may be the "next big thing."
3.

CyberespionageImplications

Regardless of the type of attack and specific attack vector,18
cyberespionage poses a serious threat to U.S. economic and national
security. On the national security side, cyberespionage has been dubbed
"the biggest intelligence disaster since the loss of nuclear secrets [in the
late 1940s]."l82 Perpetrators "not only gather[] information, but can map
networks for future attacks and can leave behind backdoors or malware

that without "on-going security auditing" smaller companies may not know if they
were hacked or how much client information has been compromised).
177. Kaspersky Lab Predicts Core Threats for 2013, NET SEC. (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=14072 ("Kaspersky Lab expects . . .
targeted attacks, with the purpose of cyber-espionage, to continue in 2013 and beyond,
becoming the most significant threat for businesses.").
178. ESET, TRENDS FOR 2013: ASTOUNDING GROWTH OF MOBILE MALWARE 2
(2012),
http://go.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/Trends for 2013 preview.pdf
("[W]e see as the main trend for 2013 an exponential growth of mobile malware.");
TRENDMICRO, SECURITY THREATS TO BUSINESS, THE DIGITAL LIFESTYLE, AND THE
CLOUD: TREND MICRO PREDICTIONS FOR 2013 AND BEYOND 1 (2012),
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/spotlightarticles/sp-trend-micro-predictions-for-2013-and-beyond.pdf
("The
volume
of
malicious and high-risk Android apps will hit 1 million in 2013.").
179. See VERIZON, supra note 91, at 27 (explaining that drive-by downloads are
auto-executed web-based malware); Drive-By Downloads: How They Attack and How
to
Defend Yourself
TECHNEWSDAILY
(May
18,
2012,
9:01
AM),
("Drive-by
http://www.technewsdaily.com/7789-driveby-download-definition.html
downloads are malicious pieces of software that are downloaded to a computer, tablet
or smartphone when the user views a compromised Web page or HTML-based email
message. In many cases, the malware will be automatically installed on the system.").
180. NET SEC., supra note 177 ("[2013 will bring an] increase in cybercriminal
attacks targeting cloud-based services.").
181. An attack vector is the technical term used by cybersecurity experts to describe
"the approach used to assault a computer system or network." Attack Vector, PC MAG.,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia term/0%2C1237%2Ct%3Dattack+vector&i%3D
57711%2C00.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
182. War in the Fifth Domain: Are the Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons of
Conflict?, ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16478792
(quoting James Lewis at CSIS); see Letter from Michael Chertoff et al. to Harry Reid

&

Mitch

McConnell,

U.S.

Senators

(June

6,

2012),

available at

http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/cybersecurity-support-letter-from-top-nationalsecurity-leaders ("(The cyberthreat] represents one of the most serious challenges to
our national security since the onset of the nuclear age sixty years ago.").
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designed to execute or facilitate [a future] attack."1 8 3 With respect to the
implications of cyberespionage for economic security, Richard Clarke, the
former counterterrorism czar in three U.S. presidential administrations,
recently offered this grim warning:
Every major company in the United States has already been penetrated
by China.
My greatest fear . .. is that, rather than having a cyber-Pearl Harbor
event, we will instead have this death of a thousand cuts. Where we lose
our competitiveness by having all of our research and development
stolen by the Chinese. And we never really see the single event that
makes us do something about it. That it's always just below our pain
threshold. That company after company in the United States spends
millions, hundreds of millions, in some cases billions of dollars on R&D
and that information goes free to China.. . . After a while you can't
compete. 184
4. Perpetratorsof Cyberespionage

Many countries-including Russia, France, Israel, India, Japan, and
Taiwan-are believed to engage in cyberespionage,185 but according to
most cybersecurity experts, China is in a class by itself.186 China has both
the ability and the motivation to engage in a campaign of
cyberespionage, 187 given the close relationship between China's military
183. SPADE, supra note 23, at 7.
184. Rosenbaum, supra note 148; see ALPEROVITCH, supra note 96, at 3 ("[I]f even

a fraction of [the petabytes of exfiltrated data] is used to build better competing
products or beat a competitor at a key negotiation (due to having stolen the other
team's playbook), the loss represents a massive economic threat not just to individual
companies and industries but to entire countries that face the prospect of decreased
economic growth in a suddenly more competitive landscape and the loss of jobs in
industries that lose out to unscrupulous competitors in another part of the world. And
let's not forget the national security impact of the loss of sensitive intelligence or
defense information.").
185. Hersh, supra note 149 ("[According to a] retired four-star Navy admiral . . .
Russia, France, Israel, and Taiwan conduct the most cyber espionage against the
U.S."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 6-7 ("Espionage has a long

history and is nearly always practiced in both directions. For the U.S. and many other
states, traditional espionage has been a state-sponsored intelligence-gathering function
focused on national security, defense, and foreign policy issues. The United States
Government collects foreign intelligence via cyberspace, and does so in compliance
with all applicable laws, policies, and procedures. The conduct of all U.S. intelligence
operations is governed by long-standing and well-established considerations, to include
the possibility those operations could be interpreted as a hostile act.").
186. U.S.-CHINA EcoN. & SEC. REV. COMM'N, 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS 155
(2012), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual reports/2012-Report-toCongress.pdf.
187. See Stuart Fox, Hacker Attacks on US Reveal China's Weakness,
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and its state-owned companies;'8 the lack of independent research and
development in China;' 8 9 and the state of the Chinese economy.' 90 Chinese
actors are considered "the world's most active and persistent perpetrators
of economic espionage," according to a 2011 National Counterintelligence
Executive Report to Congress,' 9 ' and cyberespionage is believed to be an
important component of China's long-term economic development
strategy. 192 According to three former high-ranking U.S. government
officials-the former Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of
Homeland Security, and Deputy Secretary of Defense-"[t]he Chinese
government has a national policy of economic espionage in cyberspace." 9 3
TECHNEWSDAILY (Jan. 11, 2012, 4:32 PM), http://www.technewsdaily.com/7457chinese-hacking-espionage-weakness.html.
188. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM'N, supra note 186, at 156 ("The

state controls up to 50 percent of the Chinese economy, and industrial espionage
appears to be a key mission of the Chinese intelligence services."); see also REP. MIKE
ROGERS & REP. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE iv
(Comm.
Print
2011),
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov
/files/documents/Huawei-ZTE%20Investigative%2OReport%20(FINAL).pdf
(warning
U.S. companies and government agencies not to do business with China's Huawei and
ZTE, the world's second and fifth largest manufacturers of routers, based on concerns
about supply chain security).
189. See, e.g., Michael A. Riley & Ashlee Vance, China Corporate Espionage
Boom Knocks Wind out of U.S. Companies, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/china-corporate-espionage-boom-

knocks-wind-out-of-u-s-companies.html

(paraphrasing

Harvard

Business School

professor Willy Shih's comments that the Chinese "need to build a research and
development culture that can supersede their skills at mimicry"); China's
Pharmaceutical Industry Lacks Innovation, Lags Behind, WORLDWATCH INST.,

http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3923 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) ("China's
pharmaceutical industry still lacks independent and efficient research and development
capabilities . . . ."). See generally McConnell et al., supra note 164.

190. McConnell et al., supra note 164 ("China has a massive, inexpensive work
force ravenous for economic growth.").
191. NCIX, FOREIGN SPIES, supra note 165, at i; see McConnell et al., supra note
164 ("Evidence indicates that China intends to help build its economy by intellectualproperty theft rather than by innovation and investment in research and development . .
192. Siobhan Gorman, China Singled Out for Cyberspying, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424052970203716204577015540198801
540.html (according to a senior intelligence official, "economic espionage is condoned

by both China and Russia and is part of each country's national economic development
policy"); KREKEL ET AL., supra note 23, at 107 ("The apparent expansion of China's
computer network exploitation (CNE) activities to support espionage has opened rich
veins of previously inaccessible information that can be mined both in support of
national security concerns and, more significantly, for national economic
development.").
193. McConnell et al., supra note 164; see NCIX, FOREIGN SPIES, supra note 165, at
5 (accusing not only China, but also Russia of using cyberespionage to steal U.S.
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Although China repeatedly has denied involvement in cyberespionage,1 94
there is extensive evidence tying China to cyberespionage campaigns.1 95
First, and most obviously, U.S. companies have reported numerous Chinese
attempts to steal "client lists, merger and acquisition data, pricing
information, and the results of research and development efforts."1 96
Second, the 2013 National Intelligence Estimate ("NIE"), a classified
document reflecting the "consensus view of the U.S. intelligence
community,"l97 reportedly concluded that "the United States is the target of
a massive, sustained cyber-espionage campaign that is threatening the
country's economic competitiveness." 9 8 According to press reports based
on interviews of individuals familiar with the report, the NIE identified
China "as the country most aggressively seeking to penetrate the computer
systems of American business and institutions." 99

industrial secrets as a matter of national policy).
194. In January 2013, the Chinese Defense Ministry stated: "It is unprofessional and
groundless to accuse the Chinese military of launching cyber attacks without any
conclusive evidence," and in February 2013, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesman HongLei asserted: "China resolutely opposes hacking actions and has
established relevant laws and regulations and taken strict law enforcement measures to
defend against online hacking activities." David E. Sanger et al., Chinese Army Unit Is
Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-tohacking-against-us.html; see Thom Shanker, U.S. Report Accuses China and Russia of

Internet Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11
("[Chinese]
/04/world/us-report-accuses-china-and-russia-of-intemet-spying.html
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said, 'The Chinese government opposes
hacking in all its manifestations.' ").
195. See, e.g., NCIX, FOREIGN SPIES, supra note 165, at 5; KREKEL ET AL., supra
note 23, at 100; Michael Riley & Dune Lawrence, Hackers Linked to China's Army
Seen

From

EU

to

D.C.,

BLOOMBERG

(July

26,

2012,

7:00

PM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-26/china-hackers-hit-eu-point-man-and-d-cwith-byzantine-candor.html; see also, supra notes 157-162.
196. Mike Brownfield, Morning Bell: Stopping the Cyber Espionage Threat, THE

FOUNDRY (Apr. 26, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/26/moming-bellstopping-the-cyber-espionage-threat/.
197. Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Said To Be Target of Massive Cyber-Espionage

Campaign, WASH. POsT (Feb. 10, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0210/world/37026024_1_cyber-espionage-national-counterintelligence-executive-tradesecrets ("Some officials have pressed for an unclassified version of the report to be
released publicly, [but] . . . as a matter of policy, [the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence does] not discuss or acknowledge the existence of NIEs unless directed to
do so.").
198. Id.
199. Id.; see David Barboza, In Wake of Cyberattacks, China Seeks New Rules, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/1 1/world/asia/china-callsfor-global-hacking-rules.html ("American intelligence officials have [] said privately
that they have evidence of Chinese government involvement in the [recent hacking]
attacks.").
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Third, just days after the NIE was circulated, U.S. information security
company Mandiant released a report of over sixty pages offering extensive
evidence of Chinese espionage,200 including actual video of intrusion
activities in action. 2 0 1 Based on this evidence, Mandiant said that it
believes that since at least 2006, Unit 61398 of China's People's Liberation
Army 2 02 has been conducting an extensive cyberespionage campaign that
has resulted in the exfiltration of hundreds of terabytes of data-including
"broad categories of intellectual property [such as] technology blueprints,
proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business plans, pricing
documents, partnership agreements, and e-mails and contacts lists from
victim organizations' leadership"-from over 140 companies in twenty
major industries.20 3 Although not without its critics both in the United
StateS204 and beyond its borders, 20 5 the February 13, 2013 Mandiant Report
is notable for its public proffer of detailed evidence that China is engaged
in extensive government-sponsored cyberespionage campaigns.

200.

It should be noted that the group behind these attacks is "the same group that

[Dmitri] Alperovitch [then Vice President of Threat Research for MacAfee] identified
[in 2011]" as having perpetrated Operation Shady RAT. Jody Westby, Mandiant
Report on Chinese Hackers Is Not News But Its Approach Is, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2013,
8:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2013/02/20/mandiant-report-onchinese-hackers-is-not-news-but-its-approach-is/. In 2011, Dmitri Alperovitch, then
vice president of Threat Research for McAfee, authored a report about Shady RAT, the
malware that had been used by Chinese cybercriminals to exfiltrate data from a broad
cross-section of organizations over a two- to five-year period-undetected. Alperovitch
broke new ground when he included a table of more than seventy companies,
organizations, and government agencies from around the globe that had been
compromised. Id.
201. MandiantCorp, APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units,

YouTUBE (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p7FqSav6Ho (showing
live APTI Chinese threat actors, codenamed DOTAs, conducting computer network
espionage activities).
202. PLA Unit 61398 is formally known as the Second Bureau of the People's
Liberation Army General Staff Department's Third Department. MANDIANT, APT1:
EXPOSING
ONE
OF
CHINA'S
CYBER
ESPIONAGE
UNITS
3 (2013),
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/MandiantAPT1_Report.pdf.
203. Id. at 3.
204. See Mathew J. Schwartz, China Denies U.S. Hacking Allegations: 6 Facts,
WEEK (Feb. 21, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.informationweek.com
/security/attacks/china-denies-us-hacking-accusations-6-fa/240149058?
(noting that
Taia Global CEO Jeffrey Carr, who does not dispute that China engages in "massive
amounts of cyber-espionage," believes that a more rigorous analysis of Mandiant's
APT evidence (e.g., by a "professional intelligence analyst") "would likely have failed
to prove attribution").
205. See, e.g., id. (discussing Chinese media reports suggesting that the Mandiant
report was a "commercial stunt" designed to sell information security products and
services); id. (citing Chinese government comments describing the Mandiant report as
"baseless").
INFO.
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5. Cyberespionageand U.S.-China Relations
Despite the potentially dire economic and national security implications
of cyberespionage for the United States, it was only recently, in the face of
mounting public evidence of the Chinese government's involvement in
cyberespionage targeting U.S. companies, that the United States and China
began the lengthy, but important, process of diplomatic engagement on the
issue.
U.S. media reports of Chinese government-sponsored espionage
intensified in the weeks after the Mandiant Report was issued, aggravating
existing tensions between the United States and China on cybersecurity and
prompting what some have referred to as a "war of words."206 China's
Foreign Minister Yan Jiechi said U.S. reports of Chinese government
involvement in cyberespionage were "built on shaky ground" and that
"[a]nyone who tried to fabricate or piece together a sensational story to
serve a political motive will not be able to blacken the name of others nor
whitewash themselves."20 7 China increasingly went on the offensive,
complaining that it is the victim of hack attacks linked to U.S. Internet
Protocol addresses, 208 and the Chinese government repeatedly reasserted its
official position that it opposes hacking.
Mounting tensions heightened concerns that U.S. accusations of Chinese
cyberespionage would prompt trade-based retaliation from China. Indeed,
just a few weeks after the New York Times identified Coca-Cola as having
been the target of Chinese cyberespionage-in the same article that
featured the Mandiant Report 2 09 -a remote Chinese provincial government
announced that it is investigating Coca-Cola for "illegally collecting
classified information with handheld GPS equipment."2 10 The U.S.
company, which is cooperating with the investigation, has denied any
wrongdoing and says that it is simply using " 'location-based customer

206. Terril Yue Jones, U.S., China agree to work together on cyber security,
REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/13/us-

china-us-cyber-idUSBRE93CO5T20130413.
207. Barboza, supra note 199.
208. Id. Jones, supra note 206 ("China claims it is the victim of large-scale cyber
attacks from the United States").
209. Sanger et al., supra note 194. A few months earlier, the New York Times
identified Coca-Cola as the likely unnamed victim of a cyberespionage campaign

discussed in a 2010 case study published by Mandiant. Nicole Perlroth, Study May
Offer Insight Into Coca-Cola Breach, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 30, 2012, 4:09
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/study-may-offer-insight-into-coca-colabreach/.
210. Patti Waldmeir, Coca-Cola Probedover Mapping in China, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
12, 2013, 3:43 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f02a6abc-8b21-11e2-bla4001 44feabdcO.html#axzz2PGMb8mqi.
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logistics systems . . .' to improve customer service and fuel efficiency." 2 11
Regardless of what motivated the Coca-Cola investigation, many U.S.
companies are concerned about the potential trade ramifications of
confronting China on cyberespionage.
On the other hand, the increasingly public discussion of China's
involvement in cyberespionage has not been without benefit. Several
noteworthy diplomatic developments came about in the weeks and months
following the release of the Mandiant Report. On March 10, 2013,
approximately one month after the report was released, China's Foreign
Minister took an important diplomatic step, calling for international " 'rules
and cooperation' " on Internet espionage issues . ...

212

The following

day, Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President, delivered a
speech to the Asia Society unequivocally setting forth the expectations of
the U.S. with respect to China's role in cyberespionage. He said that
building a constructive relationship with China is one of the pillars of the
U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, and he identified cybersecurity as a
"growing challenge to [the U.S.-China] economic relationship." Donilon
said that U.S. cybersecurity concerns have "moved to the forefront of our
agenda," and made clear that industrial cyberespionage was an animating

concern,213 stating:
The international community cannot afford to tolerate such activity from
any country. As the President said in the State of the Union, we will take
action to protect our economy against cyber-threats. From the President
on down, this has become a key point of concern and discussion with
China at all levels of our governments. And it will continue to be. The
United States will do all it must to protect our national networks, critical
infrastructure, and our valuable public and private sector property. But,
specifically with respect to the issue of cyber-enabled theft, we seek
three things from the Chinese side. First, we need a recognition of the
urgency and scope of this problem and the risk it poses-to international
trade, to the reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall relations.
Second, Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a stop to
these activities. Finally, we need China to engage with us in a
211. Id.
212. Barboza, supra note 199.
213. "Iam not talking about ordinary cybercrime or hacking [and] this is not solely a
national security concern or a concern of the U.S. government. Increasingly, U.S.
businesses are speaking out about their serious concerns about sophisticated, targeted
theft of confidential business information and proprietary technologies through cyber
intrusions emanating from China on an unprecedented scale." Tom Donilon, Nat'l Sec.
Advisor to the President, Address to the Asia Society: The United States and the AsiaPacific in 2013 (Mar. 11, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/03/11 /remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-unitedstates-a.
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constructive direct dialogue to establish acceptable norms of behavior in
cyberspace .

. .

. [T]he United States and China, the world's two largest

economies, both dependent on the Internet, must lead the way in
addressing this problem. 2 14
President Obama himself addressed the issue of nation-state sponsored
cyberintrusions just two days later in a March 13 interview, stating:
"[w]e've made it very clear to China...that, you know, we expect them to
follow international norms and abide by international rules." 215 When
newly elected Chinese President Xi Jinping took office on March 14, 2013,
President Obama reportedly called to congratulate Xi and took the
opportunity to raise U.S. concerns about hacking. 2 16 In the course of the
call, the two leaders reportedly "committed to engage in an ongoing
discussion to address the cyber issue." 2 17
The conversation between Obama and Xi appears, at least momentarily,
to have eased the war of words between China and the United States and to
have accelerated formal diplomatic engagement on cybersecurity between
the two countries. On March 17, 2013, just days after the Obama-Xi
discussion, the new Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said: "I think we should
not make groundless accusations against each other, and spend more time
doing practical things that will contribute to cyber-security," 218 and by midApril 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United
States and China had agreed to set up a cybersecurity working group.219
While increased diplomatic engagement with China on cybersecurity is
encouraging, substantive progress will take time, and, as the U.S. Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs has noted: "It's important to have a
dialogue on this, but it's also important that the dialogue be a means to an
end and the end is really ending these practices."22 0
C. Cyberwar
The term "cyberwar" in this Article refers to "actions by a nation-state to
penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of

214. Id.
215. Steve Holland, Obama, China'sXi discuss cybersecurity dispute in phone call,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-usachina-obama-call-idUSBRE92D 11 G20130314.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Terril Yue Jones, China's new premier seeks "new type" of ties with U.S.,
REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2013, 4:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/17/uschina-parliament-hacking-idUSBRE92GO2320130317.
219. Jones, supra note 206.
220. Id.
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causing damage or disruption."22 1 It is believed that "at least 12 of the
world's 15 largest militaries are building cyberwarfare programs," 222 with
several nation-states-including the U.S., 2 23 China, 224 Russia, 225 Israel, 22 6
221. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 6 (2010).
222. Scott Shane, Cyberwarfare Emerges from Shadows for Public Discussion by

U.S. Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/us
/us-officials-opening-up-on-cyberwarfare.html.
Cf Pierluigi Paganini, The Rise of
Cyberweapons and Relative Impact on Cyberspace, INFOSEC INST. RESOURCES (OCT. 5,

2012),
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-rise-of-cyber-weapons-and-relativeimpact-on-cyberspace/ (noting that the number of nation-states developing
cyberweapons reportedly is as high as 140).
223. Mark Mazzetti & David E. Sanger, Security Leader Says U.S. Would Retaliate
Against Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013

/03/13/us/intelligence-official-warns-congress-that-cyberattacks-pose-threat-to-us.html
("[General Keith Alexander] told Congress [] that he is establishing 13 teams of
programmers and computer experts who could carry out offensive cyberattacks on
foreign nations if the United States were hit with a major attack on its own networks,
the first time the Obama administration admitted to developing such weapons for use in
wartime."). The U.S. government "has only recently acknowledged developing
cyberweapons, and it has never admitted using them" despite "reports of one-time
attacks against personal computers used by members of Al Qaeda, and of contemplated
attacks against the computers that run air defense systems, including during the NATOled air attack on Libya last year." David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped up Wave of
Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012

/06/01 /world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html
(discussing what role the United States had in the development of the Stuxnet virus,
which successfully destroyed centrifuges at a key Iranian nuclear enrichment facility
beginning in 2008); see Leon E. Panetta, Sec'y of Def., Remarks on Cybersecurity to
the Business Executives for National Security, New York City (Oct. 11, 2012),
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136
("[T]he Department has developed the capability to conduct effective operations to
counter threats to our national interests in cyberspace."); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra

note 23, at 5 ("[T]he Department [of Defense] has the capability to conduct offensive
operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests. If directed by the
President, DoD will conduct offensive cyber operations in a manner consistent with the
policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities,
including the law of armed conflict.").
224. See generally KREKEL ET AL., supra note 23.
225. See Bumiller & Shanker, supra note 107; Kim Hart, Longtime Battle Lines Are
Recast in Russia and Georgia's Cyberwar, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2008),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081
303623.html?sid=ST2008081303990 (discussing accusations that Russia launched
cyberattacks against Georgia's Internet infrastructure, disabling many Georgian
government websites and effectively establishing an "information blockade.").

226. Israel Builds Up Its Cyberwar Corps, UPI (Nov. 2, 2012, 2:37 PM),

http://www.upi.com/Business News/Security-Industry/2012/11/02/Israel-builds-up-itscyberwar-corps/UPI-52421351881449/ ("Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu
established a special division of Unit 8200 [the Israeli equivalent of the NSA] in 2010
to develop [Israel's] cyberwar capabilities."); see Sanger, supra note 223 (discussing
Israel's role in the Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities); see also John
Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2010),
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North Korea,22 7 and Iran 22 8-already considered to have joined the ranks of
the cyberwar-capable. As the "weaponization" of cyber accelerates,
mainstream press reports of the cyberwar threat tend to highlight the
potentially devastating effects of cyberattacks on our nation's critical
infrastructure. 2 29 These reports describe, inter alia, how cyberattacks (1)
on the power grid could lead to cascading failures across the nation with
catastrophic consequences; (2) on financial systems could lead to economic
panic and/or a crashing stock market; (3) on water systems could open
dams causing flooding or make entire cities uninhabitable; (4) on rail
systems (e.g., involving intentional misrouting of trains) could cause
massive collisions; (5) on air-traffic control systems could lead to mass
casualties; and (6) on nuclear facilities could result in a nuclear reactor
meltdown, leading to catastrophic loss of life. 2 30 Nonetheless, exactly what
constitutes a cyberattack remains ill-defined.
The U.S. military formally distinguishes between two types of offensive
cyberpower available to nation-states: Cyber Network Exploitation
("CNE") and Cyber Network Attack ("CNA"). While CNE is essentially
espionage, CNA refers to destructive attacks. Specifically, CNAs are
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html?hp&-r-0.
227. Tony Capaccio, North Korea Improves Cyber Warfare Capacity, U.S. Says,

(Oct. 23, 2012, 12:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1023/north-korea-improves-cyber-warfare-capacity-u-s-says.html
("North
Korea's
government has a 'significant' cyber warfare capability that it continues to improve
[according to] the top U.S. commander on the Korean Peninsula.").
BLOOMBERG

228. Ellen Nakashima, Iran Blamedfor Cyberattacks on U.S. Banks and Companies,
POST (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/iran-blamed-for-cyberattacks/2012/09/21/afbe2be4-0412-1 le2-9b24ff730c7f6312_story.html ("Iran recently has mounted a series of disruptive computer
attacks against major U.S. banks and other companies in apparent retaliation for
Western economic sanctions aimed at halting its nuclear program, according to U.S.
intelligence and other officials.").
229. The devastating effects of a cyberattack are not necessarily limited to physical
effects, but also may include economic and psychological effects (e.g., undermining
confidence in systems). See, e.g., SPADE, supra note 23, at 26 (noting that a one-day
attack on American credit card companies has been estimated to cost $35 billion, and a
"full-scale attack" on critical infrastructure could cost $700 billion).
230. See, e.g., Bumiller & Shanker, supra note 107 ("An aggressor nation or
extremist group could use .. . cyber tools to gain control of critical switches.. . . They
could derail passenger trains, or even more dangerous, derail passenger trains loaded
with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut
down the power grid across large parts of the country."); Robert Johnson, New Cyber
WASH.

Attacks Will Target Power Grids and Major Public Works, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 14,

2011),

http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-09-14/news/30153012

1 data-theft-

turbine-cyber-warfare; Barton Gellman, Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared: Terrorists
at Threshold of Using Web as Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say, WASH. POST, June 27,

2002, at Al ("U.S. analysts believe that by disabling or taking command of the
floodgates in a dam, for example, or of substations handling 300,000 volts of electric
power, an intruder could use virtual tools to destroy real-world lives and property.").
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defined as "[a]ctions taken through the use of computer networks to
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and
computer networks or the computers and networks themselves." 2 3 1
We admittedly have come a long way since 2010 when U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III said, "There's no agreed-on
definition of what constitutes a cyberattack." 2 32 But an important debate
continues to rage in military and national security law circles over what,
precisely, qualifies as a cyberattack and/or an act of cyberwar 23 3 and the
appropriate range of nation-state responses to such an act.234 When it
comes to an act of cyberwar, "it's in the eye of the beholder." 23 5
In November of 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD")
concluded for the first time that cyberattacks can constitute an act of war236
to which the United States may respond using traditional military force

231. JoINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DICTIONARY
OF
MILITARY
AND
ASSOCIATED
TERMS
60
(2012),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/newpubs/jp102.pdf
232. Cheryl Pellerin, Lynn: Cyberspace is the New Domain of Warfare, U.S. DEP'T
DEF.,
AM.
FORCES
PRESS
SERV.
(Oct.
18,
2010),

OF

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61310.
233. See Catherine Lotrionte, Cyber Operations: Conflict Under InternationalLaw,

GEO. J. OF INT'L AFF. 15, 16 (2012) ("examin[ing] the challenges in defining the term
cyberwar and [] propos[ing] a working definition . ). See generally Hathaway et
al., supra note 155.
234. For example, President Barack Obama's InternationalStrategyfor Cyberspace

released in May 2011 marked the first time that the U.S. expressed the position that it
would regard cyberattacks as on par with conventional attacks. See WHITE HOUSE,
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 28, at 14 ("When warranted,
the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other
threat to our country."); id. ("We reserve the right to use all necessary meansdiplomatic, informational, military and economic ... in order to defend our Nation, our
allies, our partners and our interests."). In a veiled reference to Article 5 of the NATO
charter requiring allies to regard an attack against any member as an attack against all,
the strategy stated: "we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through
cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our military
treaty partners." Id.
235. Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Cyber Approach 'Too Predictable' for One Top

General, WASH. POST (July 14, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national
/national-security/us-cyber-approach-too-predictable-for-one-topgeneral/2011/07/14/gIQAYJC6EI story.html (quoting a July 2011 comment made by
General James Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
236. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 9 ("The phrase 'act of war' is frequently
used as shorthand to refer to an act that may permit a state to use force in self-defense,
but more appropriately, it refers to an act that may lead to a state of ongoing hostilities
or armed conflict. Contemporary international law addresses the concept of 'act of
war' in terms of a 'threat or use of force,' as that phrase is used in the United Nations
(UN) Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides: 'All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.' ").
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(i.e., a kinetic, rather than cyber-based, response).237 According to one
military official, the basic concept is "[i]f you shut down our power grid,
maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." 238 In its 2011
report to Congress announcing its decision, DoD stated:
[T]he President reserves the right to respond using all necessary means
to defend our Nation, our Allies, our partners, and our interest from
hostile acts in cyberspace. Hostile acts may include significant cyber
attacks directed against the U.S. economy, government, or military. As
directed by the President, response options may include using cyber
and/or kinetic capabilities provided by DoD. 239
Notwithstanding DoD's report, defense officials continue to struggle to
define exactly what kind of cyberattack constitutes a "use of force" (the
equivalent of an armed attack), with some officials of the opinion that the
test should be whether or not a cyberattack has an effect equivalent to a
conventional attack.24 0 Others argue that what is important is the amount of
"actual or attempted" damage caused by the attack.24'
Some early examples of "cyberattacks" include: (1) "Web War I,",242 in
which Russia initiated a barrage of distributed denial of service ("DDoS")
attacks on Estonia's "essential electronic infrastructure" in 2007 in
response to Estonia's then-controversial decision to relocate a Soviet-era
memorial to fallen WWII soldiers; 243 and (2) coordinated Russian
cyberattacks on Georgia's Internet infrastructure in connection with the
brief war between Russia and Georgia in 2008.244 Cyberattacks also have
237. Id. at 4; see Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War,
ST. J. (May 30, 2011,
10:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html
(discussing Pentagon
thinking on the issue of what kinds of cyberattacks would be considered a "use of
force" potentially triggering retaliation); id. ("One idea gaining momentum at the
Pentagon is the notion of 'equivalence.' If a cyber attack produces the death, damage,
destruction or high-level disruption that a traditional military attack would cause, then
it would be a candidate for a 'use of force' consideration, which could merit
retaliation.").
238. Id.
239. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 4.
240. Gorman & Barnes, supra note 237.
241. Id.
WALL

242. War in the Fifth Domain, supra note 182.
243. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED

(Aug.
21,
2007),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/1509/ff estonia?currentPage=all ("All major commercial banks, telcos, media outlets, and
name servers-the phone books of the Internet-felt the impact, and this affected the
majority of the Estonian population. This was the first time that a botnet threatened the
national security of an entire nation.").
244. David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS J. 1, 2-5
(Jan. 6, 2011),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf
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been reported more recently in the ongoing conflicts between North and
South Korea,245 and Israel and Hamas.24 6 In contrast, the United States
reportedly declined to engage in offensive cyberattacks during the U.S.-led
strikes on Libya in March 201 1.247
High-profile "cyberattacks" emanating from, directed at, or intended to
influence the United States reportedly include: (1) Stuxnet; (2) Wiper; (3)
Shamoon; and (4) the summer 2012 denial of service attacks on U.S.
financial institutions. Each is described in more detail below.
First, the Stuxnet virus reportedly was unleashed as part of a U.S.-Israeli
operation to destroy centrifuges at Iran's Natanz nuclear enrichment
complex. 24 8 The operation reportedly began under President George W.
Bush and was intended to sabotage Iran's nuclear program. 24 9 Discovered
in June 2010, Stuxnet was "the first attack of a major nature in which a
cyberattack was used to effect physical destruction. ,,250
Second, like Stuxnet, the Wiper virus reportedly was created by the
United States and Israel and was used to systematically delete data and
system files from computers as part of an April 2012 cyberattack on Iran's
Oil Ministry and affiliates, including the National Iranian Oil Company.251
(explaining that Russia used cyber operations to disrupt the Georgian government's
ability to communicate strategically with the international community); Robert
Haddick, This Week At War: Lessons From Cyberwar I, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 28,
2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/28/this week at war-lessons
fromcyberwar i ("When the kinetic battle broke out on Aug. 7, Russian government
and irregular forces conducted distributed denial-of-service attacks on Georgian
government and military sites. These attacks disrupted the transmission of information
between military units and between offices in the Georgian government. Russian
cyberforces attacked civilian sites near the action of kinetic operations with the goal of
creating panic in the civilian population. Russian forces also attacked Georgian hacker
forums in order to pre-empt a retaliatory response against Russian targets.").
245. Pierluigi Paganini, Concerns Mount over North Korean Cyber Warfare
Capabilities,INFOSEC ISLAND (June 11, 2012), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview

/21577-Concerns-Mount-over-North-Korean-Cyber-Warfare-Capabilities.html.
246. Gwen Ackerman & Saud Abu Ramadan, Israel Wages Cyberwar with Hamas
as Civilians Take up Computers, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2012, 5:08 PM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-19/israel-wages-cyber-war-with-hamas-ascivilians-take-up-computers.html.

247. Eric Schimtt & Tom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on

Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18
/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html.
American officials
"rejected cyberwarfare" out of (1) concern that it might "set a precedent for other
nations ... to carry out such offensives"; (2) concern about mounting the attack "on
such short notice"; and (3) inability "to resolve whether the president had the power to
proceed with such an attack without informing Congress." Id.
248. Sanger, supra note 223.

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Kim Zetter, Qatari Gas Company Hit with Virus in Wave of Attacks on Energy
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As one Iranian official explained, "The aim [of Wiper] is to increase
pressure so that Iran will compromise in the upcoming nuclear talks on
May 23[, 2012]."252
Dubbed a "Wiper copycat," 25 3 the Shamoon virus was discovered August
16, 2012, after attacking 30,000 computers at Saudi Arabia's state-owned
oil company (Aramco) and replacing critical files on those computers with
images of a burning American flag. Although the United States has not
officially blamed Iran for the attack, it is widely believed that Iran launched
the attack in retaliation for Stuxnet. Iran likely targeted Aramco because
the company supplied oil to customers who were unable to get oil from Iran
after U.S.-led financial sanctions cut Iran's oil exports nearly in half.25 4
Just weeks after the Aramco attack, Shamoon attacked computers at
Qatar's RasGas, one of the world's largest exporters of liquefied natural
255
gas.
Iran also is believed to be behind the prolonged denial of service attacks
against major U.S. financial institutions launched in September 2012,
including Bank of America, Wells Fargo, PNC, and others.2 56
If media reports are any indication, concerns over cyberwar appear to
have intensified throughout 2012 at the highest levels of the U.S.
government, with dire warnings repeatedly emanating from top U.S.
defense officials. DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano warned in November
2011 that a cyberattack on critical infrastructure could cause "loss of life"
and "huge economic loss.",257 The following summer, six elite U.S.
Companies, WIRED (Aug. 30, 2012, 5:04 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel
/2012/08/hack-attack-strikes-rasgas/.
252. Thomas Erdbrink, Facing Cyberattack, Iranian Officials Disconnect Some Oil
Terminals from Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com

/2012/04/24/world/middleeast/iranian-oil-sites-go-offline-amid-cyberattack.html.
253. Elinor Mills, A Who's Who of Mid-East Targeted Malware, CNET (Aug. 31,

2012, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009 3-57503949-83/a-whos-who-ofmideast-targeted-malware/; Erdbrink, supra note 252.
254. Siobhan Gorman & Julian A. Barnes, Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks: US.
Officials Say Iranian Hackers Behind Electronic Assaults on U.S. Banks, Foreign

Energy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2012, 7:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com
Nicole
see
/article/SB 10000872396390444657804578052931555576700.html;
Perlroth, Connecting the Dots After Cyberattack on Saudi Aramco, N.Y. TIMES BITS

(Aug. 27, 2012, 7:20 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/connectingthe-dots-after-cyberattack-on-saudi-aramco/.
255. Zetter, supra note 251.
BLOG

256. See Nicole Perlroth, Attacks on 6 Banks Frustrate Customers, N.Y. TIMES

(Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/business/cyberattacks-on-6Chris Strohm & Eric Engleman, Cyber
american-banks-frustrate-customers.html;
Attacks on U.S. Banks Expose Vulnerabilities, BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 28, 2012),

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-27/cyber-attacks-on-u-dot-s-dot-banksexpose-computer-vulnerability.
257. Jason Ryan, Loss ofLife in Major Computer Attack, Warns Homeland Security,
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national security officials 2 5 8 urged Congress to pass cybersecurity
legislation to protect critical infrastructure, writing:
We carry the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with
the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be in the
same position again when 'cyber 9/11' hits-it is not a question of
'whether' this will happen; it is a question of 'when.' 259
In the fall of 2012, then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned that the
U.S. is at risk for a "cyber-Pearl Harbor[;] ... an attack that would cause
physical destruction and the loss of life . .. and create a profound new
sense of vulnerability." 2 60 Panetta said:
A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states [or] violent extremists groups
could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11. Such a destructive
cyber-terrorist attack could virtually paralyze the nation . . .. The most

destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching several attacks on
our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical
attack on our country. Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade
critical military systems and communication networks. 261
Finally, in an op-ed published in the New York Times on December 6, 2012
to coincide with the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, Senators Lieberman and
Collins warned:
A storm is surely gathering again, and we must resist the false sense of
calm. The attack is not a matter of if, but when. It will not be launched
ABC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011, 6:33 PM), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com
/dr20111201-congressional-approval-of-cybersecurity-bill-looks-promising.
258. Namely, Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; Mike McConnell, former Director of the NSA and former Director of
National Intelligence; Paul Wolfowitz, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; Michael
Hayden, retired U.S. Air Force four-star general and former Director of both the NSA
and the CIA; James Cartwright, retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and William Lynn III, a former Deputy
Secretary of Defense. Letter from Michael Chertoff et al. to Harry Reid & Mitch
McConnell, supra note 182.
259. Id.
260. Bumiller & Shanker, supra note 107. Testifying before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in June, 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, "The
next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples our power
systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems, our
governmental systems." Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Hon. Leon E. Panetta
to Be Secretary of Defense Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 25

(June 9, 2011) [hereinafter Panetta ConfirmationHearing] (statement of Leon Panetta),
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2011/06%2OJune/1 1-47%20-%2069-1 1.pdf.
261. Panetta, supra note 223.
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from aircraft carriers, missile silos or massed armies. It will come
through cyberspace and will strike our most vital computer systems,
those that manage our electricity grids, oil and gas pipelines,
telecommunications networks and financial markets. We know that our
digital networks are being tested, on a minute by minute basis, by wouldbe cyberterrorists, criminal gangs, rogue hackers and rival nations who
look for unguarded digital back doors that would allow them to seize
control of our most essential computers. 262
Some experts have suggested that cyberwar concerns have been greatly
exaggerated. For example, a recent Dartmouth study of cyberwar funded
by DHS concluded that "the degree of damage that could be caused in a
cyberattack bears no resemblance to an electronic 'Pearl Harbor,' "
although "inflicting significant economic costs on the public and private
sectors and impairing performance of key infrastructures (via IT networks
linked to embedded computer systems, for example) seem both plausible
and realistic."263 Prominent cybersecurity expert James Lewis at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies ("CSIS") has repeatedly expressed
skepticism of the view that cyberattacks are likely to cause widespread
death, damage, and destruction. In a 2003 interview, he said:
[N]o sane person argues-that a cyber attack could lead to mass
casualties. It's not in any way comparable to weapons of mass
destruction. In fact, what a lot of people call them is 'weapons of mass
annoyance.'[ 264] If your power goes out for a couple hours, if somebody
draws a mustache on Attorney General Ashcroft's face on his Web site,
it's annoying. It's irritatin. But it's not a weapon of mass destruction.
The same is true for this.26

262. Joseph I. Lieberman & Susan Collins, At Dawn We Sleep, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 6,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/opinion/will-congress-act-to-protect2012),
against-a-catastrophic-cyberattack.html.
263. BILLO & CHANG, supra note 23, at 7. "Some experts maintain that
cyberattacks with potential strategic national security effects, often referred to as an
'electronic Pearl Harbor,' are impossible. Others proclaim they are inevitable." Id. at
12.
264. The phrase "weapons of mass annoyance" was coined by Stewart Baker.
JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, ASSESSING THE RISKS OF
CYBER TERRORISM, CYBER WAR, AND OTHER CYBER THREATS, 11 n.2 (2002),

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/02 1101 risks of cyberterror.pdf.
265. Frontline: Cyberwar!: Interview of James A. Lewis, (PBS television broadcast
Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows
/cyberwar/interviews/lewis.html; see LEWIS, supra, note 264, at 11 ("Terrorists or
foreign militaries may well launch cyber attacks, but they are likely to be disappointed

in the effect. Nations are more robust than the early analysts of cyber-terrorism and
cyber-warfare give them credit for, and cyber attacks are less damaging than physical
attacks. Digital Pearl Harbors are unlikely. Infrastructure systems, because they have
to deal with failure on a routine basis, are also more flexible and responsive in restoring
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Writing in a similar spirit in 2010, Lewis explained: "[c]yberattacks are
not very destructive, compared to other weapons, particularly strategic
weapons. It seems fair to say that at this time, the possibility of damage,
death and destruction from cyber attack is low. Cyber weapons will have
difficulty produc[ing] casualties."266
The broad spectrum of expressed views as to the severity of the
cyberthreat may be indicative of both the reality and unpredictability of the
threat. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey
stated in 2012, "Cyber is the black swan[ 2 67 ] because we don't know
exactly what capabilities exist out there.. .. If you're asking me which of
the unknown threats worry me the most-cyber ....

Cyber is the threat

that concerns me the most." 26 8
While acknowledging the gravity of the cyber threat, intelligence
officials dramatically toned down their cyberwar rhetoric in early 2013.
For example, while Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") James
Clapper told Congress in March 2013 that cyberattacks are the most
dangerous threat facing the United States, he also said that the intelligence
community sees only a "remote chance" of a major computer attack on the
United States in the next two years. 2 69
Rhetoric aside, experts are struggling to identify appropriate responses to
nation-state cyberattacks. 2 70 The administration took a small step forward
with respect to one aspect of these difficult issues in mid-October, when
President Obama reportedly signed Presidential Decision Directive 20
("PDD-20"). 2 7 1 Although classified, PDD-20 guides federal agency
service than early analysts realized. Cyber attacks, unless accompanied by a
simultaneous physical attack that achieves physical damage, are short lived and
ineffective. However, if the risks of cyber-terrorism and cyber-war are overstated, the
risk of espionage and cyber crime may be not be fully appreciated by many
observers.").
266. LEWIS, supra note 264, at 3.
267. Black
Swan
Definition,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/black%2Bswan (last visited Apr. 1,
2013) (defining "black swan" as "an unpredictable or unforeseen event, typically one
with extreme consequences .... ).
268. ForaTv, Martin Dempsey: Cyber Attacks are Black Swan Threat to US,

YoUTUBE (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDAG IdJNu4Q.
269. Mazzetti & Sanger, supra note 223 (describing a "major" attack as one
resulting in "long-term, wide-scale disruption of services, such as a regional power

outage").
270. Jonathan Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: The Need for
Individual Accountability on Tomorrow's Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REv., no.
3, 2010, at
I ("Cyber attacks do not fit neatly into the traditional international

framework governing the use of force.").
271. Ellen Nakashima, Obama Signs Secret Directive to Help Thwart Cyberattacks,
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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responses to cyberthreats and "attempts to settle years of debate among
government agencies about who is authorized to take what sorts of actions
in cyberspace and with what level of permission." 2 72 PDD-20 reportedly is
"the most extensive White House effort to date to wrestle with what
constitutes an 'offensive' and a 'defensive' action in the rapidly evolving
world of cyberwar and cyberterrorism." 273
As experts debate the proper definition and response to nation-state
cyberattacks,2 74 another great challenge looms: understanding how we, as a
nation, should address the threat of state actors engaging in highly
disruptive (and potentially economically destabilizing) activities in the
.com domain-e.g., electronically manipulating the stock market or
triggering communications outages-that are not accompanied by the loss
of life or physical destruction typically associated with acts of war. While
some support giving U.S. Cyber Command the flexibility to defend critical
infrastructures against cyberthreats, others have deep concerns about
allowing the military to operate outside of the .mil context, including
concerns that military cyberoperations could lead to unintentional collateral
damage, such as shutting down a hospital generator.
Finally, compounding the cyberwar threat is an increasingly
sophisticated, and entirely unregulated, market for so-called "zero-day"
exploits. 2 75
Zero-day exploits are previously unknown cybervulnerabilities that can be used in a cyberattack. 2 7 6 Some liken zero-day
exploits to cyberweapons277 because they essentially "provide keys to the
doors through which cyberwarfare can be waged." 2 7 8 Hackers and others
who discover such exploits can make their findings public, work with
vendors to fix the security flaws, use the exploits for their own purposes, or
sell the exploits to security firms, black-marketers, or nation-states. Some
hackers have even suggested that corporate IT departments could become
profit centers by developing offensive exploits and selling them to the
United States and allied governments. 2 79 Nation-states may purchase
security/obama-signs-secret-cybersecurity-directive-allowing-more-aggressivemilitary-role/2012/11/14/7bf51512-2cde- l le2-9ac2- Ic61452669c3_story.html.

272. Id. (describing contents of PDD-20).
273. Id.

274. See Ophardt, supra note 270, at 1 1.
275. See generally Greenberg, supra note 146 (documenting the black market for so-

called "zero-day" exploits or "cyberweaponry").
276. Id.
277. Id. (quoting privacy activist Chris Soghoian that "zero-day" exploits are the
"bullets for cyberwar").
278. Ophardt, supra note 270, at $ 18.
279. Jeffrey Carr, Flipping Malware: A Profit Opportunity for Corporate IT

Departments, INFOSEC ISLAND

(Dec.

9,

2012),

http://www.infosecisland.com
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exploits with the "explicit intention of invading or disrupting the computers
and phones of crime suspects and intelligence targets." 2 80 Accordingly,
some hackers reportedly "self-regulate," limiting the foreign interests to
whom they are willing to sell or refusing to sell to foreign interests at all. 2 8 1
V.

RECENT CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE ACTION

One of the most fundamental cybersecurity issues facing our nation is
the appropriate role of government in helping the private sector-which
owns and operates approximately 85% of the United States' critical
infrastructure 282-address cybersecurity risks to its operations. Although
the U.S. has long relied primarily on a market-based approach to
cybersecurity, a host of laws and regulations, some of which were passed
over a decade ago, have effectively forced cybersecurity investment in
certain industry sectors, most notably the financial and health sectors.283
/blogview/22777-Flipping-Malware-A-Profit-Opportunity-for-Corporate-ITDepartments.html.
280. Andy Greenberg, Meet the Hackers Who Sell Spies the Tools to Crack Your PC
(And Get Paid Six-Figure Fees), FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012, 9:08 AM),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/21/meet-the-hackers-who-sellspies-the-tools-to-crack-your-pc-and-get-paid-six-figure-fees/.
281. Id. (reporting that vulnerability research company, Vupen, claims that it
carefully screens its clients, selling only to NATO governments and "NATO partners,"
but that Vupen admits that there is no way to ensure that clients will not sell its
products to another entity).
282. See TELECOMMS. INDUS. Ass'N, SECURING THE NETWORK: CYBERSECURITY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN 1

(2012), http://tiaonline.org/sites/default/files/pages/TIACybersecurityWhitePaper_0.pdf
(estimating that approximately eighty to ninety percent of the nation's critical
infrastructure is privately-owned); see also SPADE, supra note 23, at 25 ("[Privatelyowned telecommunications companies] own and operate most of America's cyber
infrastructure-that is, the cables, servers, routers, and switches that connect
cyberspace. The same is true for the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
("SCADA") systems that run America's physical infrastructure: power, water, and
communications. SCADA control functions are intranets, but are usually connected to
the global Internet.").
283. See, e.g., Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered Sections of 15 and 20
U.S.C.) ("FACTA"); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, §§ 501-527, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-27 ("GLB"); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. N. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered Sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) ("HIPAA"); FTC Standards
for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.1-14.5 (2012) (implementing
"safeguards" provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley); Protection of Digital Computer and
Communication Systems and Networks, 10 C.F.R. § 73.54 (2012); Identity Theft Red
Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,718 (Nov. 9, 2007); see also MARK E. SCHREIBER ET AL.,
EDWARDS WILDMAN PALMER LLP, EVERYONE'S NIGHTMARE: PRIVACY AND DATA
BREACH RISKS 25-44 (2012), http://www.acc.com/chapters/ne/loader.cfm?csModule
=security/getfile&PagelD=1300198 (discussing data security laws and regulations);
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More recently, Congress and federal regulators have adopted a number
of legislative and regulatory measures to improve transparency with respect
to cyberincidents.2 84 The measures most obviously designed to improve
transparency are data breach notification laws. Pursuant to these laws,
corporations must, under certain circumstances, disclose data breaches. As
of August 2012, forty-six states 285 and the federal government2 8 6 had

Stewart Baker & Melanie Schneck-Teplinsky, Spurring the Private Sector: Indirect
Federal Regulation of Cybersecurity in the US, in CYBERCRIMES: A

243-48 (Sumit Ghosh & Elliot Turrini eds., 2010)
(discussing financial and medical data security laws and regulations, including GLB,
HIPAA, Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009
("HITECH Act"), and FACTA).
284. Such efforts are not limited to the United States. The provisions of the
European Commission's draft data protection regulation now under consideration in the
European Union require data controllers to "notify data breaches" and impose
administrative sanctions for failure to do so. See Commission Proposal for a

MULTIDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Process ofPersonalData and on the Free Movement of
Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), arts. 31-32, at 11, art. 79, at 15

COM
(2012)
11
final
(Jan.
25,
2012),
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=COM:2012:0011 :FIN:EN:PDF.
Articles 31 and 32 require companies to notify their supervisory authority and affected
individuals within 24 hours of discovery of a "breach of security leading to the
accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or
access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed." Article 79
provides that:
The supervisory authority shall impose a fine up to 1,000,000 EUR or, in
case of an enterprise up to 2% of its annual worldwide turnover, to anyone
who, intentionally or negligently ... does not alert on or notify a personal
data breach or does not timely or completely notify the data breach to the
supervisory authority or to the data subject pursuant to Articles 31 and 32.
Id.

285. Every state has passed a data breach notification law except Alabama,
Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota. See State Security Breach Notification
Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/telecom/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 20, 2012)
(indicating that 46 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands have enacted security breach notification laws); see also State Data Breach
Notfication Laws, MINTz LEVIN, http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/PrivSecDataBreachLaws-02-07/statedatabreachmatrix.pdf (last updated Dec. 1, 2012)
(providing a downloadable matrix of state data breach laws current as of December
2011).
286. The federal data breach notification law, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17932, is one
of several amendments to HIPAA set forth in the privacy provisions of the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. §§
17921, 17931-40, 17951-53 (2009). The HITECH Act was embedded into the
stimulus bill that President Obama signed into law on February 17, 2009. American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009)
(codified as amended in scattered Sections of 6, 19, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). The HITECH
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adopted such laws.
SEC disclosure rules also serve to improve
transparency. Specifically, the SEC Division of Corporation Finance
issued staff-level guidance on October 13, 2011, at Senator John D.
Rockefeller's (D-W.Va.) urging,287 that requires companies report to the
SEC "material information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber
incidents."28 8 Appropriate disclosures may include, among other things,
"[A d]escription of cyberincidents experienced by the [SEC] registrant that
are individually, or in the aggregate, material, including a description of the
costs and other consequences ... 289 Senator Rockefeller has since urged
Act effectively provides a safe-harbor from its breach notification requirements when
protected health information ("PHI") is "secured" (e.g., encrypted using NISTapproved processes), giving covered entities and their business associates a strong
incentive to maintain electronic PHI in NIST-approved encrypted form at all times. In
the summer of 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
published an interim final "Breach Notification Rule" implementing HITECH's breach
reporting requirements. See Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health
Information, Interim Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,740 (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-08-24/pdf/E9-20169.pdf (requiring covered
entities under the HIPAA and their business associates to provide notification in the
case of breaches of unsecured protected health information). Breach Notification Final
Rule
Update,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
AND
HUM.
SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule
/finalruleupdate.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). The FTC issued companion breach
notification regulations, FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 42962
(Aug. 25, 2009). On January 25, 2013, HHS issued a final rule that, inter alia,
modified the Breach Notification Rule. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy,
Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 55665702 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). Among other things,
the final rule amended the definition of "breach" used in the regulations so as to
"replace[] the [B]reach [N]otification [R]ule's 'harm' threshold with a more objective
standard." 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5695. Specifically, breach notification was not required
under the interim rule if a covered entity or business associate could "demonstrate that
there [was] no significant risk of harm to the individual," 78 Fed. Reg. 5641, but under
the final rule, a breach is presumed unless "the covered entity or business associate ...
demonstrates [through a risk assessment] that there is a low probability that the
protected health information has been compromised." 78 Fed. Reg. 5695.
287. Elizabeth Wasserman, SEC Urged to Give Stronger Guidance on Cyber
Disclosure, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2013, 9:57 AM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/sec-urged-to-give-stronger-guidance-oncyber-disclosure.html ("Rockefeller in May 2011 wrote to then-SEC Chairman Mary
Schapiro pointing out the growing risk posed to U.S. companies by 'malicious actors'
who 'attack and disrupt computer networks to steal valuable trade secrets, intellectual
property, and financial and confidential information.' He asked the SEC to develop
and publish guidance to clarify disclosure requirements pertaining to 'information
security risk, including material information security breaches involving intellectual
property or trade secrets.' ")
288. CF

Disclosure Guidance: Topic

No.

2,

SEC

(Oct.

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
289. Id.

13,

2011),
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the SEC to adopt formal cybersecurity guidance. In an April 10, 2013
letter to incoming SEC Chairman, Mary Jo White, Senator Rockefeller
wrote:
While the [SEC] staff guidance has had a positive impact on the
information available to investors on these matters, the disclosures are
generally still insufficient for investors to discern the true costs and
benefits of companies' cybersecurity practices . .

.

. Investors deserve to

know whether companies are effectively addressing their cybersecurity
risks-just as investors should know whether companies are managing
their financial and operational risks . . . . Formal guidance from the SEC

on this issue will be a strong signal to the market that companies need to
take their cybersecurity efforts seriously.290
Laws, regulations, and guidance on data breach notification arguably help
the market function more efficiently by enabling it to evaluate companies
in part based on their ability to keep their networks secure. The more
information is available about cyberincidents and cyberthreats, the better
the cybersecurity market should function, since more reliable data will help
corporations more accurately calculate efficient levels of cybersecurity.
Accordingly, disclosure-forcing rules are often viewed as part of a larger
effort to combat what some believe to be chronic U.S. private sector
underinvestment in cybersecurity.
Vulnerability mitigation has long been the cornerstone of U.S.
cybersecurity policy, 29 1 with legislators struggling to properly incentivize
corporations to improve their cyberdefenses without dampening

290. Elizabeth Wasserman, SEC Urged to Give Stronger Guidance on Cyber
Disclosure,BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 10, 2013, 9:57 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/sec-urged-to-give-stronger-guidance-on-

cyber-disclosure.html.http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id
=4ceb6cl l-b613-4e21-92c7-a8eldd5a707e.
291. See, e.g., WHITE HouSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 2, at i, iii ("It
is the fundamental responsibility of our government to address strategic vulnerabilities
in cyberspace and ensure that the United States and the world realize the full potential
of the information technology revolution. ... Without major advances in the security of
[the nation's digital infrastructure] systems or significant change in how they are
constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the United States can protect itself from the
growing threat of cybercrime and state-sponsored intrusions and operations."); see also
Hathaway, supra note 156, at 78 ("[R]eal [cybersecurity] leadership requires adopting
and embedding sometimes-costly security solutions into our core infrastructures and
enterprises . . . ."); Press Release, Mac Thornberry, U.S. Representative, Thornberry
Named Leader of New Cybersecurity Task Force (June 24, 2011), available at
http://thornberry.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=248853 (quoting
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) as saying that " '[s]trengthening our
networks' security is fundamental to protecting our national and financial security,
promoting economic growth, and creating jobs").
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innovation.2 92 The 2012 congressional session was no exception, as
Senators vigorously debated the merits of legislation that would have set
minimum cybersecurity standards for the private sector. Also at issue in
that session was legislation designed to facilitate the flow of informationin both directions-between the private sector and the U.S. government.
A.

CongressionalAction (2011-2012)

A flurry of cybersecurity-related activity in both houses of Congress
during the 112th Congress ultimately led to successful passage of a
controversial cybersecurity bill in the House in April of 2012, but failure to
pass cybersecurity legislation in the Senate during the 2012 session.
Despite Congress' failure to pass cybersecurity legislation, the debate over
the bills that were considered is described in some detail below as it
informs current discussions about the appropriate way forward.
1. Administration Legislative Proposal
On May 12, 2011, the Administration submitted cybersecurity legislation
to Congress.293 At the core of the seven-part package were provisions
giving DHS authority to regulate critical infrastructure.294 These provisions
required owners and operators of critical infrastructure to develop
cybersecurity plans, the implementation of which was to be evaluated by
the Secretary of DHS.295
2. U.S. House ofRepresentatives
a. Republican Cybersecurity Task Force
In June of 2011, House Republicans announced the creation of a GOP292. There have been approximately thirty cybersecurity proposals in the House and
Senate since 2009.

See David Perera, Congressional Cybersecurity Bill Roundup,

(May 12, 2010), http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story
/congressional-cybersecurity-bill-roundup/2010-05-12
(listing cybersecurity bills
introduced during 111th Congress, i.e., January 3, 2009 through January 3, 2011); see
also ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO
CYBERSECURITY:
DISCUSSION
OF
PROPOSED
REVISIONS
4-8
(2012),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf
(discussing selected cybersecurity
legislative proposals considered in the 112th Congress).
293. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, LAW
ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS
RELATED
TO
COMPUTER
SECURITY
(2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/law-enforcementFIERCEGOVERNMENTIT

provisions-related-to-computer-security-full-bill.pdf.
294. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
CYBERSECURITY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COVERED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
ACT
(2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters

/cybersecurity-regulatory-framework-for-covered-critical-infrastructure-act.pdf
295. Id. §§ 5-6.
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only task force to study cybersecurity and make recommendations to House
leadership.2 96 The resulting task force report, issued in October of 2011,
departed from the Administration's proposal in several important
respects. 297 Most notably, the task force unanimously recommended
adoption of voluntary cybersecurity standards tied to incentives to improve
cybersecurity. 298 Representative Thornberry (R-TX), leader of the task
force, subsequently explained that incentives help to "elevate
[cybersecurity] in the consciousness of CEOs and businesses." 29 9 The task
force specifically recommended that Congress consider research and
development tax credits for cyberinvestments and consider whether
cybersecurity insurance can help improve security. 30 0 The task force also
recommended that Congress use federal purchasing power to improve
cybersecurity by revising the Federal Acquisition Regulations to require
appropriate security in all federal IT procurements. 30 ' At the event
announcing completion of the task force report, Thomberry declared:
"anybody who gets a federal grant ought to have some sort of minimum
level of cybersecurity." 30 2
Despite differences between the
Administration's legislative proposal and the task force recommendations,
in December 2011, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) described
the House Republican cybersecurity task force recommendations as "fully
consistent with our efforts."303
296. Press Release, Rep. Mac Thornberry, supra note 291.
297. See, e.g., MAC THORNBERRY ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOUSE
REPUBLICAN CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE 7-8 (2011), http://thornberry.house.gov
/uploadedfiles/cstffinalrecommendations.pdf The task force agreed with the White
House on "the need to simplify data-breach reporting requirements for companies,
update information-security standards for government agencies, and boost recruitment
of qualified cybersecurity workers." Eric Engleman, House Republican Cybersecurity
Plan Echoes Part of Obama Policy, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-05/house-cybersecurity-task-force-wary-ofrules-on-network-defense.html.
298. THORNBERRY ET AL., supra note 297, at 7-8; Engleman, supra note 297
(explaining that the report also recommended that Congress facilitate the creation of a
non-government clearinghouse for information-sharing among businesses and the
government). Task force leader Rep. Thornberry also noted that about fifty outdated
laws related to cybersecurity need to be revised and he noted that "basic hygiene" steps
could eliminate the majority of malware. Id.
299. Zach Rausnitz, House Cybersecurity Task Force Suggest Incentives, InfoSharing,
FIERCE
HOMELAND
SEC.
(Oct.
12,
2011),
http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/house-cybersecurity-task-force-suggestsincentives-info-sharing/2011-10-12#ixzz2EnMElhif.
300. THORNBERRY ET AL., supra note 297, at 8.
301. See id. at 19.
302. Rausnitz, supra note 299.
303. Gautham Nagesh, Reid says Senate will take up cybersecurity bill next year,
THE

HILL (Nov. 17, 2011, 11:52 AM), 194245-senate-will-take-up-cybersecurity-bill-
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CISPA

Ultimately, the House did not pass legislation based on the
recommendations of its cybersecurity task force. Instead, on April 26,
2012, after nearly seven hours of debate, 30 4 the U.S. House of
Representatives passed the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
("CISPA") of 2012,305 a highly controversial bill that, according to
legislative sponsors, was designed to address the Chinese and Russian
cyberespionage threat 306 and protect critical infrastructure. 3 07
The purpose of CISPA was to remove legal obstacles to information
sharing30 8 between private sector companies and the U.S. government in
two ways. First, CISPA was drafted to give the intelligence community the
authority to share cyber threat intelligence, including classified
intelligence, with certain private-sector entities under certain conditions.30 9
next-year.
304. Declan McCullagh, How CISPA Would Affect You (faq), CNET (Apr. 27, 2012,
4:00 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921 3-57422693-281/how-cispa-wouldaffect-you-faq/.
305. H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012). CISPA is also known as the RogersRuppersberger bill after Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) and Dutch Ruppersberger (D-Md.), the
chairman and the ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence ("HPSCI"), respectively.
306. See Declan McCullagh, House Passes CISPA Internet Surveillance Bill,

ZDNET (Apr. 27, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/news/house-passes-cispainternet-surveillance-bill/6360341 ("[HPSCI Chairman Rogers said that CISPA is]
needed to stop the Chinese government from stealing our stuff [and that the Chinese
are] stealing the value and prosperity of America."); Press Release, Rep. Mike Rogers,
Co-Sponsors Top 100 for the Rogers-Ruppersberger Bipartisan Cyber Bill (Mar. 29,
2012),
available
at
http://mikerogers.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx
?DocumentlD=287920 ("Every day U.S. businesses are targeted by nation-state actors
like China for cyber exploitation and theft .

. .

. This consistent and extensive cyber

looting results in huge losses of valuable intellectual property, sensitive information,
and American jobs. The broad base of support for this bill shows that Congress
recognizes the urgent need to help our private sector better defend itself from these
insidious attacks . . . .").
307. Press Release, Rep. Mike Rogers, supra note 306 (quoting HPSCI Ranking
Member C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger) ("Without important, immediate changes to
American cybersecurity policy, I believe our country will continue to be at risk for a
catastrophic attack to our nation's vital networks-networks that power our homes,
provide our clean water or maintain the other critical services we use every day. This
small but important piece of legislation is a decisive first step to tackle the cyber threats
we face.").
308. James A. Lewis, Code Red, FOREIGN POL'Y (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/code-red
("[Information to be
shared] can include 'signatures' and other cyberthreat indicators, such as intelligence
information, reports of successful penetrations, and information on the identities or
network addresses of the 'attacking computers ..... ).
309. See H.R. 3523 § 1104(a)(1) (amending the National Security Act of 1947 to
require the Director of National Intelligence "to establish procedures to allow elements
of the intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence [including classified
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Second, CISPA was designed to encourage businesses to voluntarily share
cyberthreat information with the government by offering a variety of
protections, including exemptions from liability; 310 limitations on
government disclosure of shared information, including a Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") exemption;31 ' and prohibition on government
use of shared cyberthreat information for regulatory purposes. 312
Supporters of CISPA describe it as an "information sharing" bill. They
say it "helps the private sector defend itself from advanced cyber threats,
without imposing any new federal regulations or unfunded private sector
mandates, and contains protections for privacy and civil liberties."013
Opponents include not only an array of privacy and civil liberties
advocates, who claim that CISPA will make it easier for the federal
government to access personal information, 3 14 but also those who see the
intelligence] with private-sector entities"); id. § 1104(a)(2)(A) (classified cyber threat
intelligence may only be shared with "certified entities" or persons with "an
appropriate security clearance"); id. § 1104(a)(2)(C) ("[C]lassified cyber threat
intelligence may only be ... used by a certified entity in a manner which protects such
cyber threat intelligence from unauthorized disclosure."); id § 1104(a)(3)(B) (providing
authority to "grant a security clearance on a temporary or permanent basis to a certified
entity" and grant "approval to use appropriate facilities"). Taken together, these
provisions allow the government to share classified threat information with businesses
under certain specific conditions. For example, businesses receiving classified threat
information may need security clearances for personnel and technical, administrative,
and procedural safeguards to handle classified information.
310. Id. § 1104(b)(4)(A) ("No civil or criminal cause of action shall lie or be
maintained in Federal or State court against a [cybersecurity provider or certain other
designated entities] acting in good faith for using cybersecurity systems to identify or
obtain cyber threat information or for sharing such information in accordance with this
section. . . .").
311. Id. § 1 104(b)(3)(C)(i) (providing that cyberthreat information shared with the
federal government "shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5,
United States Code [i.e., FOIA]"); id. §1 104(b)(3)(C)(ii) (providing that cyberthreat
information shared with the federal government "shall be considered proprietary
information and shall not be disclosed to an entity outside of the Federal Government
except as authorized by the entity sharing such information").
312. Id. §1 104(b)(3)(C)(iii).
313. Press Release, Rep. Mike Rogers, supra note 306.
314. See Chloe Albanesius, Internet Groups Launch Anti-CISPA Protest, PC MAG.
(Apr. 16, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2403080,00.asp;
see also Declan McCullagh, Advocacy Group Flip-Flops Twice Over CISPA
Surveillance Bill, CNET (Apr. 25, 2012, 10:53 PM), http://news.cnet.com/830131921 3-57421624-28 1/advocacy-group-flip-flops-twice-over-cispa-surveillance-bill/
(discussing positions taken by the Center for Democracy and Technology, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation); Greg
Nojeim, Jim Dempsey, & Leslie Harris, A Recap of Months of CDT Advocacy on
CISPA,
CTR.
FOR
DEMOCRACY
&
TECH.
(Apr.
26,
2012),
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/2604recapping-state-play-cispa
("Since
CISPA
was
introduced, CDT has consistently said the bill has three critical civil liberties problems .
... The first is that CISPA permits unfettered sharing of private communication with

284

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA WREVIEW

Vol. 2:2

bill as doing little to advance cybersecurity.3 15 As one cybersecurity expert
bluntly stated: "sharing information is a feeble response to a serious
threat."016 President Obama was equally decisive-although somewhat
more reserved-when he weighed in on the issue in a July 2012 op-ed,
stating, "Simply sharing more information is not enough. Ultimately, this
is about security gaps that have to be filled." 17
CISPA was an enormously controversial bill.3 " Although the bill's
sponsors amended CISPA just days before it passed the House ostensibly to
address privacy and civil liberties concerns, several of the most
controversial provisions in the bill remained untouched. One such
provision is § 1104(b)(1)(B) which provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a self-protected entity319
may, for cybersecurity purposes(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain cyber threat
information to protect the rights and property of such self-protected
entity; and
(ii) share such cyber threat information with any other entity, including
the Federal Government.320
CISPA critics maintain that the phrase "notwithstanding any other
provision of law" allows the private sector to share threat information with
the government regardless of existing federal and state laws-including
the government; second, it permits that sharing to go to any agency including the supersecret NSA; and third, it permits the government to use this information for purposes
wholly unrelated to cybersecurity. On these grounds we oppose CISPA.").
315. Mac Thomberry, Cybersecurity Needs Our Full Attention, POLITICO (Apr. 25,

2012,
9:24
PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/75604.html
#ixzz2EntrTr5D (supporting CISPA, but noting the most prominent criticism is that
CISPA "does not go far enough").
316. Lewis, supra note 308.
317. Obama, supra note 100.
318. The controversy over CISPA stemmed in part from its substantive provisions
and in part from comparisons-some unwarranted-of CISPA to the Stop Online
Privacy Act ("SOPA"), H.R. 3261, and PROTECT IP Act ("PIPA"), S.B. 968,
legislation that was roundly condemned in the technology community months before.
See Violet Blue, Say 'Hello' to CISPA, It Will Remind You of SOPA, CNET (Apr. 13,

2012, 7:35 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57413627-93/say-hello-to-cispait-will-remind-you-of-sopa/; Rebecca Greenfield, Why CISPA is Worse Than SOPA,
2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com
THE
ATLANTIC
WIRE
(Apr. 27,
/technology/2012/04/why-cispa-worse-sopa/51638/; Megha Rajagopalan, Is CISPA
SOPA 2.0?

We Explain the Cybersecurity Bill, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 26, 2012, 11:16

AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/is-cipsa-sopa-20-we-explain-the-cybersecuritybill.
319. A "self-protected entity" is "an entity, other than an individual, that provides
goods or services for cybersecurity purposes to itself." Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. § 1104(h)(12).

320. Id. § 1104(b)(1)(B).
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laws such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act32 -some of
which specifically limit such sharing in order to protect information
privacy and civil liberties. Moreover, critics maintain that use of such
sweeping language could have "unforeseen consequences. 3 22
Another highly controversial aspect of CISPA-and one that was not
addressed by amendments-was that it permits the private sector to share
cyberthreat information directly with the National Security Agency
("NSA").323 Rhetoric began to fly when this provision was interpreted in
some circles as raising the specter of government surveillance.
Representative Jared Polis (D-Co) argued: "Allowing the military and NSA
to spy on Americans on American soil goes against every principle this
country was founded on." 324 HSPCI Chairman Rogers defended CISPA,
saying: "There is no government surveillance, none, not any in this bill." 325
In fact, CISPA does not include a formal grant of surveillance authority to
NSA, but the bill arguably "usher[s] in a new era of information sharing
between companies and government agencies-with limited oversight and
privacy safeguards." 32 6 The Administration took the position that CISPA
"effectively treats domestic cybersecurity as an intelligence activity and
thus, significantly departs from longstanding efforts to treat the Internet and
cyberspace as civilian spheres."3 27

321. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-22 (2012).
322. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH

SERV.,

RS 20617, How BILLS

AMEND

1-2 (2003), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20617_20030804.pdf ("[A] bill
may preface new provisions being added to law with such a phrase as, 'notwithstanding
any other provision of law.' Such a phrase tends to imply that the new language is
intended to supersede any conflicting provisions of previous law. This broad phrase,
however, does not specify which provisions it is meant to refer to, and may therefore
have unforeseen consequences for both existing and future laws.").
323. House leadership did not allow for amendments on this issue. The Center for
Democracy and Technology ("CDT"), which had vigorously opposed CISPA, came to
an informal understanding with the House Intelligence Committee that, in return for
CDT's willingness not to oppose CISPA moving forward, the House would consider
amendments on what CDT considered to be two major privacy and civil liberties issues
in CISPA-"the flow of internet data directly to the NSA and the use of information
for purposes unrelated to cybersecurity . . . ." When the House leadership subsequently
blocked amendments on both issues, CDT reasserted its opposition to CISPA. See
Press Release, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., CDT Opposes CISPA Going Forward
(Apr. 25, 2012), availableat https://www.cdt.org/prstatement/cdt-opposes-cispa-goingforward.
324. McCullagh, supra note 306.
STATUTES

325. Josh Smith, Bucking Veto Threat, House OKs CISPA Cybersecurity
Information-Sharing Bill,
NAT'L
J.
(Apr.
26,
2012,
7:02
PM),

http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/bucking-veto-threat-house-oks-cispacybersecurity-information-sharing-bill-20120426.
326. McCullagh, supra note 304.
327. Id.
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Other controversial provisions of CISPA were amended before its
passage. For example, after critics lambasted the bill's original language
allowing the government to use information shared under CISPA for "any
lawful purpose," the bill was amended to limit government use and
retention of shared information to five enumerated purposes: (1)
cybersecurity;328 (2) investigation and prosecution of cybersecurity crimes;
(3) protection of individuals from the danger of death or serious bodily
harm and investigation and prosecution of crimes involving such dangers;
(4) protection of minors from harm and/or exploitation (including sexual
exploitation, kidnapping, and trafficking); and (5) protection of U.S.
national security. 32 9 While acknowledging that these changes were a step
in the right direction, critics nonetheless expressed concern that the
amended language continued to permit "information shared under CISPA
[to] be used in criminal proceedings against individuals [even though] it
can be collected without any Fourth Amendment considerations. 3 30
CISPA supporters were quick to note that the bill does not obligate
private sector companies to share information with the government;
participation in information sharing is entirely voluntary.33 ' But critics
contended that "the cost of this information sharing-in terms of privacy
lost and civil liberties violated-is borne by individual customers and
Internet users. For them, nothing about CISPA is voluntary[,] and for them
there is no recourse," because CISPA affords broad liability protection to
companies who share information and exempts shared information from
FOIA.332
The Obama administration threatened to veto CISPA unless it ramped up
protections for critical infrastructure and privacy protections,333 but much
328. The definition of "cybersecurity" was itself limited by the amendments.
329. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523 112th Cong. §

1104(c)(1) (2012).
330. Alexander Furnas, Can Last-Minute Amendments Redeem the Troubling
Cybersecurity Bill?,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
25,
2012,
6:45
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/04/can-last-minute-amendmentsredeem-the-troubling-cybersecurity-bill/256372/. CISPA's definition of "cyber threat
intelligence" also was amended to address criticisms of over-breadth, but remains
controversial. See Anjali Dalal, Why the Cyber Intelligence Sharingand ProtectionAct
(CISPA) Is Not the Solution to U.S. Cyber Attack Fears, JUSTIA (May 2, 2012),

http://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/02/why-the-cyber-intelligence-sharing-andprotection-act-cispa-is-not-the-solution-to-u-s-cyber-attack-fears (detailing how CISPA
may circumvent the Fourth Amendment).
331. David Inserra, CISPA Is Ready for Primetime, THE FOUNDRY (Apr. 25, 2012,

6:30 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/25/cispa-is-ready-for-prime-time/.
332. Furnas, supra note 330.

333. Andrew Couts, CISPA Cybersecurity Bill Passes House 248 to 168, DIGITAL

(Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/cispa-cybersecurity-billpasses-house-248-to-168/#ixzz2DuTt6QBq.
TRENDS

FIDDLING ON THE RooF

2013

287

of the technology industry supported CISPA,334 apparently in hopes that
Congress would otherwise remain hands-off with respect to
cybersecurity.33 5
One cybersecurity expert summarized the CISPA saga as follows:
Congress knows that weak cybersecurity endangers the country-and
that America is dangerously unprepared-but it cannot muster a majority
to support serious defensive measures. The same forces that have kept
Capitol Hill in gridlock on many important issues have also blocked
effective cybersecurity legislation. That said, Congress does not want to
be in the position, after the inevitable cyberdisruption, of having to say it
knew but did nothing. The political solution to gridlock is to pass weak
legislation and pretend it will work. This is the CISPA story.
3.

U.S. Senate

The Senate ultimately failed to pass cybersecurity legislation in 2012,
however a number of bills made their way through the Senate, the most
important of which were: (1) the Strengthening and Enhancing
Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology
Act ("SECURE-IT") of 2012;337 (2) the Cybersecurity Act of 2012
("CSA");3 38 and (3) the Revised Cybersecurity Act of 2012.

a. SECURE-IT Act
The SECURE-IT Act of 2012, sponsored by Senator McCain and other
Republicans, was an information-sharing bill. It enabled private sector
"cyberthreat information" sharing with the government, including NSA.
The bill was first introduced in February and was re-introduced in June
with changes designed to address criticisms of the original bill. According
to its sponsors, the Act "recognizes industry's central role in protecting
cyber networks and provides it the liability protection it needs to share realtime cyber threat information that is necessary to combat cyber attacks."339
334. H.R. 3523 Letters ofSupport, H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,
http://intelligence.house.gov/hr-3523-letters-support (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (listing
numerous letters of support from trade associations such as BSA, Business Roundtable,
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as well as individual companies such as AT&T,
Boeing, Facebook, Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, Oracle, Symantec, and Verizon).
335. Lewis, supra note 308 ("One powerful motive for [CISPA's] passage, as a
House member privately told companies, was that it would 'help protect you from
regulation.' ").

336. Id.
337. Introduced as S. 2151 on March 1, 2012; re-introduced as S. 3342 on June 27,
2012.
338. Introduced as S. 2105 on February 14, 2012; re-introduced as S. 3414 on July
19, 2012.
339. Press Release, Senator John McCain, Senators Renew Push to Strengthen
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Civil liberties groups were highly critical of both the original and reintroduced bills, 34 0 asserting, for example, that the legislation's vague
definition of "cyberthreat information" could lead to government invasions
341
More fundamentally, civil libertarians labeled
of personal privacy.
SECURE-IT a "backdoor wiretap bill." 3 4 2 They claimed that despite
modifications of some of the bill's provisions:
SECURE IT still allows far too much information to flow to the
government, allows information to flow directly from companies in the
private sector to the NSA and other elements of the Department of
Defense, and allows shared cyber threat information to be used for noncybersecurity purposes such as national security and law enforcement.
Much of this information would otherwise be protected from government
access by the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Bypassing the
warrant requirement to facilitate intelligence and law enforcement
investigative activity effectively turns cybersecurity information sharing
into a back-door wiretap. The incremental, pro-privacy changes made to
SECURE IT [when it was re-introduced in June] do not overcome these
fundamental flaws in the legislation. 343
The SECURE-IT Act stood in stark contrast to the CSA (described in
SECURE-IT took a market-based, rather than
more detail below).
regulatory, approach and gave the federal government no new regulatory
authority with respect to cybersecurity standards. In the House, Reps.
Mary Bono Mack (R-Cal.) and Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) introduced
legislation that mirrors SECURE-IT, with only minor changes.34 4

b.

CybersecurityAct

CSA was originally introduced in February of 2012 by Senators

Cybersecurity (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord id=2ed8acb7cb2a-043e-7bb4-26766aaa2b5b.
340. Greg Nojeim & Jon Miller, SECURE-IT: Building a Better Back-Door Wiretap,
& TECH. (July 30, 2012), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/greg-

CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY

nojeim/3007secure-it-building-better-back-door-wiretap (outlining what CDT viewed
as "fundamental flaws" in SECURE-IT); Letter from Coalition in Opposition of
SECURE-IT to U.S. Senators (May 14, 2012), https://www.cdt.org/files
/pdfs/SecurelTCoalitionLetter.pdf.
341. Nojeim & Miller, supra note 340 (outlining what CDT viewed as "fundamental
flaws" in SECURE-IT).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Josh Smith, Bono Mack, Blackburn IntroduceIndustry-Friendly Cyber Bill,

(Mar. 27, 2012, 11:14 AM),
http://www.nationaljoumal.com/blogs/techdailydose/2012/03/bono-mack-blackburnintroduce-industry-friendly-cyber-bill-27.
NAT'L JOURNAL
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Lieberman, Collins, Rockefeller, and Feinstein in response to Majority
Leader Reid's instruction that all committees of jurisdiction work together
to produce a single piece of legislation. 34 5 In its original form, CSA (1)
authorized DHS to establish baseline mandatory cybersecurity performance
requirements for systems in critical infrastructure sectors; and (2) included
information-sharing provisions to facilitate private sector sharing of
cyberthreat information with other private sector companies and with the
government.346
CSA's opponents-including many Republicans and industry groupstendered the standard arguments against cybersecurity regulation, arguing
that it would be costly, ineffective, and hamper innovation.347 Industry
opponents also likely harbored concern (albeit rarely expressed) that
baselines
minimum
standards-even
cybersecurity
establishing
losses
for
liability
tort
of
potential
specter
standards-would raise the
caused by a corporation's failure to meet those standards.
One of the most commonly heard refrains from CSA opponents was that
the bill would encourage a culture not of "security," but of "compliance."
The Business Roundtable, an association of CEOs of major U.S.
companies, stated: "[CSA] would lead to static, prescriptive regulations
that do not address dynamic cybersecurity risks and would force companies
to shift scarce resources from security to compliance."34 8 The Business
Roundtable maintained that CSA favored "burdensome and ineffective
'check-the-box' security approaches over sophisticated management of
shared cyber risks." 34 9 Echoing these sentiments, the Telecommunication
Industry Association, the lead industry association representing
manufacturers and suppliers of global networks, wrote:
[I]ndustry's primary concern with transitioning to a mandatory
regulatory regime .... is that imposing rigid regulatory requirementsrequirements that by their nature will be unable to keep up with rapidly
345. Cybersecurity, U.S. SENATE COMMITFEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY & Gov'T
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/issues/cybersecurity (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
346. See Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105 §§ 105, 701-08 (2012).

AFF.,

347. See David Inserra, Cybersecurity Executive Order Touts More Regulation as
the Solution, THE FOUNDRY (Nov. 2, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012

/ 11/02/cybersecurity-executive-order-touts-more-regulation-as-the-solution/
("[R]egulations hinder innovation. Since companies will try to meet outdated
cybersecurity regulations, cybersecurity companies will focus on meeting this demand.
However, time spent meeting this demand for older cybersecurity approaches is time
not being spent innovating ways to fight newer threats.").
348. Letter from Ajay Banga, Chair, Info. & Tech. Comm., Bus. Roundtable, to
Harry Reid & Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senators (July 31, 2012), available at
http://businessroundtable.org/news-center/business-roundtable-letter-on-the-revisedcybersecurity-act-of-2012/.
349. Id.
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evolving technologies and threats-would require industry to focus on
obsolete security requirements rather than facing the actual threat at
hand, effectively making systems less secure. Instead, the key to
improving the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure is to strengthen the
broader cyber ecosystem that enables rapid information sharing,
enhances public private partnerships, and provides sufficient investment
to address current and emerging threats. 350
Meanwhile, proponents of CSA viewed the bill as a basic-and long
overdue--effort to provide a necessary security framework for private
sector companies, particularly those that control critical infrastructure.3 5 1
Under the CSA,
Company CEOs would only need to certify once a year that they had
taken steps to secure their networks, using measurable outcome-based
guidelines. DHS would not prescribe how they should do this, but
simply define outcomes that a company could then use any technology
or technique to achieve. This was very light regulation, but for some it
was still too much. 352
c.

Revised CybersecurityAct

On July 19, 2012, in what was ultimately an unsuccessful attempt to
secure Senate passage of their cybersecurity legislation, Senators
Lieberman and Collins introduced a revised version of their omnibus
cybersecurity bill ("Revised Cybersecurity Act") designed to address
Republican concerns.
The compromise bill, which the Obama
Administration supported, included voluntary cybersecurity standards for
critical infrastructure,35 3 information-sharing provisions,3 54 and substantial
350. TELECOMMS. INDUS. Ass'N, supra note 282; see Inserra, supra note 347
("[R]egulations create a false sense of security and an attitude of compliance. The
private sector would follow the regulations and do little more. After all, if it follows
the regulations, the government has declared that the private sector is doing
cybersecurity right. This will give the private sector the wrong incentive. Instead of
promoting the adoption of the most appropriate cybersecurity system, regulations
merely encourage the private sector to meet the outdated standards.").
351. CSA reflects the view espoused by some experts that federal government action
is necessary to secure the Internet's infrastructure. See, e.g., SPADE, supra note 23, at
36 ("The biggest step the federal government can take is to secure the Internet's
infrastructure .

. .

. If the government intends to use the commercial sector for IT,

industry security must be federally regulated."). Colonel Spade takes the argument
even further, arguing that "SCADA systems must be disconnected from the Internet."
In his view, critical infrastructure should then be included in a "federally secured
network," which would "allow national utilities to remain linked with greatly reduced
vulnerability to CNE [i.e., cyber network exploitation]." Id.
352. Lewis, supra note 308.
353. See Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. § 103; see also Jonathan
G. Cederbaum et al., Senate to Consider Compromise Cybersecurity Legislation,
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civil liberties protections. 5 s
First, the Revised Cybersecurity Act provided for voluntary standards.
To encourage CI owners and operators to adopt the standards, the bill
offered an array of incentives. The incentives included liability protection
from any punitive damages arising out of a cybersecurity incident if the CI
owner/operator was substantially in compliance with the standards at the
time of the incident; priority technical assistance for response to cyber
threats; and potential access to classified cyberthreat information. 35 6
Second, the Revised Cybersecurity Act included revised informationsharing provisions.357 These provisions required the creation of a federal
cybersecurity information exchange led by a civilian agency,35 and limited
the sharing of private-sector provided cyberthreat information with other
Federal agencies. In this vein, the bill allows disclosure of cyberthreat
indicators to, and use of those indicators by, law enforcement only for
specific purposes. 35 9 The bill also provides liability protection for private
sector actors who share information with the government in "good faith"
and without "gross negligence."360
Critics of the compromise bill described a number of concerns in
addition to those typically expressed in prior debates over cybersecurity
standards (i.e., cost, hindered innovation, "compliance" over "security,"
etc.). For example, one critic suggested that "the government will withhold
cyber threat and vulnerability information from those private sector actors
who do not adopt the [voluntary] standards" 361and wrote:

(July 23, 2012), http://wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail
.aspx?NewsPubld=l 0737418914.
354. See S. 3414 §§ 701-08.
355. See, e.g., id § 201 (amending the Federal Information Security Management
Act to include the civil liberties protections set forth in §§ 3553(b)(1)(G),
3553(e)(2)(A)(ii), and 3554(b)); id. § 301 (amending the Homeland Security Act of
2002 by adding Sections 242(d)(4) and 243(a)(4)); id. §§ 704(g)(3)-(6). For a detailed
analysis of the provisions of the Revised Cybersecurity Act, see Cederbaum et al.,
supra note 353.
356. See SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFF., THE
REVISED CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2012 S. 3414 (INTRODUCED JULY 19 2012) (2012),
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/cybersecurity-act-of-2012_-revision-two-pageWILMERHALE

summary; see also Paul Rosenzweig, Thoughts About the Revised Lieberman-Collins
Cybersecurity
Bill,
LAWFARE
(July
21,
2012,
11:20
AM),

http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/thoughts-about-the-revised-lieberman-collinscybersecurity-bill/.
357. S. 3414 §§ 701-08.
358. Id. § 703.
359. Id. § 704(g)(2).
360. Id. § 706(b), (g).
361. Rosenzweig, supra note 356.
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It is at least reasonable to ask whether this is the right carrot. Should the
government be in the position of denying government threat information
to critical infrastructure owners who choose not to adopt the voluntary
standards (especially if that decision may be for justifiable business
reasons of cost). If the infrastructure in question is truly "critical" it is in
America's collective interest to protect them as much as we can.
Denying them the informational tools to do so because they don't follow
the qovernment's lead may be cutting off our nose to spite our own
face.
Another criticism was that the bill did not sufficiently protect companies
against liability. Although the bill protects companies from punitive
damages if they comply with the standards, one legal scholar claimed that
the protections were of little value saying, "I would have argued that even
in the absence of an explicit liability protection[,] any company that
adopted government approved cybersecurity standards and could show
their compliance with them would be immune from punitive damages."36 3
Cybersecurity expert James Lewis criticized the compromise bill for a
more fundamental reason. According to Lewis, the bill "simply translates
the status quo into legislation-a status quo we all know is inadequate."36 4
Lewis explains that the bill "relies on voluntary action-for everyone,
regardless of their importance to national security. But what everyone does
now is entirely voluntary, and more of the same will not improve
security."3 6 5 According to Lewis:
[The bill] continues the overreliance on information sharing,
accompanied by complicated protections to assuage the privacy
community. Regulatory agencies can make cybersecurity standards
mandatory to the limits of their existing authorities . . . . The bill offers

weak incentives for companies to certify that their networks are
secure .... [and flew companies are likely to certify themselves because
the incentives in the bill don't compensate for the regulatory risk this
creates.366
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the White House and many Senators
lent their support to the bill. In an unusual move, President Obama signed
a July 19, 2012, Wall Street Journal op-ed urging the Senate to pass the
compromise bill. He argued:

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Lewis, supra note 308.

365. Id.
366. Id.
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The American people deserve to know that companies running our
critical infrastructure meet basic, commonsense cybersecurity standards,
just as they already meet other security requirements. Nuclear power
plants must have fences and defenses to thwart a terrorist attack. Water
treatment plants must test their water regularly for contaminants.
Airplanes must have secure cockpit doors. We all understand the need
for these kinds of physical security measures. It would be the height of
irresponsibility to leave a digital backdoor wide open to our cyber
adversaries.
It is important to note that the Senate's compromise bill embraced a
voluntary, incentives-based system; precisely the system that the Chamber
of Commerce proposed in their March 2011 White Paper and that the
House task force endorsed in October 2011.368 Even so, on August 2,
2012, just weeks before the 2012 election, Senate Republicans blocked the
compromise legislation from coming to a vote after "a handful of business
lobbying groups and trade associations, most notably the United States
Chamber of Commerce," opposed "voluntary" standards.369
CSA's
supporters failed (by a vote of 52-46) to get the sixty votes needed to end
debate on the filibustered bill. 3 70
On October 13, 2012, just days after then-Defense Secretary's Panetta's
"cyber 9/11" speech, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid vowed to bring
the stalled legislation back for Senate consideration during the lame duck
session.371 On November 14, the Senate once again failed to advance the
legislation, this time by a vote of 51-47.372
367. Obama, supra note 100.
368. THORNBERRY ET AL., supra note 297, at 7-8 ("Congress should encourage
participation in the development of voluntary cybersecurity standards and guidance
through non-regulatory agencies such as [NIST], to help the private sector improve
security. These standards should be developed by a public-private partnership, focus
on security best practices, and remain technology-neutral as much as possible.
Additionally, the public-private partnership should evaluate which incentives or
strategies would increase the adoption of successful security best practices. An
example would include varying degrees of liability protections afforded to companies
that voluntarily implement the enhanced security practices.").
369. Letter from John D. Rockefeller IV, U.S. Senator, Chairman, Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. & Transp., to Virginia M. Rometty, President & C.E.O., IBM (Sept.
19, 2012), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a-Files.Serve&File-id
=396eb5d5-23a4-4488-a67c-d45f62bbf9e5.
370. Sarah Orrick, Cybersecurity Bill Blocked by Senate Filibuster, CONG. DIG.

(Aug. 3, 2012), http://congressionaldigest.com/cybersecurity-bill-blocked-by-senatefilibuster.
371. Ben Geman, Reid Vows Fresh Effort to Pass Stalled Cybersecurity Bill in

November, THE HILL (Oct. 13, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/261891-reid-vows-fresh-bid-to-pass-stalled-cybersecurity-bill.
372. Bill Summary & Status, 112' Congress (2011-2012), S. 3414, LIBR. OF CONG.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 12:s.3414: (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
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B. Rockefeller Letter
On September 19, 2012, just weeks after comprehensive cybersecurity
legislation was first blocked in the Senate, Senator Rockefeller sent an
"unprecedented"3 73 letter directly to the CEO of each of the Fortune 500
companies seeking their views on cybersecurity "without the filter of
Beltway lobbyists."374 Senator Rockefeller posed the following eight
questions seeking detailed information on corporate cybersecurity

practices:375
1. Has your company adopted a set of best practices to address its
cybersecurity needs?
2. If so, how were these cybersecurity practices developed?
3. Were they developed by the company solely, or were they
developed outside the company? If developed outside the
company, please list the institution, association, or entity that
developed them.
4. When were these cybersecurity practices developed? How
frequently have they been updated? Does your company's board
of directors or audit committee keep abreast of developments
regarding the development and implementation of these practices?
5. Has the federal government played any role, whether advisory or
otherwise, in the development of these cybersecurity practices?
6. What are your concerns, if any, with a voluntary program that
enables the federal government and the private sector to develop, in
coordination, best cybersecurity practices for companies to adopt
as they so choose, as outlined in the Cybersecurity Act of 2012?
7. What are your concerns, if any, with the federal government
conducting risk assessments, in coordination with the private
sector, to best understand where our nation's cyber vulnerabilities
are, as outlined in the Cybersecurity Act of 2012?
8. What are your concerns, if any, with the federal government
determining, in coordination with the private sector, the country's
most critical cyber infrastructure, as outlined in the Cybersecurity
Act of 2012?
Then (in what appears to have been a thinly veiled reference to passage
373. See Catherine Dunn, Ex-IBM Privacy Officer on Preparingfor the Future of

Cybersecurity, LAW.COM (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel
/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202578672642&ExlBM PrivacyOfficer onPreparing_for-t
heFuture of Cybersecurity&slreturn=20130122101602 (quoting Harriet Pearson,
former IBM Chief Privacy Officer and now-partner at Hogan Lovells, describing
Rockefeller's letter as "unprecedented").
374. Letter from John D. Rockefeller IV to Virginia M. Rometty, supra note 369.
375. Id.
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of the Patriot Act after 9/11) Senator Rockefeller wrote that the approach
taken in the compromise bill "strikes me as one that companies would want
to have codified in statute, rather than risking reactive and overly
prescriptive legislation following a cyberdisaster."37 6 Yet,
[m]ost observers believe that the United States will only get effective
cybersecurity legislation after there has been a crisis and that the country
will then overreact, trampling privacy and putting in place rigid
requirements. No one on the Hill wants this outcome, but it may be
unavoidable. The fate of cybersecurity legislation is symptomatic of a
larger political crisis. Congress knows there is a problem, but cannot
agree on a fix.377
In the absence of a legislative fix in the 2011-2012 session, Senator
Rockefeller and others urged President Obama to address cybersecurity
through an Executive Order, while many Republicans, including Senator
Collins, cautioned the President against doing so.378
C.

Executive Order

Whether these [cybersecurity] bills become law or not, the task of
finding new, effective ways to secure the country's infrastructure and
networks will now revert to the executive branch.
- James A. Lewis, CSIS

As early as August 2012, press reports suggested that the White House,
frustrated by Congress' failure to act on cybersecurity, had begun to
entertain the idea of taking executive action.380 The White House focused
its efforts on critical infrastructure protection, the most controversial part of
the comprehensive cybersecurity legislation that failed in the Senate,
recognizing, of course, that limits on executive authority would constrain
its ability to fully implement its policy vision through executive action.38'
376. Id.
377. Lewis, supra note 308.
378. Eric Chabrow, 'We Can't Wait'for Cybersecurity: Divisions Surface Among
Cybersecurity Act Backers, BANK INFO SECURITY (Sept.
10, 2012),

http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/we-cant-wait-for-cybersecurity-p-1352
Executive Order should not be a substitute for legislative action .

. .

("[A]n

. An executive

order could send the unintended signal that congressional action is not urgently
needed.").
379. Lewis, supra note 308.
380. Suzanne Kelly, President Mulling Executive Order to Fill Cybersecurity Gap,
CNN (Aug. 9, 2012, 4:49 PM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/09/presidentmulling-executive-order-to-fill-cybersecurity-gap/.
381. See, e.g., CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENVTL. SEC., UNIV. OF COLO. L. SCH., THE
BOUNDARIES OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY: USING EXECUTIVE ORDERS TO IMPLEMENT
FEDERAL
CLIMATE
CHANGE
POLICY
15-21,
http://cospl.coalliance.org
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Just six weeks after Senate Republicans first blocked comprehensive
cybersecurity legislation, the Administration had completed an initial draft
of its cybersecurity Executive Order ("EO").382 A revised draft, dated
November 21, surfaced shortly after Senate Republicans blocked passage
of compromise cybersecurity legislation on November 14, 2012 during the
lame duck session.
Although DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano suggested that the
Administration's cybersecurity EO was "close to completion" in late
September,3 84 the final EO was not signed until February 12, 2013.
Some theorized that the Administration was working to "get it right" by
reaching out to stakeholders for input. Indeed, according to a White House
spokeswoman, by the end of November, "The National Security Staff ha[d]
held over 30 meetings with industry, think tanks, and privacy groups,
meeting directly with over 200 companies and trade organizations
representing over 6,000 companies that generate over $7 trillion in
economic activity and employ more than 15 million people." 38 6 Others
conjectured that the threat of an EO dealing only with the critical
infrastructure problem could open the door for legislative movement on the
previously-stalled comprehensive cybersecurity bill.3 87 Still others thought
/fedora/repository/co:5359 (discussing sources of authority for executive orders); see
also Brian Prince, Obama Administration in Talks to Draft Cyber-Security Executive

Order,EWEEK (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.eweek.com/servers/obama-administrationin-talks-to-draft-cyber-security-executive-order/ (discussing constraints on what
executive orders can accomplish).
382. The Administration's draft Executive Order is not to be confused with the
administration's Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-20, signed in October or with
the draft Presidential Directive on Critical Infrastructure Protection which is designed
to update HSPD-7. See Nakashima, supra note 271. Although initial media reports
suggested that a draft of the Administration's Executive Order had been leaked in midSeptember, the leaked document was the Presidential Directive updating HSPD-7. See
Mike Masnick, LEAKED! Here's the White House's Draft Cybersecurity Executive
Order, TECHDIRT (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:23 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles

/20120914/19280020390/leaked-heres-white-houses-draft-cybersecurity-executiveorder.shtml.
383. Draft Exec. Order, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Nov. 21
2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/1 l/White-House-DraftExecutive-Order-Dated-11-21-12.pdf [hereinafter Draft Exec. Order].
384. Sen. Rockefeller Asks Fortune 500 CEOs for Cybersecurity Best Practices,
HOMELAND
SEC.
NEWS
WIRE
(Oct.
18,
2012),

http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20121018-sen-rockefeller-asks-fortune500-ceos-for-cybersecurity-best-practices.
385. Although signed on February 12, 2013, the EO was embargoed for release until
after the February 13, 2013 State of the Union Address.

386. Tony Romm, Draft Cyber Executive Order Excludes Commercial Products,

POLITICO (Nov. 30, 2012, 3:51 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/1 1/draftcyber-executive-order-excludes-commercial-products-84462.html#ixzz2FcFUYVZB.
387. See Andy Grotto, Staff Member, Senate Select Intelligence Comm., Speaking
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that the Administration held off because it wanted the political cover of
failed congressional legislation before issuing the EO.
When the EO was issued, it focused on two major issues: cybersecurity
information sharing and the development and implementation of risk-based
cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure.
1. Information Sharing

The EO's information sharing provisions build on existing DoD and
DHS information sharing initiatives designed to safeguard critical defense
information stored on, or transiting, the privately-owned networks of
defense industrial base ("DIB") and, in some cases, CI companies. These
initiatives include the DIB Cybersecurity and Information Assurance
Program ("DIB CS/IA"), the DIB Exploratory Cybersecurity Initiative
("DIB Pilot"), the DIB Enhanced Cybersecurity Services ("DECS")
Program, and the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services ("ECS") Program.
DoD initiated the voluntary DIB CS/IA information sharing program
with DIB companies to help safeguard sensitive but unclassified DoD
information on DIB unclassified networks.389 DIB companies participating
in the program are required to execute a framework agreement governing
their cybersecurity information sharing with the government. Under the
DIB CS/IA program, DoD provides "cyber threat information and
information assurance best practices to DIB companies,"390 and in return,
DIB participants report to the government "cyber incidents that may
involve DoD information" and, participate in cyberintrusion damage
assessments as needed. 3 91 Although the program began with a limited
number of DIB participants, DoD subsequently opened the program to all
eligible DIB companies 392 and formalized the program through an interim
at ABA Section of Science and Technology Law in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17, 2012).
388. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,636, Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity § 1, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,737, 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013) (discussing the policy
behind the EO in section one), with Draft Exec. Order, supra note 383, § 1.
389. Memorandum from Ashton B. Carter, U.S. Deputy Sec'y of Def., on Defense
Industrial Base Cyber Security 1 (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy
/policyvault/OSD012537-12-RES.pdf.
390. Id.
391. Id.; Howard A. Schmidt, PartnershipDevelopments in Cybersecurity, WHITE
HouSE BLOG (May 21, 2012, 2:17 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/05

/21/partnership-developments-cybersecurity.
392. Dep't of Def. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Voluntary Cyber Security and
Information Assurance (CS/IA) Activities, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,615, 27,621 (May 11,
2012) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 236) [hereinafter DIB CS/IA Program] (setting forth
DIB participant eligibility requirements); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., DoD
Announces the Expansion of Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Voluntary Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Activities (May 11, 2012), available at
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15266.
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final rule issued May 11, 2012."'
The DIB CS/IA program includes an optional component known as DIB
DECS specifically addresses the need to share
ECS ("DECS").394
classified threat information and signatures with DIB companies
participating in the DIB CS/IA. Specifically, under the DECS program, the
government (i.e., NSA) provides "classified cyber threat and technical
information either to a DIB company or to the DIB company's Commercial
Service Provider [("CSP")]." 39 5 DECS was based on "lessons learned"
from a DoD pilot program, known as the DIB Pilot, that started back in
July 2010. The DECS program ultimately became a joint DoD-DHS
program "falling under the umbrella" of DHS's Enhanced Cybersecurity
Services ("ECS") program 396 with DHS taking the leadership role.
The first phase of ECS "focused on the cyber protection of the DIB
companies participating in DoD's [DIB CS/IA]."3 97 By January 2013,
DHS had decided to expand ECS to provide "enhanced cybersecurity
protection" to all U.S. CI sectors through "the sharing of indicators of
malicious cyber activity with CSPs." 3 9 8
The success of the DIB Pilot, DECS, and ECS is unclear. While some
view these programs as "an important step forward in our ability to catch
up with widespread cyberthreats,"3 w others have expressed concern that
"[t]he DIB pilot probably increases the defenders' work factor much more
than it increases the attackers."400 An independent review of the DIB
Pilot401 found that the program had only "marginal benefit.A02
393. DIB CS/IA Program 77 Fed. Reg. 27,615.
394. DIB ENHANCED CYBERSECURITY SERVICES (DECS), http://www.dc3.mil/dcise
/DIB%20Enhanced%2OCybersecurity%2OServices%20Procedures.pdf.
395. Memorandum from Ashton B. Carter, supra note 389, at 1.
396. In January 2012, DHS and DoD announced that they would be undertaking a
proof of concept known as the Joint Cybersecurity Services Pilot ("JCSP"). Under the
JSCP, operational relationships with CPSs in the DIB Pilot were shifted from DoD to
DHS. JCSP subsequently became known as the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services
(ECS) program. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR THE ENHANCED CYBERSECURITY SERVICE (ECS), DHS/NPPD/PIA-028 2 (2013),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/privacy pia-nppd ecsjan2
013.pdf.
397. Id. at 2.
39 8. Id.
399. Taylor Armerding, Will Voluntary Cyber Threat Sharing Plan Case Doubt
Over
CISPA?,
NETWORKWORLD
(May
18,
2012,
9:20
AM),

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/051812-will-voluntary-cyber-threat-sharing259423.html (quoting Richard A. Hale, deputy chief information officer for
cybersecurity at the NSA).
400. Id. (quoting Jay Healey, director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at Atlantic
Council, a Washington, D.C. think tank).

401. Hearing to Receive Testimony on US. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber
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The EO builds on existing information sharing programs in several ways.
First, the EO confirms that it is U.S. policy to improve cybersecurity
information sharing, specifically by increasing the "volume, timeliness, and
quality" of cyberthreat information shared with the U.S. private sector.403
Second, the EO puts the President's imprimatur on the planned expansion
of ECS to CI sectors. Specifically, the EO directs DHS and DoD to
establish procedures to expand ECS to all CI sectors within 120 days.404
Third, pursuant to the EO, unclassified versions of reports of cyberthreats
to the United States that identify a specific target must be rapidly
disseminated to the target.405
The EO also encourages the private sector to share information with the
government. Toward this end, the EO provides that "[i]nformation
submitted voluntarily . . . by private entities under this order shall be

protected from disclosure to the fullest extent permitted by law.'A06
However, private sector companies may remain reluctant to share
information with the government due to the EO's lack of liability
protections. The White House did not have the authority to provide
liability protections through an executive order; an act of Congress is
required.4 07 Indeed, legislation may be necessary to address a number of
Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and
the Future Years Defense Program Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 112th
Cong. 1-3 (2012) (opening statement of Carl Levin, U.S. Senator), http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/Transcripts/2012/03%2OMarch/12-19%20-%203-27-12.pdf
[hereinafter Hearing Testimony in Review of Defense Authorization 2013] ("Carnegie
Mellon conducted an independent assessment of the DIB Pilot for DoD.").
402. Armerding, supra note 399 (noting that only "1% of attacks [were] ... detected
using NSA threat data that the companies did not already have themselves," according
to Jay Healey, director of the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative); Hearing
Testimony in Review of Defense Authorization 2013, supra note 401, at 3 (opening
statement of Carl Levin, U.S. Senator) ("Carnegie Mellon concluded [based on their
independent assessment] that NSA provided few signatures that were not already
known to the companies themselves, and in many cases, the DIB companies by
themselves detected advanced threats with their own non-signature-based detection
methods that probably [were] not known to the NSA."); Jason Healey, Cybersecurity
Legislation Should Force U.S. Government to Listen Less and Speak More, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2012/03/cybersecurity-legislation-should-force-us-government-to-listen-lessand-speak-more/254491/ ("[NSA's signature database is] considered among the crown
jewels of the U.S. government's defense capabilities [but] may not be as awe-inspiring
as advertised.").
403. Exec. Order No. 13,636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity §§ 1,
4(a), 78 Fed. Reg. 11,737, 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
404. Id. § 4(c), at 11,739-40.
405. Id. § 4(b), at 11,739.
406. Id § 5(d), at 11,740.
407. Eric Chabrow, Exec Order Could Ease Cybersecurity Bill Passage:Ridding
Gov's Role in Setting Standardsfrom Legislative Equation, BANK INFO SECURITY (Dec.
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issues surrounding information sharing, including the controversial privacy
and civil liberties implications of such sharing.408
2.

CybersecurityFramework

In addition to information sharing, the EO calls for the collaborative
development and voluntary adoption of a new cybersecurity framework to
include risk-based cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure. 4 09 The
EO directs NIST to "lead the development of a framework to reduce cyber
risks to critical infrastructure ("Cybersecurity Framework");" 4 10 to engage
in an "open public review and comment process;"41 1 and to publish a final
version of the Cybersecurity Framework within one year. 4 12 The EO
directs that the Cybersecurity Framework shall include "standards,
methodologies, procedures, and processes that align policy, business, and
technology approaches to address cyber risk." 4 13 The EO requires the
Cybersecurity Framework to incorporate voluntary consensus standards
and industry best practices to the fullest extent possible. 4 14
With an eye toward encouraging-rather than impeding-a competitive
market, the EO addresses several of the concerns that industry had voiced
For example, the EO clarifies that "the
over voluntary standards.
Cybersecurity Framework will provide [cybersecurity] guidance that is
technology neutral," 415 will not pick technological winners and losers, and
will thereby "enable . . . [CI] sectors to benefit from a competitive market

for products and services that meet the standards, methodologies,
procedures, and processes developed to address cyber risks."4 16
The EO directs DHS to "establish a voluntary program to support the
adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework [by CI owners and

7, 2012), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/exec-order-could-ease-cybersecurity-billpassage-a-5341.
408. See id. ("The more contentious matters dealing with information sharing, which
also includes protecting the privacy and civil liberties of citizens whose personal
information could be exposed during exchanges of data between business and
government, must be addressed by legislation.").
409. Exec. Order No. 13,636 § 7(b), 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,739; Chabrow, supra note
407 ("At the heart of the proposed executive order is a process in which the federal
government . . . would collaborate with industry to establish IT security best practices
that [CI owners] . . . could adopt voluntarily.").

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Exec. Order No. 13,636 § 7(a), 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,740-41.
Id. § 7(d), at 11,741.
Id. § 7(e), at 11,741.
Id. § 7(a), at 11,740-41.
Id.
Id. § 7(b), at 11,741.

416. Id.
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operators].""
The EO explores greater use of "carrots," in the form of
incentives, to promote industry participation. Indeed, it "directs the
Treasury and Commerce Departments to recommend a set of possible
incentives that would entice operators of critical infrastructure to join a
voluntary program in which they would follow a set of cybersecurity
standards." 418 The EO further directs that DHS, Treasury, and Commerce
identify which incentives are available under existing law and which
require legislation.4 19
The EO also seeks recommendations regarding the potential use of
federal purchasing power to influence adoption of cybersecurity standards.
Specifically, the EO directs DoD and the General Services Administration
("GSA"), in consultation with DHS and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory
Council, to make recommendations to the President regarding the
"feasibility, security benefits, and relative merits" of "incorporating
security standards into acquisition planning and contract administration" as
well as steps that can be taken "to harmonize . . . existing procurement
requirements related to cybersecurity."420
In summary, the EO facilitates information sharing and the development
and adoption of cybersecurity standards by CI owners and operators. Some
congressional leaders fear (and some industry groups are hopeful) that the
executive order sends a signal that congressional action is not urgent.421
However, others believe that by addressing the issue of cybersecurity
standards for CI owners and operators, the EO potentially removes from
the legislative debate the very issue that prompted Republicans to block the
compromise cybersecurity bill, and may therefore pave the way for
congressional action on cybersecurity legislation in 2013.422
D.

CongressionalAction (2013)

1. U.S. House ofRepresentatives
a. CISPA
On February 13, 2013, immediately after the EO was issued, HSPCI
Chairman Rogers re-introduced CISPA.423 CISPA passed out of committee
on April 10, 2013, after a closed-door debate during which six amendments
417. Id. § 8(a), at 11,741.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. § 8(e), at 11,741.

421. Cf Kelly, supra note 378.
422. See Chabrow, supranote 407.
423. H.R. 624, 113th Cong. (2013).
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to the bill-including several amendments designed to strengthen the bill's
privacy and civil liberties protections-were approved.424 The bill's
sponsors subsequently took the position that, as amended, CISPA provides
appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties.42 5 Many privacy and
civil liberties advocates vehemently disagreed,426 and on April 16, 2013,
just days before CISPA reached the House floor for a vote, the White
House issued a veto threat, explaining that "if the bill, as currently crafted,
were presented to the President, his senior advisors would recommend that
he veto the bill." 4 27 The White House explained that "[w]hile there is
bipartisan consensus on the need for . . . [cybersecurity information

sharing] legislation, it should adhere to the following priorities: (1)
carefully safeguard privacy and civil liberties; (2) preserve the longstanding, respective roles and missions of civilian and intelligence
agencies; and (3) provide for appropriate sharing with targeted liability
protections."4 28 The House passed CISPA by a vote of 288-127 on April
18, 2013, just days after the Boston Marathon bombings, with Rep. Mike
McCaul (R-Tex.) stating at the House hearing:
"In the case of Boston, they were real bombs. In this case, they're digital
bombs. These bombs are on their way. That's why this legislation is so
urgent. For if we don't and those digital bombs land and attack the
424. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Bipartisan Cybersecurity Bill Clears Key Hurdle, April 10, 2013,
http://intelligence.house.gov/press-release/bipartisan-cybersecurity-bill-clears-keyhurdle-0. For a textual version of the bill and its amendments, see H.R. 624 - The Bill
andAmendments, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,
http://intelligence.house.gov/hr-624-bill-and-amendments (last visited May 3, 2013).
425. Myths and Facts about the Cyber Intelligence Sharing andProtectionAct

(CISPA), http://www.dutch.house.gov/CISPA%20MYTHBUSTER%202013.pdf, see
Cyber Intelligence Sharing and ProtectionAct of2013, U.S. HOUSE OF REP.
PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,

http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/CivilLibertie
sTPsCyberBillFeb 112013v2.pdf.
426. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union decries CISPA's continued
(1) lack of civilian control over domestic cyber programs; (2) failure to limit the
sharing of personal information; and (3) "unlimited immunity" for hack backs.
Michelle Richardson, CISPA Remains FatallyFlawedAfter Secret Committee Markup,
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 12, 2013, 12:20 PM),

http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security-free-speech/cisparemains-fatally-flawed-after-secret ("We have flagged four general categories of
problems in CISPA that have to be fixed before it is passed, and the markup only
substantially fixed one of them .... ).
427. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 624- CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION
ACT (2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/lI 3/saphr624r_2013

0416.pdf.
428. Id.
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United States, and Congress failed to act, then Congress has that on [its]
hands."429
b. SECURE-ITAct
On April 10, 2013, Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) re-introduced
the SECURE-IT Act in the House.430
2.

U.S. Senate

On the Senate side, Senators Tom Carper, John D. Rockefeller IV, and
Diane Feinstein introduced the Cybersecurity and American Cyber
Despite its
Competitiveness Act of 2013431 on January 23, 2013.
impressive title, the legislation is nothing more than a "sense of Congress"
that there should be legislation.432 In his press release announcing the bill,
Senator Carper stated: "It is a priority this year to act on comprehensive
cybersecurity legislation.A33
Senator Feinstein has since announced her intention to introduce
information sharing legislation through the Senate Intelligence Committee,
which she chairs. 3"
E.

Regulatory Litigation

Recent regulatory litigation developments, such as Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") v. Wyndham, should inform corporate cybersecurity
investments.435 Wyndham marks the first time that the FTC has sued a
major company in federal court for failure to secure customer information.
The FTC's suit alleges that Wyndham and its subsidiaries had flawed
security practices (including failure to erect firewalls, use appropriate
429. Elizabeth Flock, Texas Congressman Uses Boston Bombing to Argue for CISPA

Passage,U.S.

NEWS

& WORLD REPORT (Apr. 18, 2013),

http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2013/04/18/texascongressman-uses-boston-bombing-to-argue-for-cispa-passage.
430. H.R. 1468, 113th Cong. (2013).
431. S. 21, 113th Cong. (2013).
432. Id. § 3.
433. Press Release, Tom Carper, U.S. Senator, Comprehensive Cybersecurity Bill
23,
2013),
available at
this
Congress
(Jan.
Will
Be
Priority
http://www.carper.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=99646255-b7034647-96e5-clc4e9fdcla4.
434. Katy O'Donnell, Intelligence Leaders: Cybersecurity Now the Top Global
Threat, MAIN JUST. (March 13, 2013, 9:38 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com
(quoting
/2013/03/13/intelligence-leaders-cybersecurity-now-the-top-global-threat/
Senator Feinstein saying that she and Senator Chambliss will begin an effort shortly to
"see if we can't get a bill that we can agree to move through the [Senate Intelligence]
committee on the information-sharing part of it.").

435. Complaint, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., filed (D. Ariz. 2012) (No.
2:12-cv-01365-SPL), http://fic.gov/os/caselist/1023142/120626wyndamhotelscmpt.pdf.
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passwords, or configure software to keep credit card information secure).436
FTC officials have called the alleged security flaws "obvious.'A 37
In the Wyndham complaint, the FTC claims that Wyndham's security
practices constitute both unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the
FTC Act. First, the FTC alleges that Wyndham's failure to safeguard
personal information caused substantial consumer injury and constituted an
unfair practice. Second, the FTC alleges that Wyndham's privacy policy
misrepresented the security measures that the company and its subsidiaries
took to protect consumers' personal information.438 The FTC alleges, for
example, that Wyndham failed to keep up with industry cybersecurity
standards despite promising to do so in its own privacy policy. 4 3 9
In Wyndham, the FTC essentially is asserting that it can use its
enforcement authority to hold companies to their data security promises,
including promises to adopt "reasonable security measures." As the FTC
litigates more of these cases, a body of legal rulings is likely to develop
regarding the meaning of "reasonable security."440 Such rulings potentially
could eventually serve as a basis for tort liability (i.e., liability for failure to
take reasonable security measures), which likely explains why the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, through the National Chamber Litigation Center,
has filed an amicus brief on behalf of the defendants in Wyndham, urging
the Court to grant Wyndham's motion to dismiss.441
Wyndham also serves as a cautionary tale, reminding corporations of the
care that must be taken when drafting corporate data security policies
governing the handling of consumer information. It is imperative that
corporations ensure that their data security policies accurately describe
their data security practices and make only those promises that the
436. See id. at 10.
437. Craig Timberg, FTC Sues Wyndham Hotels over Hacker Breaches, WASH.
POST (June 26, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-26/business
/35459761_1_hackers-personal-data-information-security.
438. Complaint at 17, Wyndham Worldwide Corp., (No. 2:12-cv-01365-SPL).
439. Id. at 18-19.
440. In a recent non-regulatory litigation that may signal the "future of business-tobusiness litigation," according to Crowell & Moring LLP partner David Bodenheimer,
an Oregon company reportedly sued its bank to recover nearly a quarter of a million
dollars that cyberthieves stole from its accounts. The company reportedly alleged that
the bank violated the requirements for commercially reasonably security procedures set
forth in Uniform Commercial Code Section 4A. Brian Krebbs, Hay Maker Seeks
Cyber Heist Bale Out, KREBS
ON
SECuRITY,
April
13,
2013,
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/04/hay-maker-seeks-cyberheist-bale-out/;
see
Complaint at 1, Oregon Hay Prod., Inc. v. Cmty. Bank (Or. Cir. Ct.) (No.
CVH120083).
441. See Brief for U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., filed (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. 12-1365SPL).
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corporation can and will keep.
VI. PRIVATE SECTOR CHALLENGES
The basic problem-truesince 1998-is there are no incentives sufficient
to make companies in most critical infrastructuresectors take voluntary
action to bring the security of their networks to the level needed for
nationaldefense.
- James A. Lewis, CSIS"42

A.

The Limits of Vulnerability Mitigation

The U.S. self-regulatory approach to ".com" cybersecurity has long been
heavily focused on vulnerability mitigation. Behind the fancy language is a
simple idea: that by strengthening our cyberdefenses we will better protect
the ".com" domain against cyberthreats, including cybercrime,
cyberespionage, and cyberwar. Yet, by all accounts, it appears that we
remain quite vulnerable to cyberthreats.
Many experts believe that our continued vulnerability stems from
chronic private sector underinvestment in cyberdefenses, particularly with
respect to critical infrastructure.44 3 Some companies simply fail to make
investments in even the basic vulnerability mitigation measures necessary
to protect against the cyberthreats posed by "script-kiddies" and run-of-themill cybercriminals. 44 Other companies may invest in cyberdefense to
protect their own assets, but their investments rarely reflect the fact that, as
the nation becomes increasingly interconnected, one company's
vulnerabilities may result in harm to another company-or even the nation.
As cybercrime, cyberespionage, and cyberwar proliferate, the
consequences of inadequate cyberdefenses will only mount.
More fundamentally, in some contexts, our nation's focus on
vulnerability mitigation may be misplaced. While good cyberdefenses may
be sufficient to ward off certain cyberthreats (e.g., opportunistic
cybercrimals), they likely will be insufficient to keep determined
adversaries, such as nation-state actors, from perpetrating cyberespionage
or cyberwar. This problem will only be exacerbated as malware "trickles
down'" 5 from nation-state actors to cybercriminals," 6 and as hacking tools
442. Lewis, supra note 308.
443. See Letter from Michael Chertoff et al. to Harry Reid & Mitch McConnell,
supranote 182.
444. Panetta, Remarks on Cybersecurity, supra note 223 ("[T]he reality is that too

few companies have invested in even basic cybersecurity.").
445. Robert Bigman, Guest Blog: Former CIA CISO on Nation-State Security
Challenges, FIREEYE BLOG (June 15, 2012), http://blog.fireeye.com/research/2012/06
/former-cia-ciso-national-security.html ("[A]dditional attacks (mostly kernal rootkits)
have appeared that reflect the 'trickle down' of APT technology from nation-states to
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are commoditized.
Accordingly, it may be worthwhile to view vulnerability mitigation as
but one part of a more holistic ".com" cybersecurity strategy that seeks not
only to defend cyberspace, but also to deter threat actors. Today, nationstates and nation-state sponsored actors engaged in cyberespionage face
few, if any, consequences for their actions. The U.S. private sector could
play an important role in shifting the focus of cybersecurity efforts toward
threat deterrence, potentially through its own actions, and also by
encouraging the U.S. government to explore ways to bring all elements of
national power-including economic, diplomatic,44 7 and military-to bear
on the evolving cyberthreat.
B.

Obstacles to Effective Vulnerability Mitigation

According to experts, one of the key challenges to vulnerability
mitigation is the difficulty of spurring adequate private sector investment in
cyberdefense, a difficulty that may stem from a variety of sources,
including the widely-acknowledged lack of reliable cyberincident data;4
the "it can't happen to me" mentality evidenced by some corporations; and
the "public good" nature of cybersecurity.

the cybercriminal industry .

. .

. [T]he Chinese government engaged cybercriminals to

assist in the development and peer review of the Aurora attack code and even shared
the final product with them.").
446. Matthew J. Schwartz, 7 MiniFlame Facts: How Much Espionage Malware
Lurks?,
INFORMATIONWEEK
(Oct.
17,
2012,
12:56
PM),

http://www.informationweek.com/security/management/7-miniflame-facts-how-muchespionage-mal/240009237 ("Another worry from nation states' malware espionage
operations is that their tricks will.soon be put to use by criminals. In a 2009 report on
malware used for surveillance purposes, Cambridge University researchers Shishir
Nagaraja and Ross Anderson wrote, 'What Chinese spooks did in 2008, Russian crooks
will do in 2010 and even low-budget criminals from less developed countries will
follow in due course.' In other words, how long will it be until today's Flame
[cyberattack malware] becomes the inspiration for tomorrow's financial malware
attack?").
447. See, e.g., Press Release, Kirsten Gillibrand, U.S. Senator Gillibrand Announces
New Cybersecurity Bill Includes Measures She Authored to Combat Global Cyber
Criminals (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov
/newsroom/press/release/gillibrand-announces-new-cybersecurity-bill-includesbill]
("[The
new
measures-she-authored-to-combat-global-cyber-criminals
authorize[es] a State Department official to coordinate U.S. diplomatic strategy to
combat cybercrime and establish a consistent foreign policy when it comes to
cybercrime issues across relevant federal departments, agencies, U.S. embassies, and
consulates.").
448. Deirdre K. Mulligan & Fred B. Schneider, Doctrine for Cybersecurity,
DAEDALUS,
Fall 2011, at 70, 73, http://www.cs.comell.edulfbs/publications
/publicCYbersecDaed.pdf ("[The] lack of information about vulnerabilities, incidents,
and attendant losses makes actual risk calculations difficult.").
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1. Lack of CyberincidentDataNecessary to CalculateROI
Executives understandably may be reluctant to invest in cybersecurity
without a clear understanding of the return on investment ("ROI")449 for
their cybersecurity dollar because cybersecurity is expensive and can easily
become a "black holeA450 for spending. Unfortunately, the industry lacks
reliable ROI data upon which to build a business case for increased cyber
defense investments.
Reliable ROI data depends on reliable data about the frequency of
cyberincidents, the costs of cyberincidents, and the effectiveness of
mitigation methods. Reliable cyberincident information is lacking, both
because corporations may be victimized without their knowledge, 45 1 and
because corporations may be reluctant to report cybersecurity breaches, 452
for fear of repercussions in terms of compromised cybersecurity,
competitiveness, regulatory risk, consumer response, cost, and/or
reputation.45 3 Without reliable data about the frequency of cyberincidents,
it is difficult for companies to calculate the probability with which
449. See Simon Moffatt, Information Security: Why Bother?, INFOSEC ISLAND (Dec.
9, 2012), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/22774-Information-Security-WhyBother.html ("Organisations have finite budgets which will cover all of IT and related
services, and it is a fair objective, to have to show and prove, either via tangible or
intangible Rol, that a piece of software or consultancy will have a beneficial impact on
the organisation as a whole.").
450. Erik Sherman, Hackers Target Small Businesses, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH
(July
6,
2012,
11:05
AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_16257467265/hackers-target-small-businesses/.
451. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 96, at 2 ("I am convinced that every company in
every conceivable industry with significant size and valuable intellectual property and
trade secrets has been compromised (or will be shortly), with the great majority of the
victims rarely discovering the intrusion or its impact."); Kellermann, supra note 142
("55% of our customers had to be informed that they had a breach versus actually being
aware themselves.") (emphasis added); Perlroth, supra note 111 (experts say the
majority of cyberattacks go "undisclosed or unnoticed"); Andrea Shalal-Esa, Scores of
U.S. Firms Keep Quiet About Cyber Attacks, REUTERS (June 13, 2012, 3:08 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/13/net-us-media-tech-summit-cyber-disclosuridUSBRE85CIE320120613 (" '[M]any corporations were unaware that their networks
had been breached until FBI agents notified them that they discovered proprietary,
company-specific data outside their networks,' [according to Shawn Henry, the FBI's
'former top cyber cop.'] ") .
452. Shalal-Esa, supra note 451 (" 'There have been lots of breaches in every
industry that have never been publicized,' said Shawn Henry .... .").
453. See Gorman & Tibken, supra note 162 (" 'It would have been better if RSA
was more forthright from the beginning [of their breach]. They unnecessarily damaged
their reputation by holding back,' said [one] Gartner analyst .

. .

. [RSA CEO Art

Coviello] said his company has provided the right amount of information to its
customers. Providing any further information, he said, would give the hackers a
blueprint for how to mount further attacks."); CF Disclosure Guidance, supra note 288
(discussing concerns that detailed corporate cyberincident disclosures could provide a
"roadmap" for adversaries seeking to compromise corporate network security).
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cyberincidents are likely to strike. Similarly, reliable information about
both the tangible and intangible costs associated with cyberincidents is
lacking, not only because corporations are reluctant to report
cyberincidents, but also because of the practical difficulty of measuring
certain costs, including opportunity costs and the costs associated with
reputational harm, loss of consumer confidence, intellectual property loss,
and loss of consumer privacy.4 54 Finally, the effectiveness of mitigation
methods is unknown.
Despite the importance of reliable cyberincident data, a recent survey of
1000 publicly-traded companies revealed that "[fifty-two] percent failed to
report. . . network breaches." 455 Experts believe that many corporations
fail to report cyberincidents, despite reporting obligations under data
breach notification laws and other applicable disclosure rules, such as the
SEC's cybersecurity guidance. One cybersecurity expert points to the
telling example of a publicly traded defense contractor whose IP was
exfiltrated to China as a result of a cyberintrusion. The company decided
not to disclose the intrusion and, as justification for its decision, stated that
the company "only do[es] business with the U.S. government and it doesn't
really matter that the Chinese stole all their IP because the U.S. government
will never buy from China, so it wasn't really material to them."4 5 6 So long
as companies continue to withhold cyberincident data, obtaining reliable
calculations of ROI for cyberdefense spending will remain problematic.
2.

"It Can'tHappen to Me" Mentality

Whether due to lack of cyberincident data or otherwise, some companies
view themselves as immune from cyberthreats. Consider the case of smalland medium-sized businesses ("SMBs"). SMBs are attractive cyber targets
because they traditionally have weaker cyberdefenses than larger
businesses due to resource constraints. 45 7 Attacks on SMBs recently
accelerated, with the number of targeted attacks against SMBs doubling in
the last half of 2012.458 Moreover, companies with 100 or fewer employees
454. See generally ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 139 (discussing the difficulties of
precisely measuring indirect losses from cybercrime, such as loss of consumer
confidence). Estimating cyberespionage costs is also difficult as "there is no reliable
data available." See id. (criticizing a UK report in which "the authors admit the
proportion of IP actually stolen cannot currently ... be measured with any degree of
confidence, so they assign probabilities of loss and multiply by sectoral GDP").
455. Shalal-Esa, supra note 451 (citing 2011 SAIC study).
456. See id.
457. See Sherman, supra note 450 (describing SMBs as "perfect prey" because they
"tend to lack the resources to fully secure their computer systems," yet they also tend to
have "significant amounts of money").
458. Andy Singer, SMBs-the Weakest Link in the Cybercriminal Supply Chain?,
SYMANTEC (July 10, 2012), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/smbs-weakest-
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were the victims in sixty-three percent of data breaches Verizon analyzed
in a 2010 study. 45 9
Despite their vulnerability, some SMBs have failed to take even the most
basic corporate security steps. For example, nearly ninety percent of SMBs
have no formal internet security policy and nearly seventy percent lack
even an informal policy, according to a recent survey jointly conducted by
the National Cyber Security Alliance ("NCSA") and global security
solutions provider Symantec. 46 0 Nearly sixty percent of SMBs do not even
have a backup plan in case of a data breach, notwithstanding the significant
costs associated with such breaches.4 6'
On the whole, the SMBs surveyed by NCSA/Symantec are surprisingly
unconcerned about cybersecurity. According to the survey: (1) over eighty
percent of SMBs are satisfied with the amount of data security they provide
and think they are investing adequate resources in cybersecurity; 462 (2)
seventy-seven percent said that their companies are safe from cyberthreats
including hackers, breaches, viruses, and malware; 4 63 and (3) sixty-six
percent of SMBs are not concerned about an external or internal
cybersecurity threat. 46 Moreover, seventy percent said they have no
employee social media usage policy despite the fact that social media can
leave businesses more vulnerable to phishing and other social-engineering

link-cybercriminal-supply-chain ("[T]here appears to be a direct correlation between a
rise in attacks against small companies and a drop in attacks against larger ones, which
could mean that attackers are diverting resources directly from one group to the other.
Even though larger businesses (2500+ employees) continue to be the primary target for
most targeted attacks . . . the gap between the two is quickly closing.").

459. Sherman, supra note 450.
460. Press Release, Symantec, New Survey Shows U.S. Small Business Owners Not
Concerned About Cybersecurity; Majority Have no Policies or Contingency Plans (Oct.
http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release
at
available
2012),
15,
/article.jsp?prid=20121015_01.
461. Id.; Ponemon Study Shows the Cost of a Data Breach Continues to Increase,

(Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.ponemon.org/news-2/23 (noting that in a study
of forty-five data breach cases, the most expensive data breach cost the affected
company $31 million to resolve; the least expensive cost $750,000, emphasizing that
most of the costs are from legal defense spending).
462. NAT'L CYBERSECURITY ALLIANCE & SYMANTEC, 2012 NATIONAL SMALL
(2012) http://www.staysafeonline.org/download/datasets/4393
STUDY
BUSINESS
/2012_ncsa symantec small business studyfact sheet.pdf.
463. Id.; Small Business Online Security Infographic, STAYSAFEONLINE.ORG,
http://www.staysafeonline.org/stay-safe-online/resources/small-business-onlinesecurity-infographic (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
464. Scott Cornell, SMBs in the U.S. Are Soft on Cybersecurity, FARONICS (Nov. 6,
2012), http://www.faronics.com/2012/smbs-in-the-u-s-are-soft-on-cybersecurity/; Press
Release, Symantec, supra note 460 ("Visa Inc. reports that small businesses represent
more than 90 percent of the payment data breaches reported to the company.").
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based cyberincidents. 4 6 5
This "it can't happen to me" mentality has the potential to lead to
particularly grave consequences in the current environment, where bad
actors are increasingly setting their sights on corporations "low down in the
security supply chain as a stepping-stone, with the expectation that they
will have less robust security features in place than the top-tier defense
4 66
contractors or government agencies they ultimately want to target.'Today's environment necessitates greater awareness of cyberthreats among
SMBs, as well as the companies they supply.
3.

"No CorporationIs An Island": Cybersecurityas a Public Good

According to many experts, another key challenge to achieving optimal
(or even adequate) private sector investment in cyberdefenses is the fact
that cybersecurity is a public good.467 One company's underinvestment in
cyberdefense can redound to the detriment of other companies with whom
they connect. Indeed, "a single compromised system anywhere in a
network can serve as a launching point for attack on other systems
connected to that network." 4 68 Some companies-e.g., SMBs-may be
motivated to invest sufficiently to protect their own assets, but are unlikely
to invest sufficiently to protect the assets of companies with whom they do
business, leading some experts to conclude that "the private sector will not
supply adequate cybersecurity on its own; it's a public good that's missing
as the result of market failure." 4 69 As our interconnectedness grows, the
problem is only exacerbated.
465. NAT'L CYBERSECURITY ALLIANCE & SYMANTEC, supra note 462; Small
Business Online Security Infographic,supra note 463.
466. Ben Weitzenkorn, 'Aurora' Google Hackers Still an Active Threat, Report
Says, TECHNEWSDAILY, (Sept. 10, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.technewsdaily.com
/8090-aurora-google-hackers-active-threat.html; see Singer, supra note 458 ("[W]hile
your business may not be the primary target of an attack, cybercriminals may be using
your organization as a stepping-stone to attack other businesses .

.

. SMBs typically

don't have the resources to maintain a full IT staff, so [they] could be seen as a weaker
link in the supply chain.").
467. Mulligan & Schneider, supra note 448, at 75 ("Cybersecurity is non-rivalrous
and non-excludable; by definition, it is a public good It is non-rivalrous because one
user benefiting from the security of a networked system does not diminish the ability of
any other user to benefit from the security of that system. And it is non-excludable
because users of a secure system cannot be easily excluded from benefits security
brings.") (emphasis in original); see Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the
Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and Other Public Security

Goals 5 (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of L., Working Paper Series, Paper 26, 2005),
available at http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/gmule/art26.
468. Mulligan & Schneider, supra note 448, at 74.
469. David Perera, Lewis: Common Assumptions About Cybersecurity Are Wrong,

(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.fiercegovemmentit.com/story
/lewis-common-assumptions-about-cybersecurity-policy-are-wrong/2011-09-28.
FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT
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Moreover, when companies calculate their optimal level of investment in
cybersecurity, they consider their own risks (e.g., risk of IP loss from an
intrusion and the cost of such loss), but not the broader set of potential
risks, including not only risks to other companies with whom they are
connected, but the potential societal risks to our nation's economic or
national security from successful cyberespionage or cyberattack.
Companies invest in cybersecurity to protect their own assets from
cyberthreats, but their investments are unlikely to account for the potential
harm to our economic or national security in the event of a cyberincident.
Specifically, "[c]ompanies assess the probability that a threat will become
an attack, and if there is an attack, whether they will be held liable. They
weigh the cost of preventive measures against the risk of liability. Almost
all conclude that the liability risk for cyberattack is too low to justify
greater effort. This is a sensible business decision but does not help
national security."470
C.

Failureof Vulnerability Mitigation in the Face ofDetermined
Adversaries

While there are many challenges to effectively mitigating vulnerabilities,
more fundamentally, our nation's focus on cybersecurity through
vulnerability mitigation may be misplaced. It has become apparent from
the trajectory of both cybercrime and cyberespionage losses that even
sophisticated corporate vulnerability mitigation efforts do not thwart the
most concerted adversaries (e.g., nation-state adversaries, terrorists,
sophisticated cybercriminals, and hacktivists). Even organizations with
highly sophisticated cybersecurity programs (e.g., DoD, RSA Security,
Lockheed Martin, and Google) are not immune from successful penetration
by determined adversaries.
Vulnerability mitigation may be failing against determined adversaries
because, when it comes to sophisticated cybersecurity, the offense (i.e.,
threat actor) currently has a substantial advantage over the defense (i.e.,
cyberdefender).4 7 1 Offense is cheaper, more agile,472 better organized,4 73
470. Lewis, supra note 308.
471. Some simple examples demonstrate this point. First, it only takes "a couple
hundred lines of code to ... sneak ... something out of somebody's network," but it
can take "at least a million lines of code to patch [the vulnerability]" and there is "more
area to attack with every patch.

. .

. Everything is in the favor of the attacker." James

E. Cartwright, General (Retired), Address at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Global Security Forum 2012: Fighting a Cyber War (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://csis.org/files/attachments/120411 FightingACyberWar GSF Transcript.pdf.
Moreover, if there are twenty vulnerabilities in a networked information system, the
offense needs to exploit only one to be successful while the defense may need to find
and patch all twenty to successfully keep out a determined adversary. See, e.g., King,
supra note 141 ("The defenders have to be good everywhere; the attacker only has to
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has no boundaries,474 and has no legal obstacles with which to contend.475
When confronted with sophisticated cyberdefenses, determined adversaries
can redouble their efforts to exploit and target vulnerabilities or circumvent
the target's cyberdefenses altogether using relatively unsophisticated social
engineering-based attacks, such as those used to successfully penetrate
RSA Security. 47 6 Additional defensive measures may bring no additional
protection in real terms (i.e., companies still may be vulnerable), so it is not
surprising to learn that companies weighing the cost of additional
cybersecurity measures against the costs of not taking such measures
frequently decide not to act.
For all of these reasons, corporate executives are understandably
skeptical regarding the return on investment from dollars spent on
vulnerability mitigation and have difficulty seeing the business case for
increased cybersecurity resource expenditures. Section VII discusses a
number of ways in which corporations can begin successfully to address
the daunting cybersecurity challenges they face.
VII.
A.

PRIVATE SECTOR OPPORTUNITIES

Pathways to Effective Vulnerability Mitigation

As the U.S. private sector strives to bolster cybersecurity, due
consideration should be given to: (1) basic cyberhygiene to protect against
opportunistic cyberintrusions; (2) improved situational awareness through
be good on one place."). Consider the challenges involved in successfully securing a
complex and interconnected system such as the smartgrid-our nation's next
generation electric grid-or the current electric grid, where security has been "bolted
on" because it was not originally "designed in." Cf MITRE CORP., STANDARDIZING
CYBER THREAT
INFORMATION

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH THE
EXPRESSION
(STIXTM)

STRUCTURED

3

THREAT

(2012),

http://makingsecuritymeasurable.mitre.org/docs/STIX-Whitepaper.pdf
(considering
how "intelligence-driven" computer network defense could potentially challenge the
"conventional wisdom" that offense has an inherent advantage over defense and
discussing potential opportunities to "fundamentally affect the balance of power
between the defender and the adversary").
472. The cyberthreat against which companies are defending is constantly evolving
with the result that "[e]ven big companies with significant IT staffs have difficulty
keeping up with all the changes, updates, modifications, and upgrades necessary to
keep up with the world of criminal hacking." Sherman, supra note 450.
473. SANS INST., AN UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD: THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CYBER
CRIMINAL vs. LAW ENFORCEMENT-AND SOME PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS 3-5 (2002),
http://www.sans.org/readingroom/whitepapers/legal/uneven-playing-field-advantagescyber-criminal-vs-law-enforcement-and-practica_115.
474. Id. at 7.
475. Id.

476. Bright, supra note 86 (calling the attack on RSA "run-of-the-mill" and
explaining that it was not "extremely sophisticated" as originally suggested by RSA).
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threat intelligence; and (3) adoption of cyberinsurance to manage the
consequences of inevitable cyberintrusions.
1.

Cyberhygiene

Many cybersecurity experts believe that basic cyberhygiene is a simple
and logical first step in corporate cybersecurity. 4 77 Estimates suggest that
good cyberhygiene could prevent up to eighty-five percent of cyberintrusions, according to Howard Schmidt, former cybersecurity coordinator
for President Obama.4 78 Rather than waiting for legislative mandates or a
cyberincident to spur corporate cybersecurity spending, corporations would
be wise to consider whether some proactive investments in basic cyberhygiene4 79 are warranted as part of their basic corporate responsibility.4 80
However, some argue that even basic cyberhygiene is expensive, if not
cost-prohibitive, for some companies. A recent study lends some credence
to that claim. Based on interviews with technology managers from 172
U.S. organizations in six industries, the study found that "[t]o be able to
thwart 84 percent of attacks, up from the current 69 percent, respondents
said they would have to almost double their average expenditures on
477. A Brief History of the 20

Critical Security Controls, SANS

INST.,

http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/history.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
("[T]he Commander of the US Cyber Command and Director of NSA announced that
he believed adoption of the 20 Critical Controls was a good foundation for effective
cybersecurity.").
478. See Howard Schmidt, Priceof Inaction Will Be Onerous, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 18,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/10/17/should-industry-face-morecybersecurity-mandates/price-of-inaction-on-cybersecurity-will-be-the-greatest
("It is
estimated that as high as 85% of successful intrusions could have been prevented by
just implementing good 'cyber-hygiene.' "); see also Press Release, Mac Thornberry,
U.S. Representative, Cybersecurity Task Force Releases Recommendations (Oct. 5,
2011),
available
at
http://thornberry.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx
?DocumentlD=263044 ("The consensus among experts is that 85% of current
cyberthreats can be thwarted by current cyber hygiene."). According to the Australian
Department of Defence, "[a]t least 85% of the targeted [cyberintrusions] that the
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) responded to in 2010 could have been prevented by
following the first four mitigation strategies listed in DSD's Top 35 Mitigation
Strategies." Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions, AUSTRALIA DEP'T OF
DEF.-DEF.
SIGNALS
DIRECTORATE,
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec
/top35mitigationstrategies.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the top four
mitigation strategies as: patching applications, such as Java and Microsoft Office;
patching operating system vulnerabilities; minimizing the number of users of with
administrative privileges; and application "whitelisting" which allows users to run only
approved applications).
479. See John Brennan, Cybersecurity Awareness Month Part III, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Oct. 19, 2009, 4:39 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/CybersecurityAwareness-Month-Part-III (providing "tips" for improved cyber hygiene).
480. Ann Goodman, Digital Security: Business's Social Responsibility, ANN

(July 1, 2012), http://anngoodman.com/2012/07/01/digital-securitya-business-social-responsibility/.
GOODMAN'S BLOG
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equipment and practices such as user verification systems, encryption and
workforce training."481

2.

SituationalAwareness Through Threat Intelligence

Improving our nation's cybersecurity requires companies not just to
invest more in cybersecurity, but to invest wisely. Today, many companies
invest their cybersecurity dollars in intrusion detection systems and other
perimeter defense systems designed to detect breaches. Cybersecurity
experts have begun to challenge the "breach prevention" model of
cybersecurity. For example, one expert writes:
[W]e stubbornly adhere to Einstein's definition of insanity: doing the
same thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome. In
this case, that same thing is responding to breaches by investing
disproportionate sums of money in perimeter defenses in a futile attempt
to prevent breaches.
Stop pretending you can prevent a perimeter breach. Accept that it will
happen and build your security strategy accordingly. We need to admit
that we, as an industry, have a problem. Start by asking yourself if your
security philosophy has changed much in the last 10 years. It almost
certainly has not. You're likely to be spending 90% of your security
budget the same way you did back in 2002, which undoubtedly focuses
on perimeter and network defenses. 482
Perimeter defense systems do not tell you who is on your system, so
once an adversary penetrates the network without being detected, 48 3 he may
lurk undetected for years, as was the case with Operation Shady RAT.4 84
Better situational awareness of corporate networks through threat
intelligence is just one example of the ways in which corporations

481. Eric Engleman & Chris Strohm, Cybersecurity Disaster Seen in U.S. Survey

Citing

Spending Gaps, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-3 1/cybersecurity-disaster-seen-in-u-ssurvey-citing-spending-gaps.html.

482. Tsion Gonen, Breach Prevention is Dead Long Live the 'Secure Breach,'
WORLD (Oct. 29, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.networkworld.com
/news/tech/2012/102912-secure-breach-263779.html.
483. Joseph Menn, Hacked Firms Fight Back with Vigilante Justice, GLOBE & MAIL
(June 18, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/technews/hacked-firms-fight-back-with-vigilante-justice/article4321501/
("Consumergrade antivirus you buy from the store does not work too well trying to detect stuff
created by the nation-states with nation-state budgets.").
484. See generally ALPEROVITCH, supra note 96; Larry Greenemeier, No Hacktivism
NETWORK

Here: McAfee Reveals Cyber Espionage That Went Undetectedfor Years, Sd. AM.

(Aug. 3, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2011/08/03/nohactivism-here-mcafee-reveals-cyber-espionage-that-went-undetected-for-years/.
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vulnerable to cyberespionage threats may be able to ramp up their
cyberprotections.
For companies handling sensitive customer information, encryption is
another relatively simple security measure to be considered. 4 85 Online
retailer Zappos recently suffered a breach in which the attacker accessed
customer information, but it is believed that the attackers received
"virtually nothing of value from the theft" because the data was
encrypted.4 86 Some have even noted that the intrusion could "well make
Zappos more secure moving forward, since potential attackers will know
the company represents a poor investment of their time and effort.A 7
3.

Insurance

Cybersecurity is much more than just a technical challenge.
Recognizing that perfect security generally is unattainable, unnecessary,
and cost-prohibitive,4 88 most companies embrace risk management (i.e.,
managing the risk of loss due to cyberincidents) as a central element of
information security.489
The motivating principle behind the risk
management approach to cybersecurity is to invest in security so as to
reduce "expected losses" from attacks.4 90 Such losses may include

485. Effective encryption implementations require, inter alia, successful key
management and robust access controls. See VORMETRIC, DATA PROTECTION FOR
PHYSICAL,

VIRTUAL,

AND

CLOUD

ENVIRONMENTS

1-2

(2012),

http://www.vormetric.com/sites/default/files/sb-physical-virtual-cloud-environmentsdata-protection.pdf.

486. Gonen, supra note 482.
487. Id.
488. Kenneth L. Wainstein & Keith M. Gerver, The Rockefeller Letter and the
Cybersecurity Debate, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.lexology.com
/library/detail.aspx?g-a50eelcO-2931-4550-9aaf-cc8daldfe7cO ("[O]ne recent survey
of 172 U.S. companies found that they would have to boost their cyber spending almost
900% to achieve a level of security that would stop 95% of cyberattacks."); Engleman
& Strohm, supra note 481 ("To achieve an ideal level of security in which 95 percent
of attacks are thwarted, utilities and energy companies surveyed in the Bloomberg
study would have to increase average annual spending more than seven-fold to $344.6
million per company from the current level of $45.8 million.").
489. In fact, critical infrastructure companies participating in a recent Bloomberg
study said that they would need to nearly double their cybersecurity spending to
improve the security of their systems, and even then would "remain vulnerable." Helen
Domenici & Afzal Bari, BGOV Study: The Price of Cybersecurity: Big Investments,
Small
Improvements,
BLOOMBERG
Gov'T
BLOG
(Feb.
1,
2012),
http://about.bgov.com/2012/02/0 1/bgov-study-the-price-of-cybersecurity-biginvestments-small-improvements/; see ALPEROVITCH, supra note 96, at 6 (discussing
how the availability of countermeasures against the bad actor "caused the perpetrator to
adapt and increasingly employ a new set of implant families and [Command &
Control] infrastructure").
490. Mulligan & Schneider, supra note 448, at 6.
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reputational risk; 4 91 potential loss of valuable intellectual property;
regulatory risk (e.g., regulatory penalties imposed for cybersecurity failure
or failure to satisfy data breach notification requirements); and liability for
loss due to negligence (e.g., liability for harm to consumers arising out of
penetration of inadequately secured corporate networks).
Cyberinsurance is an important private sector risk-management tool.
Over the past decade, the insurance industry's response to cyberrisks has
evolved significantly. Initially, many standard policies were worded
broadly enough to cover losses arising out of cybersecurity breaches;
however, insurance companies quickly recognized this and moved to
exclude cyberrisks from their standard coverage. To fill the resulting gap
in coverage, insurers began marketing specialized cyberinsurance
policies.4 92
Cyberinsurance has a number of important benefits. Specifically,
Cyber-insurance increases cyber-security by encouraging the adoption of
best practices. Insurers will require a level of security as a precondition
of coverage, and companies adopting better security practices often
receive lower insurance rates. This helps companies to internalize both
the benefits of good security and the costs of poor security, which in turn
leads to greater investment and improvements in cyber-security. The
security requirements used by cyber-insurers are also helpful. With
widespread take-up of insurance, these requirements become de facto
standards, while still being quick to update as necessary. Since insurers
will be required to pay out cyber-losses, they have a strong interest in
greater security, and their requirements are continually increasing.
Accordingly, a well-functioning cyberinsurance market could help to "align
private incentives with the overall public good.A 94
Despite the potential benefits of cyberinsurance, the industry has been
slow to purchase policies, with only about thirty-five percent of public
companies currently investing in such coverage.495
In some cases,
491. Gorman & Tibken, supra note 162 (noting that despite mitigation measures, a
security breach will still hurt RSA's reputation).
492. Louis Chiafullo & Brett Kahn, Coveragefor Cyber Risks, COVERAGE, ABA

May/June 2011, at 3, 7,
http://www.meagher.com/files/upload /Coverage MayJune2011_Woodworth.pdf.
SECTION ON LITIG., COMMITEE ON INS. COVERAGE LITIG.,

493. WHITE HOUSE, CYBER-INSURANCE METRICS AND IMPACT ON CYBER-SECURITY
1-2,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cyber/ISA%20-%20CyberInsurance%2OMetrics%20and%2OImpact%20on%2OCyber-Security.pdf
494. Walter S. Baer & Andrew Parkinson, Cyberinsurance in IT Security
Management, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 50 (2007), http://www.sis.pitt.edu
/-dtipper/2825/Cln.pdf.
495. See Chubb 2012 Public Company Risk Survey: Cyber-Did You Know?,
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executives may not think that their companies are vulnerable to attack, and,
in other cases, cyberinsurance simply may be cost-prohibitive.496
2013 may be the year of cyberinsurance as executives (1) come to better
understand the threats of cybercrime, cyberespionage, and cyberwar; and
(2) deal with legal and regulatory developments, including the SEC's
game-changing cybersecurity guidance issued in October of 2011.497 This
staff-level guidance not only clarifies that companies must report "material
information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents," but also
provides that "to the extent material, appropriate disclosures may
include ... [d]escription of relevant insurance coverage." 498 The SEC's
staff guidance is expected to spur corporate interest in cyberinsurance,499 as
would the more formal SEC guidance Senator Rockefeller has urged the
SEC to adopt.500
Some foresee a system in which (1) civil liability is imposed for
cybersecurity breaches (possibly with safe harbors or other limitations on
CHUBB GRP. OF INS. Cos., http://www.chubb.com/infographics/chubb3/index.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2013); see also Nicole Perlroth, Insurance Against Cyber Attacks
Expected to Boom, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Dec. 29, 2011, 10:50 AM),

http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/insurance-against-cyber-attacks-expected-toboom/ ("[O]nly a third of companies surveyed by Advisen, a research group, say they
have purchased a cyber insurance policy.").
496. Specialized cybercoverage is expensive for a number of reasons. First,
considerable uncertainty remains about the appropriate pricing of cyberinsurance
policies. While insurers are aware of the risk of very large losses, they lack the
empirical data necessary to construct actuarial tables (in part this is true because
systems-and hence vulnerabilities-change quickly such that "the past is not a good
predictor of the future"). Second, networked information systems are particularly
vulnerable to a major disaster that could result in a large number of claims.
Accordingly, the cost of re-insurance for cyberinsurers is high. Finally, barriers to
entry into the cyberinsurance market reduce competition. One significant barrier to
entry is that a catastrophic event could occur before an insurer has "built up sufficient
cash reserves" to pay out on its policies. CYBER-INSURANCE METRICS AND IMPACT ON
CYBER-SECURITY, supra note 493; Press Release, Eur. Network Info. Sec. Agreement,
ENISA Report Calls for Kick-Start in Cyber Insurance Market (June 29, 2012),
available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/press-releases/enisa-report-calls-forkick-start-for-kick-start-in-cyber-insurance-market ("[To date,] obstacles to the
development of an effective cyber insurance market have included lack of actuarial
data on the extent of the risk and uncertainty about what type of risk should be insured
against.").
497. CF Disclosure Guidance,supra note 288.

498. Id.
499. See Perlroth, supra 495 (reporting an insurance broker's prediction that

cyberinsurance premiums could grow by fifty percent in the twelve to eighteen month

period starting in January 2012).
500. Elizabeth Wasserman, SEC Urged to Give Stronger Guidance on Cyber
Disclosure, BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 10, 2013, 9:57 AM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-1 0/sec-urged-to-give-stronger-guidance-oncyber-disclosure.html.
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cybersecurity liability where industry has made a reasonable effort to
conform to insurer-adopted best practices); (2) private insurers cover
industry losses; and (3) the government offers backstop reinsurance for
cyberinsurers to help reduce the price of cyberinsurance, thereby improving
private sector access to cyberinsurance, and, arguably, leading to improved
cybersecurity. 50
Others have suggested that the federal government use its market power
to promote cyberinsurance by requiring its contractors and subcontractors
to carry cyberinsurance.502 This approach would directly increase demand
for cyberinsurance. Moreover, companies that purchase cyberinsurance to
meet federal contracting requirements presumably would tout their
coverage as a competitive advantage when bidding on private contracts,
thereby putting pressure on their competitors to purchase cyberinsurance.
Accordingly, some argue that this approach would ultimately bring about
improved security, more insured companies, and, potentially, reduced costs
for insurance coverage.503 To the extent that development of an insurance
market leads to improved security, one might view insurance as part of a
holistic vulnerability mitigation strategy, but, at the end of the day,
insurance largely is a form of consequence management-a means by
which companies manage the consequences of cyberintrusions-and will
not, by itself, stop cyberintrusion.
Basic hygiene, improved situational awareness, and maturation of the
cyberinsurance market all contribute to vulnerability mitigation, yet
vulnerability mitigation alone will not solve the U.S. cybersecurity
problem.
B.

Beyond Vulnerability Mitigation

The prevailing approach to cybersecurity in the U.S. has been
vulnerability mitigation, but the rapid emergence of cyberespionage and
cyberattacks as long-term threats to U.S. economic and national security
necessitates a serious reevaluation of the private sector's role in
cybersecurity as well as U.S. cybersecurity policy. Determined adversaries
will find a way to successfully breach even the most sophisticated and
heavily fortified organizations, as demonstrated by the successful attacks
on DoD, RSA, Lockheed Martin, and Google. Simply throwing money at
the cybersecurity problem and attempting to build higher fences around
important corporate networks is not proving itself to be a workable longterm solution for U.S. industry, as the above-mentioned Bloomberg study
501.

CYBER-INSURANCE METRICS AND IMPACT ON CYBER-SECURITY,

493, at 4-5.
502. Id. at 3.

503. Id. at 5.

supra note
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suggests. 504 Nor can corporations afford to rely solely on law enforcement
efforts to track down and bring perpetrators to justice, as law enforcement
is "overwhelmed" by the problem, 0 5 and hindered by a host of
jurisdictional and other issues. 5 0 6
The private sector should give serious consideration to potential options
for threat deterrence. As the private sector shifts from a "perimeter
defense" to a "threat intelligence" model, it simultaneously should explore
the feasibility of "active defense"507 and other innovative approaches to
cybersecurity threats. The spectrum of "active defense"sos ranges from
"modest steps to distract and delay a hacker"50 9 to more controversial
504. Engleman & Strohm, supra note 481.
505. Stewart Baker et al., The Hackback Debate, STEPTOE CYBERBLOG (Nov. 2,
http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-hackback-debate/
2012),
("Cybercrime has cost consumers and banks billions of dollars. Yet few cyberspies or
cybercriminals have been caught and punished. Law enforcement is overwhelmed both
by the number of attacks and by the technical unfamiliarity of the crimes."); Tim
Wilson, Companies Should Think About Hacking Back Legally, Attorney Says, DARK

7:45
AM), http://www.darkreading.com/risk(Nov. 1, 2012,
management/ 167901115/security/security-management/240012675/companies-should("Calling law enforcement
think-about-hacking-back-legally-attorney-says.html
doesn't help-they are simply overwhelmed with other cases."); Ellen Nakashima,
READING

Several Nations Trying to Penetrate US. Cyber-Networks, Says Ex-FBI Official,

PosT (Apr. 18, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0418/world/35451842_1_cyber-private-sector-networks (" 'I know a lot of companies
have suffered, and they are going to want to see somebody come in and assist them,'
said [Shawn] Henry, former executive assistant director of the FBI's Criminal, Cyber,
WASH.

Response and Services Branch. 'It won't be the U.S. government .

. ..

so it's going to

have to be the private sector.' ").
506. SANS INST., supra note 473, at 7-8.
507. The concept of "active defense" stands in contrast to "passive defense" which
relies on firewalls, patches, and anti-virus software. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M.
Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking:Self-Defense and Deterrencein Cyberspace, 25

HARv. J.L. & TECH. 417, 461 (2012) ("Active defenses are a ... category of response
to cyberattacks and enable attacked parties to detect, trace, and then actively respond to
a threat by, for example, interrupting an attack in progress to mitigate damage to the
system.").
508. Id. at 513 (asserting that active defense is not a unitary whole and describing
the different aspects of active defense as "detecting, tracing and [mitigative or
retributive] counterstriking").
509. The military has been interested in "active defense" for years. See, e.g., John
Stanton, Rules of Cyber War Baffle U.S. Government Agencies, NAT'L DEF. MAG. (Feb.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2000/February/Pages
2000),
/Rules4391.aspx ("The Air Force Research Lab ... has in place a number of cyberdefense mechanisms such as false databases made from deception software (available
on the Internet) that create a bogus trail for potential hackers."). A TransAttack-or
forensic analysis-begins once an attack is detected. As described by an Air Force
Research Lab employee, "While the attack is happening we gather the evidence: Who
is doing this? Where are they?" Id. Today, private sector security companies offer
"active defense" approaches, including deception, to their clients. Liam Tung,
CrowdStrike Boss Explains Offensive Security in TargetedAttacks, CSO (Aug. 9, 2012,
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measures,5 10 the legality of some of which may be unclear under today's
laws. Some examples of active defense include:
First, installing honeypots, fake networks and fake documents to slow the
attackers down, leave them confused, and perhaps provide the defenders
an early warning that the outer walls have been breached. Second,
building 'beacons' into your documents, so when they're stolen and
opened by the attackers, the documents phone home, telling you not only
that you've been compromised, but [also] maybe something about the guys
who did it."
Finally, the private sector should consider how to change the .com
cybersecurity debate in Washington, which has long-focused on
vulnerability mitigation. For political and other reasons, today's debate
remains focused on information sharing and voluntary standards, which,
according to some experts, may be helpful only "in the margins."
The
11:44
AM),
http://www.cso.com.au/article/433128/crowdstrike bossexplains_
offensive securitytargeted attacks/ ("[Companies are increasingly demanding]
deception, denial, disruption. They're moving more into the government mindset of
deception. [Imagine, hypothetically, that] somebody breaks in and steals the plans [for
Norththrop Grumman's B-2 Stealth Bomber.] [B]ut if the plans are wrong and the
thing doesn't fly, think about the cost of that [to the adversary].").
510. "Hackback" is at the more aggressive end of the "active defense" spectrum, and
an animated debate is raging among the cyber-elite over its legality as well as its
advisability as a matter of policy. See Stewart Baker, RATs and Poison: Can
Cyberespionage Victims Counterhack?, SKATING ON STILTS (Oct. 13, 2012),
http://www.skatingonstilts.com/skating-on-stilts/2012/10/us-law-keeps-victims-fromcounterhacking-intruders.html (making a policy case for counterhacking); Stewart
Baker, RATs and Poison II -

The Legal Case for Counterhacking, VOLOKH

CONSPIRACY (Oct. 14, 2012, 2:51 pm), http://www.volokh.com/2012/10/14/rats-andfor
(making
the
legal
case
poison-ii-the-legal-case-for-counterhacking/
counterhacking); Baker et al., supra note 505 (debating on legal and policy grounds the
following questions: "Can the victims of hacking take more action to protect
themselves? Can they hack back and mete out their own justice?"); see also Patrick
Lin, 'Stand Your Cyberground' Law: A Novel Proposalfor Digital Security, THE

(Apr. 30, 2012, 12:59 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2012/04/stand-your-cyberground-law-a-novel-proposal-for-digitalATLANTIC

security/256532/; Taylor Armerding, Should Best Cybercrime Defense Include Some
Offense?,
NETWORK
WORLD
(June
20,
2012,
7:50
AM),

http://www.networkworld.com/research/2012/061912-should-best-cybercrime-defenseinclude-260345.html; Wilson, supra note 505 ("Hacking back should never be a
company's first response, but in the case of a persistent attacker, it might be the only
answer. 'You might be spending $50,000 to $100,000 a week to battle a persistent
threat' [attorney David Willson] says. 'You've tried all of the traditional
approaches.' ").

511. Stewart Baker, Taking the Offense to Defend Networks, STEPTOE CYBERBLOG
(June 19, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/06/19/taking-the-offense-todefend-networks/; see Wilson, supranote 505.
512. Ellen Nakashima, Cybersecurity Should Be More Active, Official Says, WASH.

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0916,
2012),
(Sept.
(quoting
Steven
16/world/35494752_1_top-cyber-private-sector-crowdstrike
Chabinsky, former Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI's Cyber Division and current
POST
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private sector should urge Congress to broaden the debate to include
consideration of the private sector's potentially game-changing role in
threat deterrence. The private sector should urge Congress to remove
barriers to private sector efforts to develop innovative approaches to threat
deterrence. The private sector simultaneously should urge the government
to bring all elements of national power-including economic,513
diplomatic, 514 and military5 '5-to bear to deter would-be threat actors.

Senior Vice President of Legal Affairs and Chief Risk Officer at CrowdStrike).
513. On the economic front, the private sector could, for example, press for greater
domestic legal protections from the threat of economic espionage, potentially including
penalties for those Chinese companies benefitting from industrial espionage. This
would be a natural extension of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission recommendations that Congress "conduct a review of existing legal
penalties for companies found to engage in, or benefit from, industrial espionage."
U.S.-CHINA EcoN. & SEC. REv. COMM'N, supra note 186, at 188; see Gerald O'Hara,
Comment, Cyber-Espionage: A Growing Threat to the American Economy, 19

COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 241, 244 (2010) (discussing the Economic Espionage Act and
concluding that "current law is inadequate to deal with the cybertheft of corporate trade
secrets"). Others have suggested that the United States use the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") approval process for leverage. See Stewart
Baker, More on Cybersecurity and Attribution: Si Chuan University and Tencent,
STEPTOE CYBERBLOG (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/12/05

CFIUS is the
/more-on-cybersecurity-and-attribution-si-chuan-university-and-tecent/.
"inter-agency committee authorized to review transactions that could result in control
of a U.S. business by a foreign person .

.

. in order to determine the effect of such

transactions on the national security of the United States." See Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS. RES. CTR.,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-ForeignInvestment-in-US.aspx (last updated Dec. 20, 2012, 1:37 PM).
514. The administration recently stepped up efforts to address the threat of Chinese
cyberespionage through diplomatic channels, beginning with National Security Advisor
Tom Donilon's speech at the Asia Society. Donilon, supra note 213 ("Specifically
with respect to the issue of cyber-enabled theft, we seek three things from the Chinese
side. First, we need a recognition of the urgency and scope of this problem and the risk
it poses-to international trade, to the reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall
relations. Second, Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a stop to
these activities. Finally, we need China to engage with us in a constructive direct
dialogue to establish acceptable norms of behavior in cyberspace . . . ."). See also infra
Section IV.B.5. However, much work remains to be done. On the diplomatic front, the
United States can act through a variety of channels, potentially including the WTO, to
penalize companies that benefit from industrial espionage and to "discourage foreign
countries from enabling or tolerating cyberespionage." O'Hara, supra note 513, at 274
("[T]he President should instruct the United States Trade Representative to engage
strategic allies to coauthor a resolution decrying the use of cyber attacks to
misappropriate proprietary economic information. There are many countries in both
the developed and developing blocs that have much to lose through cyber-espionage
attacks, and using the WTO as a vehicle to navigate change on intellectual property
protection has been successful in the past.").
515. The United States needs to continue to develop its military strategy for
deterring cyberattacks. General Alexander's public testimony on March 12, 2013
clearly plays into such a strategy by identifying the capabilities CyberCom is
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With these actions, it is hoped that the fiddlers on the roof will "[keep
their] balance... for many, many years"sl to come.

developing and how they are to be used. Specifically General Alexander told Congress
that he is developing "an offensive team that the Defense Department would use to
defend the nation if it were attacked in cyberspace" and that "[t]hirteen of the teams
that [the Pentagon is] creating are for that mission alone." Mazzetti & Sanger, supra
note 223; Richard Lardner, Pentagon Forming Cyber Team to Prevent Attacks,

PHYS.ORG
(March
12,
2013),
http://phys.org/news/2013-03-deters-majorcyberattacks.html#jCp ("Alexander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that
foreign leaders are deterred from launching cyberattacks on the United States because
they know such a strike could be traced to its source and would generate a robust
response."). Alexander's comments certainly appear to have been designed to serve a
deterrence function. See generally Jack Goldsmith, The Significance of Panetta's
Cyber Speech and the PersistentDifficulty of Deterring Cyberattacks, LAWFARE (Oct.

15, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/10/the-significance-ofpanettas-cyber-speech-and-the-persistent-difficulty-of-deterring-cyberattacks/
(discussing then-Defense Secretary Panetta's speech and suggesting that "the speech's
real significance . . . concerns DOD's evolving deterrence posture .

. .

. Panetta had

two main messages related to deterrence. [First,] '[p]otential aggressors should be
aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and to hold them
accountable for their actions that may try to harm America.'

Second, . . . he makes

plain that the DOD has the capabilities and desire to engage in a preemptive attack[]
against imminent cyber threats.") (emphasis in original). See Charles L. Glaser,
Deterrence of Cyber Attacks and U.S. National Security, GEO. WASH. UNIV. CYBER

http://www.cspri.seas.gwu.edu
RES. INST. 6 (2011)
SECURITY POL'Y AND
/Seminar/o2OAbstracts%20and%2OPapers/2011-5%20Cyber/o20Deterrence%20and
%20Security%20Glaser.pdf ("Deterring cyber attacks may not be as difficult as the
emerging conventional wisdom suggests. . . . To support its deterrence policy, the

United States needs a clear declaratory policy that lays out its plans for responding to
various types of attacks.").
516. FIDDLER ON THE ROOF, supra note 1.

